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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ELECTORAL RULES AND ELITE RECRUITMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF THE BUNDESTAG AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
by
Murat Altuglu
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor Tatiana Kostadinova, Major Professor
In this research, I analyze the effects of candidate nomination rules and campaign
financing rules on elite recruitment into the national legislatures of Germany and the
United States. This dissertation is both theory-driven and constitutes exploratory
research, too. While the effects of electoral rules are frequently studied in political
science, the emphasis is thereby on electoral rules that are set post-election. My focus, in
contrast, is on electoral rules that have an effect prior to the election. Furthermore, my
dissertation is comparative by design.
The research question is twofold. Do electoral rules have an effect on elite recruitment,
and does it matter? To answer these question, I create a large-N original data set, in
which I code the behavior and recruitment paths and patterns of members of the
American House of Representatives and the German Bundestag. Furthermore, I include
interviews with members of the said two national legislatures. Both the statistical
analyses and the interviews provide affirmative evidence for my working hypothesis that
differences in electoral rules lead to a different type of elite recruitment. To that end, I
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use the active-politician concept, through which I dichotomously distinguish the
economic behavior of politicians.
Thanks to the exploratory nature of my research, I also discover the phenomenon of
differential valence of local and state political office for entrance into national office in
comparative perspective. By statistically identifying this hitherto unknown paradox, as
well as evidencing the effects of electoral rules, I show that besides ideology and culture,
institutional rules are key in shaping the ruling elite. The way institutional rules are set
up, in particular electoral rules, does not only affect how the electorate will vote and how
seats will be distributed, but it will also affect what type of people will end up in elected
office.
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CHAPTER 1 – INSTITUTIONAL RULES AND ELITE RECRUITMENT

Problem Statement
In this chapter, I outline a theoretical framework and a research design for this study,
which I detail in the following chapters. Theoretically tying together this research is
Zaller’s (1998) hypothesis that different electoral rules attract “naturally…a certain type
of politician” (Ansolbahere 2005) and in extenso Rahat and Hazan, who hypothesize that
“the behavior of individual politicians must be affected by the nature of the selection
method” (Rahat and Hazan 2001: 297).1

To that end I begin by discussing the relevance and interconnectedness of electoral rules,
legislators, and legislatures. Thereby, I provide the theoretical foundation for my
hypotheses. I follow this discussion by connecting the research problem at hand with
theories on democratic quality. After outlining the two hypotheses, I discuss the two key
factors of candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules in determining
democratic quality. Next, I argue for the present case selection of Germany and the
United States and provide a preview of alternative explanations. Following this I assess
the relevance of the study and outline its contributions. Finally, I provide the tentative
research design and a brief conceptualization and operationalization of this research.

1

This theoretical framework is an economical one, based on the role of “incentives and their
consequences” and “goals and their desirability” (Sowell 2011: 75).

1

Research Problem, Conceptual Terminology, and State of Current Research
In this section, I discuss the basic principles relevant to the research problem of
institutional rules’ effect on elite recruitment. I base this discussion on current political
science research. The first issue to be analyzed therefore is if and why elected office is
important in the first place. Consequently, it can be understood why it matters to research
how elected offices are filled. The second issue analyzed is that of democratic quality, for
the purpose of establishing why national legislatures are important for the quality of
democracy. In the third step, I analyze why a particular composition of a national
legislature is important in and of itself. This I follow up with an analysis of institutional
rules’ effect on the composition of a national legislature. I conclude this section with a
discussion that introduces the basic conceptual terminology of active-politician and
passive-politician,2 and the hypotheses that is based on them.

The Importance of Elected Office
An essential requirement in a representative democracy is that each citizen has the right
to run for office (see below) and to allow the peoples’ will to become the law of the land.
Institutional guidelines to do so, however, change the probability for a citizen to; a) run in
elections, and b) to be elected. The basic requisite for representation, posited by Max
Weber, is that the representative ascribes his acts “to a group” rather than himself (Pitkin
1967: 51). The importance of electoral rules is that they function as transmission belts
between the “political elites and the social structure” (Putnam 1976: 21), i.e. the people.
2

The active-politicians and passive-politician concepts are treated as discrete variables in this study for
argument’s sake. In reality, active-politicians and passive-politicians constitute a continuum.

2

Joseph Schumpeter, calls this the “classical doctrine of democracy” and defines it as
follows:
“It will be more convenient to reserve only the most important decisions
for the individual citizen to pronounce upon – say by referendum – and to
deal with the rest through a committee appointed by them – an assembly
or parliament whose members will be elected by popular vote”
(Schumpeter 2008: 250-251).

Such institutional framing gas consequences, since in the end the legislative power will
be entrusted into the hands of those people who are able to successfully master the
different institutional challenges for a seat in the United States Congress or the German
Bundestag. Different characters, different types of personae can deal better under one or
the other system. Each country has its own peculiar mode of electing legislators. Indeed,
some countries use different sets of electoral rules at the same time. In connection with
the peculiar culture and ideology3, each political system will then provide different
challenges, incentives and disincentives to politicians. On the basis of these, different
personality types will find it easier or harder to succeed in politics. The characteristic
composition of the highest legislature will differ in the end, since one or the other
personality type will be more likely to succeed under the peculiar institutional rules.

3

One could also use the term “political culture.”
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It matters, however, what sort of people prevail in politics, since “behavior is shaped
by…ideas” (Pitkin 1967: 1).4 Different electoral systems pose different challenges and
incentives to potential politicians. If consequently different characters are attracted to
politics, and different strata of society prevail in politics, then the institutional framework
must exert a selective function on representation.5 Since representation is inherently
related to democracy (Pitkin 1967: 2), institutional rules acquire, intentionally or
unintentionally, a determinative character on who prevails in politics and who does not.6

The small Hellenic poleis could function without institutional guidelines for elections and
politicians’ selections. Back then, direct democracy was used. But now, the large Western
democracies use indirect means of democracy, the representative democracy. This change
in the modus operandi of democratic rule had profound effects on the people, i.e. the
electorate, and the politicians, i.e. legislators, as well as the relationship between these
two groups. Erich From described this in the following way:
“In the early days of democracy there were various kinds of arrangements
in which the individual would concretely and actively participate in voting
4

Paralleling Pitkin’s claim, Walter Lippmann states that “from the existence of differing economic
situations you can tentatively infer a probable difference of opinions, but you cannot infer what those
opinions will necessarily be” (Lippmann 1997: 117).
5

Theoretically, this aspect is discussed as a “property–disposition relationship” phenomenon. The
argument is that a relationship exists between “some characteristic of quality of a person (property) and a
corresponding attitude or inclination (disposition)” of a person (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000:
115). One example would be the level of political tolerance or ethics of politicians as a “categoric group”
(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 2000: 119). E.g., depending on social class status, a person’s
predisposition to tolerance, risk-taking, or corruption, to give some examples, may vary. For the purpose of
my study, it can be said if institutional rules lead to variation in certain “properties,” then this means
national legislatures will have different “dispositions.”

6

“Institutional rules determine who winners and losers are” and that is why it is important to understand
how they function and what their effects are, especially for politicians (Bowler et al. 2006: 434)

4

for a certain decision or for a certain candidate for office. The questions to
be decided were familiar to him, as were the candidates the act of voting,
often done in a meeting of the whole population of a town, had a quality of
concreteness in which the individual really counted. Today the voter is
confronted by mammoth parties which are just as distant and as
impressive as the mammoth organizations of industry. The issues are
complicated and made still more so by all sorts of methods to befog them.
The voter may see something of his candidate around election time; but
since the days of the radio, he is not likely to see him so often, thus losing
one of the last means of sizing up ‘his’ candidate. Actually he is offered a
choice between two or three candidates by the party machines; but these
candidates are not of ‘his’ choosing, he and they know little of each other,
and their relationship is as abstract as most other relationships have
become” (Fromm 1994: 128-129).

The reliance upon representative democracy rather than direct democracy necessitates an
elected elite of politicians operating within an institution. On the basis of this institutional
blueprint, a multiplicity of different democratic political systems evolved. These systems
can be broadly classified according to their mode of election: proportional and
majoritarian. Yet other ways to classify democratic systems may be more refined and
more informative. One point of view therefore is presented in this study, which focuses
on the pre-electoral stage of democracies. A new and fresh perspective is gained by
looking at democratic processes through the prisms of campaign financing and candidate
nomination rules.

5

In this context, the task of political scientists is to compare and contrast the different
political systems to ascertain their idiosyncrasies, and, establish possible patterns that can
be used for generalizations.7 The national legislature, the highest lawgiving body in a
political system, as well as being the source for the executive in many countries, logically
comes out as the prime object of interest for the study of democratic quality. If then
institutional rules have a significant and determinative influence on elite recruitment into
a national legislature, this finding would have far-reaching consequences. This study
speaks then directly to debates about democratic quality.

The Importance of Personality
The idea that personality matters, i.e. that the individual faculties of a politician in power
do matter, is not merely a theoretical issue. The idea has practical real-life effects.
Especially in politics, where a person’s socialization, life experience, education, and
erudition inform his decisions (which have a real-life effect on the governed people), it
matters what type of person comes into a position of power. A dichotomous approach to
this problem comes naturally, by distinguishing between those people who have a certain
quality and those who lack it.

H.L. Mencken, for example, referring to a study by Havelock Ellis, arrives at the
conclusion that “first-rate men” are not skilled “at manual and mental tricks.” Mencken
contrasts the “familiar incompetency of admittedly first-rate men for what we call
7

Science means generalizations. Without generalizing statements that link separate observations together,
no explanation and thus no science is possible (Meehan 1965: 43).
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practical concerns” with the “mental inferiority” of those successful in practical life
(Mencken 1949: 24). Even more pertinent to the political elite recruitment is another
analysis of Mencken. Mencken says that “the Presidency is now closed to the kind of
character that he8 had so abundantly.” Calling Grover Cleveland the “last of the
Romans,” Mencken observes a change in the political recruitment process. These new
types of politicians who make it in politics, prevail due to them being “more politic and
pliant men.” “They get it by yielding prudently, by changing their minds at the right
instant, [and] by keeping silent when speech is dangerous. Frankness and courage are
luxuries confined to the more comic varieties of runners-up at national conventions”
(Mencken 1949: 229).

The issue of what types of personalities are in a position of political power is also
discussed by Robert Bork. Referring to Karl Mannheim, three “principles for the
selection of elites” are identified. These are “blood, property, and achievement.” While
blood (i.e. pedigree) was the principle in aristocratic societies, property the principle in
bourgeoisie societies, the last principle of achievement9 is that of elite selection in
modern democracies, with the addendum that “blood” has returned as a factor in elite
recruitment (Bork 2003: 73). Bork clarifies this “blood” factor by pointing to “race,
ethnicity, and sex as analogues of the blood principle” (Bork 2003: 73). Thus again, a
dichotomous categorization of elite recruitment is given.

8

Mencken is referring to Grover Cleveland.

9

Achievement being brought into operation in economic terms.

7

In the work of Walter Lippmann, the requirement is found that if “the citizens of a state
are to judge and distribute offices according to merit, then they must know each other’s
characters; where they do not possess this knowledge, both the election to offices and the
decision of lawsuits will go wrong.” On the basis of such knowledge, the people would
then be able to decide who is “most fit to govern” (Lippmann 1997: 164). Yet again, a
difference of opinion exists who is most fit to govern. Lippmann cites as an example on
the one hand Thomas Jefferson, who “thought the political faculties were deposited by
God in farmers and planters,” while Alexander Hamilton, on the other hand, advocated
for “landholders, merchants, and men of learned professions” as the ideal for a
representative political body (Lippmann 1997: 163-164). While there are, consequently,
differences in opinion what types of personalities should have political power,
nonetheless there is accord in the understanding that it matters who is ruling.

The Study of Democratic Quality – Institutions and Elite Recruitment
Some of the existing studies on democratic quality focus on legislative behavior, some
look at elite recruitment and candidates’ sociological background, and others on
institutional guidelines (see Figure 1.1). All this work exposes the intricate mechanisms
of a representative democracy, which “formalizes and institutionalizes public influence
over rulers” (Roberts 2010: 5). Democratic quality is the umbrella term for such an
approach. Many different avenues have been pursued by political scientists to ascertain
the effects of democratic political systems on the quality of democracy (see Table 1.1).

8

Table 1.1. Existing standards for assessing democratic quality – Extension of Roberts’s categorization.
Listed are the indicators used by different political scientists.
Altman and
Diamond and
Lijphart (1999) O’Donnell
Putnam et al.
Roberts
Perez Linan
Morlino (2005)
(2004)
(1994)
(2010)
(2002)
Effective civil Rule of law
Policy process
Electoral
Democracy
Elections
rights
Policy
Participation
accountability
Women’s
Government
Effective
pronouncemen Mandate
Competition
representation Legal System
participation Vertical
ts
responsivenes
Political
State and
Effective
Policy
accountability
s
equality
government
competition
implementatio Policy
Horizontal
Electoral
Courts
n
accountability
responsivenes
participation
State
Freedom
s
Satisfaction
institutions
Equality
with
Social context
Human
Responsivenes democracy
development
s
Government‐
voter proximity Human rights
Corruption
Popular cabinet
support
Kinder and
gentler
qualities

Research on democratic quality subjects any possible realm of a political system to
scrutiny. As Figure 1.2 shows, such research was an active area of interest for American
political scientists in the 2000s. One realm of politicians’ activity is of key relevance: the
national legislative body in a democratic system, due to the simple fact that every aspect
of the political system and political life is determined by its decisions. Consequently, the
study of legislatures is an important task for political scientist.

9

Figure 1.2. Prevalence of democratic quality in American political science research

Note: Bars represent frequency (in numbers) of the usage of the terms “Quality of Democracy” and
“Democratic Quality” in APSA and MPSA conference-paper abstracts.

Such research would remain, however, quite incomplete without combining the
institutionalist analyses with a focus on politicians’ background and behavior. This
approach would allow one to gauge the influence of elites on democratic quality.
Furthermore, it has to be understood that the different criteria for democratic quality
exhibited in Table 1.1 are the aggregate outcomes of individual politicians’ actions. This
means that things measured as indicators of democratic quality are, to paraphrase Sartori,
very far up on the ladder of abstraction. Terms like “effective participation,” “freedom,”
“satisfaction with democracy,” are not only highly abstract within a political system, but
even more so in comparative perspective.

Elite recruitment, which is surprisingly missing in Table 1.1, however, is something
much farther “down” on the ladder of abstraction. The “quality,” or rather the type, of the
recruited elite is much more accessible and tangible than the other, at times quite
ambiguous, indicators listed in Table 1.1. One can precisely analyze what type of people
get into politics on the basis of what incentives are available, i.e. what institutional rules
are in effect. Consequently, statistical measures of the recruited elite are precise, too. Yet
elite recruitment does not merely deserve scrutiny for its hermeneutical precision alone.

10

Elite recruitment in and of itself is significant. To gauge the democratic quality of a
political system, the understanding of who rules and why they rule is much more
important than most indicators listed in Figure 1.1, which are epiphenomena of the
recruited elite. All the things described in Table 1.1 take place after elite recruitment
happens. The political elite, constituted among others on the basis of the existing
candidate nomination and campaign financing rules, causes the phenomena listed in the
table. This is why they are epiphenomena. It is thus surprising that the many
epiphenomena received so much attention in political science, but one of the key
phenomena therefore, the rules analyzed here, did not receive such attention.

Thus macro-level institutionalist analyses dominate the study of democratic quality.
Lijphart’s work (also listed in Figure 1.1), is such a macro-level study. Lijphart (1999)
asks the simple question whether the institutional form of democracy matters. He argues
that a specific arrangement of institutions (majoritarian vs. consensus systems) leads to
different forms of democracy, ergo to different democratic quality. Lijphart shows that
institutions arranged in a consensus system can provide a “kinder, gentler” democracy
and still be effective. The present study parallels this axiomatic logic of Lijphart that the
institutional design – here, the electoral rules – matters for the type of democracy. The
difference, however, is that first, Lijphart’s dependent variables are highly removed from
the independent variables, meaning that there is no immediate logical connection between

11

the cause and the effect. Second, the dependent variables in and of themselves are highly
abstract and loose, especially in comparative perspective.10

Institutional designs of representative democratic systems are analyzed by many different
means. Rational choice is used to understand institutions’ influence on the legislative
process (Tsebelis 2002), the effects of pre- and post-election influence of the citizenry on
policymaking (Powell 2000), the effects of electoral institutions on voting behavior (Cox
1997), the effect of veto power on law-making (Cameron 2000), legislative institutions’
utility to incumbents (Fenno 1973, Mayhew 1974), and the effects of candidate quality on
legislative composition (Schlesinger 1966, Rohde 1979).

The reasoning behind the use of institutional parameters as an explanation of legislatures
and legislative behavior is quite broad. Many different pathways have been explored in
the literature: the influence of constitutional review on legislative behavior (Vanberg
2001), electoral laws on responsiveness (Bawn and Thies 2003), veto-players on
coalitions’ policy agenda (Martin 2004), committees on coalitions (Kim and Loewenberg
2005), and even the influence of electoral rules via rural inequality on electoral fraud
(Ziblatt 2009).

10

For example, what might be corruption and political equality (some of the dependent variables) in one
system is not necessarily seen as corruption or political equality in another political system. Additionally, in
the coding process, much ambiguity is added. What the coder might decide to code as corruption, might
have been coded as no corruption by another person. (See hard data/ soft data discussion below). Thus,
there is a methodological difference between Lijphart’s approach and mine.

12

A particular line of institutionalist research that is of interest to the present study
established that electoral rules play an important role in shaping the future of a legislature
(Duverger 1972, Shugart and Carey 1992, Mainwaring 1997). These works showed that
the institutional form of democracy matters in the realm of electoral rules. Yet the
connection of these insights to elite recruitment remains feeble. What is missing is a
large-N comparative statistical test on the influence of electoral rules on political
recruitment and in extenso on democratic quality.

Legislatures’ Composition
Political scientists and theorists have produced different perspectives on how a legislative
body should be composed to fulfill the requirements of democratic quality. It is argued
that democratic representation requires a composition that “corresponds accurately to that
of the whole nation,” that parliament is an “accurate reflection.” This perspective is
shared, among others, by John Adams and Edmund Burke (Pitkin 1967: 60-61). The
understanding of “accurate reflection,” is mostly expressed by the term descriptive
representation, as introduced by Hanna Pitkin.

Edmund Burke’s distinction between delegate and trustee type of representation remains
as the most insightful distinction of representation (Kramnick 1999). Simply put, it
distinguishes between delegates who act in the legislature in accordance to the wishes of
those whom they represent, and trustees who have the autonomy to act in accordance to
their own conscience. Common to all theorization on representation is that citizens

13

should feel represented (Pitkin 1967: 9). Otherwise, alienation from politics and
frustration with democracy is a likely consequence.

Thus the composition of a legislature is relevant for the quality of democracy, not merely
by its party-political composition, but also by the kinds of individuals who occupy
legislative seats. Legislators’ perception of mandate is one aspect of their characteristics.
Learning more about their personality traits, one will be able to see what sorts of
individuals are attracted to politics and win access to power at the highest levels. Since de
jure national legislatures are the most influential political institutions in democratic
systems, the problem of their composition is of vital importance. Can it be assumed that
irrespective of the individualistic composition of such legislative bodies, the same
performance could be delivered? The argument made henceforth is that individuals
matter, in that individuals have different Weltanschauungen, i.e. different life
experiences, and thus a different outlook on life. This informs and shapes how legislators
interact with each other, deal with the demos, and view political issues. In short, the
individuals shape the “corporate climate” of a legislature. Political culture and values,
traditions and political history (Putnam 1993), are some of the factors that influence and
shape the Weltanschauung of individuals. It is therefore not enough to perceive
representation as a function of democracy, and consequently focus on what type of
representation exists. One has to look at the individual representatives, who are not
automata but have unique personae.

14

Therefore, the objective should not only be to establish what kind of representation exists
and, which one is normatively superior, but the how and why – what are the causes and
ramifications of different electoral rules on democratic quality? This is another
contribution of this research. In the next section, I deepen the discussion on why
legislative representativeness and composition are important for democratic quality.

Institutional Rules and their Effect on Elite Recruitment
There is an abundance of political science theory and research on particular institutional
rules, particularly electoral rules, and their effect on legislatures, the legislative process,
and legislators. My research can be categorized among these works. In this section, I will
review this class of research upon which I draw to formulate hypotheses. I start with Beth
Rosenson (2006), who connects ethics laws (institutional rule) and legislative
recruitment, in particular the composition of state legislatures (elite recruitment).11 Thus a
logic prevails which is very similar to that of my research. In the case of Taagepera’s
work, institutional rules are again researched in their function as independent variables.
Taagepera’s focus is thereby on the effects of electoral rules. Indeed, a statement such as
“elections are one way to determine who the leaders will be” (Taagepera 2007: 1), would
fit right into my research. On a closer look, however, there are significant differences.

On one hand, my focus is on the individual politician. The political personality and its
reliance on the institutional setting are at the forefront. Taagepera’s work, on the other

11

I have more detail on Rosenson’s work in Chapter Two.
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hand, is embedded within the copiously studied (Taagepera 2007: 8) area of electoral
systems and their effect on vote and seat distributions, as well as party sizes. Thus the
dependent variables are organizational entities and even more abstract effects such as
democratic quality (Taagepera 2007: 13). Similarly, the independent variables of
Taagepera’s work are the, again, popularly researched aspects of seat allocation formulas
and district magnitude (Taagepera 2007: 23, 28). My focus is, in contrast, on the
individual and the electoral rules that have an effect prior to the election.

A simpler logic is pursued by Powell and Vanberg (2000), where the well-known link
between the type of electoral threshold and the quality of representation is examined.
Their research attempts to find out to what extent the (artificial) median voter is
represented (Powell and Vanberg 2000: 406-407). Although their claim that single
member district (SMD) systems are worse in comparison to proportional representation
(PR) systems in achieving “good correspondence between citizen and legislative
medians” (Powell and Vanberg 2000: 402) is questionable, the inherent logic that rules
have a measurable effect is upheld. In Chapter 2, I provide a more extensive discussion of
the research on institutional rules and elite recruitment.

The work of F.A. Hayek provides a generic theory for effects of rules on behavior. The
first principle derived from Hayek is that a constant impetus by governmental regulation
onto the people “produces…a psychological change, an alteration in the character of the
people. This is necessarily a slow affair, a process which extends not over a few years but
perhaps over one or two generations” (Hayek 2007: 48). From Hayek’s theorem, I can
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derive that institutional rules, such as candidate nomination rules and campaign financing
rules, will have an effect on the people over time.

Besides this generic proposition that rules influence people, another theorem can be
inferred from Hayek’s work, namely that rules influence elite recruitment, i.e. what type
of political personality is affected by rules. Quoting de Tocqueville, Hayek writes: “It
covers the surface of society with a network of small complicated rules…through which
the most original minds and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate to rise above
the crowd. The will of men is not shattered but softened, bent, and guided” (Hayek 2007:
49). From this observation I can derive the notion that certain institutional rules will be
favorable to certain personality types. In Chapter 2, I will expand this generic statement
into the active-politician/ passive-politician model. The operational definition for
institutional rules and their assumed effect I base on Sowell’s economic definition of the
role of prices. Paraphrasing him, I state that the “primary role [of institutional rules] is to
provide incentives to affect behavior in the use of producers and their resulting products.
[Institutional rules] not only guide consumers, they guide producers as well” (Sowell
2011: 15).

Theories of Democratic Quality and Representative Institutions
The goal of the present study is to fill in the gap in research pertaining to how
institutional rules, particularly candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules,
influence elite recruitment into national politics. The starting point is the understanding
that electoral laws affect democratic quality. Specifically, the argument advanced here is
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that institutional pathways for candidate nomination and campaign financing lead to
“artificial selection” (Darwin 1859). By enabling and attracting different types of
individuals to a political career, distinct institutional arrangements lead – by default and
unintentionally – to legislative representation by different groups. I thereby extend the
argument that electoral laws have a “mechanical effect” as well as constituting a
“psychological factor” (Duverger 1972, Riker 1982), and focus onto the pre-electoral
nomination and campaign financing phases. They have a mechanical effect by increasing
the likelihood for a certain type of politician12 to succeed in a democratic system. The
psychological factor expresses itself by discouraging potential politicians from entering
the playing field in the first place.

This line of institutionalist reasoning is common in political science. As mentioned with
Duverger, the idea that “there is indeed some demonstrable relation between electoral
forms and the structure of party systems” (Riker 1982: 755) has been in the focus of
political science for many decades. My contribution is to extend this logic into the underresearched area of political recruitment. If institutions affect voters, parties, etc., it is
reasonable to assume that they affect politicians, and their entrance into politics, as well.

As a result of the distinct selection processes, it can be expected that different types of
personalities will succeed. Thereby, the composition of the legislatures shows a different
reflection of society, which may have consequences for the quality of democracy.

12

Variation being in social background, status, education, wealth, character, etc.
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Moreover, drawing upon Inglehart (1990), values and behavior may also be related to
educational, sociological, and vocational class. If one institutional framework tends to
channel a certain group into the highest echelons of power while making politics
unattractive to other segments of society, the democratic quality of a political system will
be skewed into one or the other direction. Therefore, it is important to establish where
and to what extent such biases in legislative representation may occur that could impair
the democratic principle of representation of equal chances to all (Pitkin 1967).

Theories of democratic quality require that an electoral system be designed to guarantee
competitive, free, egalitarian, decisive, and inclusive elections. Yet these qualifiers of
democratic elections remain unstudied in regard to the composition of parliaments: who
actually competes and gains access to power. O’Donnell et al. (2004: 15) opens a door
into the study of this aspect of elections by adding that democratic electoral systems need
to provide everyone with “the right to try to get elected.”13

Consequently, it can be proposed that if an electoral system gives certain strata of society
an edge over others in the electoral competition, some groups’ access to power will be
enhanced disproportionately. Furthermore, the ambitions of certain groups in society to
engage in politics will be thwarted. Such an electoral system has less democratic quality
than an electoral system which does not cause such shortcomings.

13

As previous research noted, every citizen should enjoy the “right to have a say in what happens to him”
(Pitkin 1967:3). If, however, the way politicians get nominated and finance their campaigns skews elite
recruitment in one way or the other before the citizen has a final sat with his voting, then the “right to have
a say in what happens to him” is affected.
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Intricately connected with the type of persons elected in one or another political system,
is the recruitment path of politicians. Politicians attain an elected position either actively
through their own efforts, abilities, and skills, or a position is passively handed to them.
In authoritarian regimes, seats may be reserved for ethnic and other minorities to build a
façade of representativeness. The following anecdote narrated by Robert Putnam
illustrates this:
“On November 29, 1917, shortly after the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power in
the name of the workers and peasants of Russia, a delegation of revolutionary
intellectuals and military experts prepared to depart for crucial peace negotiations
with the Germans at Brest-Litovsk. A young worker had been named to the
delegation for appearance’s sake, but as the envoys sped through the Petrograd
evening toward their train, they realized in consternation that the group still
included no peasant. Spotting an old muzhik trudging through the snow, they
persuaded him to accompany them. The historic delegation was complete”
(Putnam 1976: 21).

However, democratic regimes are not at all immune to similar attempts to have
representatives as “window displays.” Increasing the proportion of women or other
minority groups, not through their individual capacities but by party fiat, is common in
partisan-democratic systems. Proportional representation in combination with closed lists
(Farrell 1997: 72) enables party elites to determine the composition of party-lists and
affect descriptive representation. Thus, in some representative democracies a tension
exists between “who rules” and “who should rule” (Putnam 1976: 2).
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In Germany, for example, many women hold seats in the Bundestag. A number of
youngsters, some barely high school graduates and still teenagers, hold legislative seats
as well. They are in the Bundestag because a “higher power” (i.e. the party), not the
people, “placed” them there by promoting and nominating them. The goal is to fulfill the
requirements for certain quotas14 and show how important representativeness is for a
party. In sum, the leadership of the parties in the German Bundestag aims at reflecting the
demographic composition of the society they represent.

In contrast, such a scheme would be unthinkable for Congress. To hold a seat in
Congress, a candidate has to self-recruit, has to win a primary, and then an election, and
all this primarily on his or her own. Consequently, the composition of Congress cannot be
expected to reflect that of the Bundestag since youngsters and women (and other
minorities) cannot effectively compete with better-equipped candidates. No higher
partisan authority exists that could artificially set up a more or less representative image
of society in Congress, and yield to minority pressure groups. Due to the electoral rules
pertaining to candidate nomination and campaign financing, the decisions are made on
the local level by locals.

This striking contrast between the Bundestag and Congress can be attributed to the “rules
of the game” on the front end of the recruitment process. The question is, which of the
two systems comes closer to a “portrait of society” described by classical elite theorists.

14

Set by law, or expectations of the elite or the society.
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The question is also, in which case is there “a socially isolated, self-seeking leadership
caste that cleverly dominates the abject masses” (Putnam 1976:4). Putting it bluntly, on
the one hand, the masses are not represented literally in Congress. But the Congressmen
are those nominated, elected, and funded by the people. On the other hand, the Bundestag
aims at mirroring society, but does this by excluding common people from the processes
of nomination, election, and funding, leaving them with the one duty of casting their
ballot.15 This practical two-step process leads to the two central hypotheses of this study.

I argue that basis-democratic electoral rules, such as those in the Unites States, will
attract entrepreneurial-type quality candidates. Such individualist quality candidates
will run for and hold office on the grounds of self-selection and individual ambition
and capabilities. In contrast, partisan-democratic electoral rules will award partyservice and party-interest with nominations to elected positions. The different electoral
rules lead to the prevalence of ‘active-politicians’ in the basis-democratic system and
‘passive-politicians’ in the partisan-democratic system. Institutions determine elite
recruitment.

I also argue that active and passive-politicians have a different effect on the political
process. They will exhibit different pre-legislative and post-legislative behaviors.
15

The contrasting of the German case with the American case raises, for the issue of democratic quality,
the question in which system do the people have more of a say in the selection of the candidate. Joachim
Henkel uses the term Scheinpartizipation, for which the interlinear translation would be feigned
participation, to describe a candidate nomination process where apparently people are more involved in the
selection process, yet on a closer look have actually less of a say in the process (Henkel 1976: 31). This
“problem” of democratic quality is, however, only then a problem if giving the people more of a say in the
selection process is actually a worthwhile principle in itself (Henkel 1976: 25).

22

Varying cost-benefit structures in the different institutional systems result in different
career paths that have to be taken by politicians until entering the highest national
legislature. Consequentially, the quality of democracy varies as the recruitment pools
of politicians change. Institutions determine politicians’ political behavior.

With the core hypotheses of this study I follow Zaller (1998) and Rahat and Hazan
(2001) and Cotta (Czudnowski 1982), who expressly state that institutional rules lead to
different career-paths into national legislatures, i.e. elite recruitment. Cotta depicts twoparty systems that match my distinction of basis-democratic and partisan-democratic. In
the latter, politicians have to climb the party ladder step by step. This is time-consuming
and relies heavily on patronage. From a young age on, one has to devote oneself to partyservice. This matches my partisan-democratic model.16

My basis-democratic model resembles the other party-model of Cotta, where credit is
built outside the party-structure, and resources and capabilities are gathered in an
entrepreneurial extra-party setting. In this model, the party functions merely (if at all) as
an identifying label for office seekers.

My idea that different types of legislator personae exhibit different behaviors has been
researched in the field of ambition theory (Schlesinger 1966, Rohde 1979). Herrick and
Moore (1993), for example, show that legislators in lower-level legislatures who seek
16

Compare to the Ochsentour phenomenon described in Chapter 3.
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higher office behave differently from legislators who do not have any ambition to
proceed to a higher legislature. Such “progressive ambition” manifests itself with
markedly different legislative behavior (Herrick and Moore 1993: 771). An interesting
argument advanced by the proponents of ambition theory is that legislative behavior
among legislators is “derived from their political aspirations, rather than their prepolitical and individual motivation” (Pomper 1975: 712).

This view that deemphasizes personal character and focuses on future ambition is not
shared in the present study. Rather than making a debatable judgment on what the
peculiar motivations of a politician is, the focus is shifted onto institutions framing the
“opportunity structure” (Pomper 1975: 716) in such a way that enables certain societal
groups attain a legislative career to the privation of others. Thus my interest lies in the
pre-legislative entrance level rather than classifying legislators by intensity of ambition.

The emphasis on elite background and the distinction between active-politicians and
passive-politicians matter, since their different socialization can lead to different
behavior, which affects everyone. What motivates politicians is important if their
preconditioning, based on education, socialization, and vocation, leads them to exhibit
“economic behavior” in politics, or “ethical behavior” (Sartori 1973: 17). If for passivepoliticians a career in politics is an end in itself, they will behave economically, that is,
they will try to “maximize assets, profit, material, and personal interests.” If politics is for
active-politicians a means however, their behavior will be “dutiful, disinterested,
altruistic action pursuing ideal ends, not material advantage” (Sartori 1973: 17).
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This pointed and idealistic generalization highlights the human factor in politics. While
my study is expressly institutionalist, I accept the basic tenet of political science set by
Aristotle, whose definition of the zoon politikon provides the “definition of man, not of
politics” (Sartori 1973: 7). I therefore propose first, to analyze the career paths of national
legislators; and second, to study the effect of such distinct political elites on democratic
quality. Drawing again on Schlesinger, I argue that there exist discernible “patterns of
movement from office to office” (Schlesinger 1966: 118), framed by institutions. The
next section provides the theoretical differentiation of institutional rules for candidate
nominations and campaign financing.

Particularities of the Explanatory Variables
The research problem addressed in this study is based on the effects of two institutional
rules, candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules. In this introductory
section, I provide first of all an overview on candidate nomination rules and their effect in
view of existing research and in relation to the present research problem. I do the same, in
a second step, with regard to the second explanatory variable of campaign financing
rules.

Candidate Nomination Rules and Candidate Selection
The relationship between the way candidates are nominated and the composition of the
office they compete for constitutes a puzzle. The more democratic the nomination system
looks, the less the legislature appears to be representative of the electorate. This
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relationship is due to the different effects of two institutional characteristics, the
“exclusivity” and “centralization” in the nomination process (Rahat and Hazan 2001;
Hinojosa 2005).

Exclusivity refers to the scope of the selectorate – whether it is inclusive and involves the
entire electorate in the nomination process, or whether it is exclusive and only a small
number of people decide about candidate nomination. Centralization refers to the level at
which decisions about nominations are made. Centralized nomination is observed when
decisions about candidates are made at higher (e.g. state and national) levels, while
decentralized nomination is associated with decisions made at the local level (Rahat and
Hazan 2001: 301-308).

In a basis-democratic system such as the United States, congressional candidates are
nominated in an inclusive process that is open to the electorate. Candidates self-recruit
and have to be nominated in a primary that is decided by voters in the constituency, i.e.
according to rules based on decentralization. An exclusive and centralized nominating
system is the opposite of the basis-democratic system in the United States. The partycentric system in Germany maintains such features. Decisions are made by party insiders
at the state and national level, at party conventions of the Länder–parties and the party at
the Bundes-level. Figure 1.3 depicts how the German and the American nomination
systems differ in their exclusivity and the level of their centralization. In the case of the
United States, everyone in the constituency is potentially able to decide who can stand for
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election – the selectorate equals the electorate. In Germany, only the dues-paying party
members decide who the candidate will be.

Figure 1.3. Exclusivity and Centralization in Nomination Rules.

Exclusivity

Germany

USA

Centralization
Low to High
Note: Developed from the conceptualization of Rahat and
Hazan (2001) and Hinojosa (2005)

While the American nominating system is more inclusive of the electorate, it constitutes a
handicap to potential candidates. This is due to the fact that in the American case,
candidates have to rely primarily on their own abilities and resources to win the
nomination (King 1990). The German electoral rules provide a nomination by insiders,
which “diminishes the importance of self-nomination” (Hinojosa 2005). Therefore, the
nomination can cater to the interests of the party. This way, women, young people,
minorities, and other representatives of special interests (vocational for example) and
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other groups (such as LGBT) can get elected.17 A more representative picture of society
can therefore be achieved in parliament, albeit by less democratic means.

Campaign Financing Rules
Electoral rules also vary by the way they structure opportunities for funding of political
competition. Campaign finance regulations bifurcate between the basis-democratic and
the elitist partisan-democratic models. On the one end of the scale is the reliance on
contributions from the electorate, private organizations, and donors. On the other end is
the reliance on the state treasury. In the first form, the financial dependence rests with the
electorate. In the latter, financial dependence is outside the electorate.

This dualism needs however to be broken down further. Besides the source of funding, it
also matters through what channels money is directed into the hands of the campaigner.
In particular, the question is whether or to what extent funds are channeled through the
hands of party leaders. If funds, irrespective of their source, come directly to the
campaigner, he/she will be independent of the party-leadership. If, however, campaign
funds are allotted by the party elite, the future legislator will feel indebted to them. Figure
1.4 illustrates the difference between Germany and the United States. In the latter funds
derive primarily from private sources and are at the immediate disposal of the
campaigner, while in Germany funds derive foremost from the national treasury and are
channeled through the party leadership.
17

This ties to the normative demand of descriptive representation. An example for this can be found in Bill
Clinton’s statement that his administration “looks like America” (Serna: 17).
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Figure 1.4. Sources of campaign funding.
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Consequently, four types of funding by source can be identified: funding from the state
to the candidate (1), funding from the state to the party (2), from the individual to the
candidate (3), and from the individual to the party (4). In scenarios two and four,
eventually money ends up with the candidate as well, but, as said above, this obliges
him/her to the party insiders. These consequences are often seen as disconnecting
campaigners from their “social bases,” and leading to a “lack of responsiveness to the
electorate, and declining competitiveness” (Young 2005).
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The type of institutional arrangement for campaign financing may affect the quality of
democracy. Some people believe that parties should not be dependent on the state, since
such dependence makes them “less beholden to their voters, supporters, and members,
and this may erode ties of loyalty and weaken accountability” (Williams 2000: 7). On the
basis of such observation, it was proposed that parties may develop into “cartel parties”
(Katz and Mair 1995), which would limit the role of ordinary members and supporters
(Young 2005) and even that of the electorate at large. Such parties consequently get
estranged from the people. In contrast, public money is believed to reduce the influence
of special interests on legislators.

To sum up the above arguments, to whom financial assistance obliges the legislator is
especially relevant to democratic governance.18 In the partisan-democratic system of
Germany, campaign financing is given by the state, while in basis-democratic system of
the United States, the funds come mostly from private sources. The difference here is that
candidates in the United States have to actively raise funds. Indeed, donations are
received “in response to solicitations directly from the candidates or on behalf of
candidates” by parties or interest groups (Maestas et al. 2005, Francia et al. 2003).
Although donors may not be altruistic and expect returns for their investment, the
candidate–society link is more firmly rooted in basis-democratic systems. In Germany,
candidates remain passive. They wait for the party to provide the resources. The weaker

18

See the discussion of this aspect on the basis of the interviews in Chapter 6.
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dependence on private interests notwithstanding, candidate passivity and voter disconnect
under partisan-democratic funding regimes may also hamper representation.

On the basis of this institutional framework, a successful candidacy has higher “costs” for
the candidate in the American case. Since resources are limited to a certain group within
society, mostly entrepreneurial-type people, other strata have less abilities and incentives
to campaign. Exemplary therefore is the underrepresentation of women in basisdemocratic systems that employ primaries (Hinojosa 2005). Also, it is more difficult for
ethnic and other minorities to win a primary and get nominated, except when the
constituency happens to contain a significant number of members of the respective
minority. In the end, the basis-democratic nomination system produces a less
representative outcome, while nominations in the hand of partisan “power monopolies”
usually produce a more representative picture of the electorate (Hinojosa 2005).

Basis-democratic nomination systems like the American primaries “undercut the power
of local and state political machines” and thereby enable the bringing in of “fresh
candidates [with] new ideas” (Ansolabehere 2005). It can be even argued that the primary
in itself is more competitive, more “fluid [and] volatile” than the general election. One
critical reason for this is that unlike in general elections, the voters’ choice is not framed
by party labels. Primaries do also increase seat volatility, since incumbents not only have
to take into account challengers from oppositional parties, but also from fellow party
members. In particular – in the case of the so called “safe-seats” – primaries are a
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valuable check on complacency (Ansolabehere 2005). Such increased competition and
openness invigorate democratic competition and in the end increase democratic quality.

The discussions over nomination rules and campaign financing propose how institutional
guidelines frame the pool of politicians. This means that elite recruitment is shaped on
the basis of institutional rules, which pose different incentives and disincentives, as well
as differing demands on the individual politician. Politicians have to be either proactive
in getting the nomination and funding for their campaign, or they can remain passive.
Germany and the United States exemplify this distinction nicely. In the following section,
I deepen the discussion on why the case selection of Germany and the United States is
propitious to the research at hand.

Case Selection of the United States and Germany
The theorized differences in legislative representation can best be studied in mature
political systems with similar cultural traits. Prima facie, these mature Western
democracies appear as political automata. Their diverse and intricate mechanisms are
seen as whims of the political mind from the time of their conception. What is overlooked
is that institutions function as an “invisible hand,” guiding democratic systems. Given
their politically mature citizenry and congruent political culture, it appears superfluous to
scrutinize their democratic quality. Instead, the focus of most recent research has been
turned onto young democracies where ostensibly more knowledge is to be gained. Yet,
the routinized and time-tested Western democracies are in fact the best source for
deriving propositions on democratic quality, such as elite recruitment.

32

The United States and Germany constitute the two largest Western democracies. Both
have a Christian culture19 heavily influenced by Protestant ethics (Weber 2006b). Despite
undeniably stark cultural differences, at the core the two systems retain a common
heritage. A comparison between the two systems is then plausible and promising. The
German Bundestag and the American Congress offer an excellent opportunity to test
propositions about the relationship between institutions and democratic quality. Such unit
homogeneity improves causal inferences, while at the same time, it lessens the
explanatory power of rival causal variables – (political) culture in particular.

Germany and the United States share other commonalities. They both have a long history
of parliamentary tradition. While the U.S. Congress’ tradition roots in the late 18th
century, a national parliament was established in Germany in 1871, and uninterrupted
parliamentary rule by the Bundestag exists for more than 60 years. This allows building
an extended time-series database and consequently strengthening the explanatory power
of the statistical tests.

The selection of these countries is appropriate for several other reasons. First, the United
States and Germany represent a mixture of regime types and electoral systems (see
Figure 1.5). Elsewhere in the literature, the United States is seen as a presidential system,
and Germany as a parliamentary system. The Unites States uses plurality electoral rules
19

Christian culture in the sense T.S. Eliot (1977) uses it. For the different stages of an eroding yet still
resonating Christian culture (as it is the case in the U.S. and especially Germany) see C.S. Lewis (2009).
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to elect the members of their legislature, Congress. Germany employs a mixture of
plurality and proportional representation; with the latter playing a decisive role in the
final allocation of Bundestag seats (James 2003). These institutional specifics allow
checking for differences in candidate recruitment patterns within the Bundestag, and
drawing comparisons to the solely plurality-based American system.

Figure 1.5. Regime types present in this study.
Electoral Method
Regime Type

Parliamentary

Proportional

Majoritarian ‐

Representation

Plurality

Germany

Regime
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Second, the cases at hand offer interesting examples of bicameralism. Besides the already
discussed variation in electoral and campaign finance rules, the German and the
American legislatures differ in other ways. While the House of Representatives’ power is
arguably en par with that of the Senate, the Bundestag is the sole national legislature, yet
has to reckon the de facto second chamber of the Bundesrat.20

While congressmen cannot hold executive positions, no such obstacle exists for the
career calculations of Bundestag-members. Also, the two upper houses of these bicameral
20

Even though the Bundesrat is de jure a legislative body in itself.
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assemblies are legitimated differently. While both the Senate and the Bundesrat represent
the federal units of the nation, the Senate members are nowadays directly elected while
the Länder are represented by state-delegations that resemble pre-17th Amendment state
representation in the United States. Consequently, Germany and the United States have
upper houses that diverge when it comes to their electoral base, powers, and
constitutional role.

Third, selecting based on the dependent variable will be avoided since the two countries
are chosen to vary based on the independent variables. This helps methodologically, as
selection based on the dependent variable (candidate/legislator type) is avoided as well as
bias in the final results.21

The above-mentioned similar features between the Bundestag and Congress enhance the
analysis by making it possible to automatically control for a whole set of factors that
might, under a different case selection, contaminate the findings. In sum, the crossnational statistical analysis of Germany and the United States will have external validity,
can

establish

nonspurious

relationships between the variables, and enhance

generalizability. The research will compare and not classify, since it will statistically rank
and quantify the results (Jackman 1985). Before moving on to the proposed research
design, I will discuss the primary alternative explanatory variable of culture in the the
following section.
21

However, for the purpose of theory building, selection based on the dependent variable is contributory
and is acknowledged (Koß 2012: 35, Geddes 1990: 149).
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Controls
The thesis of this study that the dependent variable of elite recruitment is determined by
institutions as the key independent variable, has its most prominent rival explanation in
political culture, and culture at large on a meta-level. As mentioned above, political
culture, defined by Robert Putnam (1993), is the result of a historic process in which
society, based on historic experiences, builds social capital that guides and frames daily
human interaction. In broader terms, Hans Morgenthau’s (1949) “national character”
definition can be used to delineate the different cultural traits of people,22 which certainly
would affect their dealings with politics, too.

Authors like Louis Hartz (1955) and Seymour Martin Lipset (1996) point out the
uniqueness of American political culture. The American emphasis on equality and the
socio-cultural diversity make it stand out. Indeed, the differences between the American
North and South posit a challenge on their own (Mencken 1949, Lipset 1996).
Nonetheless, there exists a sufficient common ground between Germany and the United
States, as mentioned earlier, based on cultural and even ethnic grounds (Brittingham and
de la Cruz 2004) that allows for the present comparison.

As mentioned above, the case selection of Germany and the United States was based on
the grounds of them providing an interesting mixture of institutional rules as well as

22

For example, Morgenthau characterized the German people as lacking “moderation.”
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cultural similarity. Nonetheless, when it comes to national characters or political cultures,
possible differences between Germans and Americans are not overlooked and will be
accounted for in this study.

Yet, by acknowledging the contentious nature of cultural claims, the following
explanation might help to put culturalist arguments aside. If, for the sake of argument, it
is acknowledged that Germany and the United States have incomparable political
cultures, the present study can still provide valuable scientific knowledge. If Germany
and the United States do not have directly comparable cultures (C11,2,3,4,N and
C21,2,3,4,N),23 but have instead distinct cultures (G1,2,3,4,N and A1,2,3,4,N), a look at the loci
where elite recruitment occurs within their societies would still provide insights.

If for example, Germany and America have comparable cultures, C1 and C2, and in the
case of C1 political recruitment occurs at the societal substrata of C11,2, while in the
comparable culture of C2 political elites are recruited from the substrata of C23,4, this
difference can be attributed to institutional factors. If however, it is assumed that
Germany and the United States have cultures (G and A) that are too distinct to be
compared, the observation that elite recruitment in Germany occurs from the societal
substrata G1,2, while in the United States the loci for political recruitment is at A3,4, can
be explained with distinct cultural traits as well as through different institutional settings.

23

The numbers in the subscript denote different cultural expressions.
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While no explanation would stand unchallenged, at least some light would be cast onto
the different loci of elite recruitment.

Relevance of the Study and its Contribution
In the hitherto discussion, a number of arguments for the contribution of the present study
were given. In the following I will bring them together and detail them. As said earlier,
my research’s approach of linking elite recruitment and democratic quality to institutional
rules in general, and the two variables of nomination rules and campaign financing rules
in particular, is an untrodden path. Conducting this research with a large-N (> 1000
observations) comparative statistical test was mentioned as one contribution. In addition,
in-depth case studies based on my interviews with legislators in both countries reveal
details overlooked in previous research.

My research contributes to the literature on democratic quality, too. This literature is vast
and eclectic. The branch of democratic quality research dealing with representation,
however, largely ignores the function of electoral rules as an instigator for variation in the
type and quality of representation. Representation is important since it is not only a
function (as it is generally accepted in the democratic quality literature), but because it is
an end in itself as well. The highest political body in a democratic system is the national
legislature. Every citizen should have potentially the same chance to get involved in
politics (O’Donnell et al. 2004).
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My research considers the incentives to pursue elected positions as a dependent variable
and the different electoral rules as the independent variable. Thereby, it contributes to the
literature by systematically studying institutional rules on candidate recruitment and
behavior that have implications for representative government. Doing this as a systematic
and comparative study of more than one political system adds more value. Beside the two
cases of the United States and Germany, my argumentation can be extended to other
cases24 in Western democracies. Thus, this research is open to replication studies.

As mentioned above, I bring together the different strands of institutionalist, democratic
quality, and representation literature in the first comprehensive, comparative, large-N,
empirical examination of career paths in national legislatures. As outlined above,
institutions’ effects on democratic quality have been studied extensively. Yet a gap exists
when it comes to political recruitment. The innovation of this research is to close this gap
with a statistical approach. Duverger showed how electoral rules frame individual
behavior. Lijphart showed how institutions affect democratic quality. I bring these and
other facets of political research together and search for “scientific generalizations”
(Riker 1982) and how electoral rules influence political recruitment.

24

The case of the United Kingdom appears to be particularly beneficial for a future extension of this
research, since the UK contains elements from both Germany and the United States. Like Germany it has
strong party control, a similar regime type, yet like the U.S. a single-member district based electoral
system.
Another case for future addition to this research is the case of Canada. Like the U.S., it has constitutionally
a bicameral system. The Canadian House of Commons has similar elections (SMD) and a similar culture
yet a different relationship with the executive. Thus the study of the impact of campaign finance rules and
candidate nomination is, again, a promising task.
The Austrian Nationalrat, situated similarly to the Bundestag in the constitutional system, is a third natural
candidate for future research to study the effects of campaign finance rules and candidate nomination in
comparative perspective, while controlling for culture and ideology.
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The present study also sheds light onto the modi operandi of distinct party structures.
While the German party structure follows a strict hierarchy, with the local, regional, state,
and national party entities being interconnected, the American parties are much looser
organized. The local and state level party organizations are not subordinate to a national
party. Instead, the national party organization (e.g. RNC, DNC) is a weak link,
institutionally tying together the state and local levels with the parties in Congress, which
is a party-arena in its own right. The assessment of
Steven Smith for this situation is that “[t]hese legislative parties have ties to the national
and state party committees, but they remain independent organizations. Even House and
Senate Republicans maintain separate organizations with only as much coordination as
their leaders choose to provide” (Smith 2007: 11).

In the contrasting case of the German parties, the party organization is significantly more
disciplined and hierarchically organized. The party chairman, nominally the leader of the
party, is either the most powerful person in the party or is part of a group controlling the
party. Thus top to bottom and bottom to top, the party structure acts, if needed,
cohesively.

Finally, the contribution of this study is both practical and methodological. It develops an
original tool for the study of politicians’ recruitment paths. It links the latter to two key
institutional rules of electoral system. Thus, when designing new electoral systems,
practitioners will be able to consult on how rules affect elite recruitment and shape the
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democratic future of a political system. Methodologically, it sets up a series of indicators
to measure institutional influences on elite recruitment that were not used hitherto.

Thus, this research aims at bridging the gap between qualitative and quantitative analysis
of elites. As it is perceived, originally, elite analysis experienced a “dramatic reversal in
the balance between theoretical formulations and empirical analysis. The boldness and
scope of Mosca’s and Pareto’s generalizations, often based upon a scanty and
methodologically rather haphazard empirical documentation, provide a striking contrast
with the limited attention given by many contemporary students of political elites to the
theoretical meaning of their empirical sophisticated studies” (Czudnowski 1982: 154155). Being alert to this discrepancy, the present research aims to base its theoretical
generalizations on a solid empirical foundation.

Unit and Level of Analysis
The unit of analysis is the individual legislator in the Bundestag and Congress. Their
respective behavior and political and non-political career path leading up to winning a
seat in the national legislature will be observed (a detailed operationalization will be
given later). I will examine the national legislators, since my aim is to observe the
influence of an institutional framework on democratic quality in a democratic system.
The national legislature is the primary factor therefore. The time span for the
observations should be extended backwards as far as possible to strengthen validity. For
the purpose of this study, I limit myself for logistical reasons alone to the 112th United
States Congress and the 16th Bundestag.
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Theoretical Approach
My goal in this research is to reveal the incentives and disincentives generated by
electoral institutional arrangements for individual politicians’ career and recruitment
patterns, and the consequences of institutional gate-keeping for democratic quality.
Fundamental to the theoretical approach advanced here, is the rational choice perspective.
The underlying assumption is that politicians act rationally in a pursuit of their interest,
which is (re)election. Their action to enter politics is driven by cost-benefit calculations.
Differences in behavior are due to constraints imposed by the institutional context.
Depending on the institutional context, different “gatekeepers…select from among the
pool of eligible” candidates (Norris 1996: 192). Different opportunity structures shape
distinct cost-benefit calculus outcomes. Consequently, determining what influences
nominations, allows explaining different behavior under different electoral rules. In the
next chapter, I will discuss this theoretical approach more in detail.

Conceptualization
The underlying conceptual distinction is that institutions at the meta-level can be divided
into basis-democratic electoral rules vs. partisan-democratic electoral rules. These
institutions are then to be broken down into the components affecting nominations and
campaign financing. Consequential to these rules, is that they lead to the prevalent
recruitment of particular types of politicians, active vs. passive, to the legislature.
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The distinctions between basis-democratic electoral rules and partisan-democratic
electoral rules pertain to 1) the mode of nominating politicians for legislatures, and 2) the
way election campaigns are financed. The basis-democratic model relies on candidate
self-nomination and individual fund raising, and the partisan-democratic model on partydominated nominations and resource allocation. The concepts of active and passivepoliticians derive their raison d’être from this distinction. In basis-democratic system
politicians have to be active in the sense that they have to self-recruit, gather supporters,
raise funds, and win the nomination and the election for office. For the “maintenance” of
the seat, legislators are largely self-responsible as well.

The opposite is expected for a partisan-democratic system. There, politicians tend to be
passive, in the sense that they get nominated by excelling in party-service. The party
provides the campaign funds (from state subsidies and/or individual donations), and the
elections are fought out almost exclusively under the party-labels. Thus individual
ambition and entrepreneurial skills are a necessity in a basis-democratic system, while
shortcomings in these aspects are partly absorbed by the partisan cushion in partisandemocratic systems. Eventually, a strong party infrastructure provides financial and
organizational support that lowers entrance costs to politics.

The proposed study identifies three conceptualizations for democratic quality, defined in
terms of fulfillment of the principle “governance by the people.” First, by scrutinizing the
recruitment pool of elites, the representativeness of a political system can be observed.
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Thereby, the permeability of a political system, and the institutional parameters that
enable or prevent successful candidacy, will be exposed for assessment.

Second, the more participatory a system is, the higher democratic quality it is providing
to its citizens. The more the levels of recruitment, nomination, and elections are found
open to citizen involvement, the more democratic a system would be. A high level of
correlation between the selectorate and the electorate would mimic the ideal of a direct
democracy. Third, the more the legislators function in the interest of society and the less
the legislature serves as a tool for legislators’ own career advancement,25 the higher
democratic quality is provided through representation. In the following section, I propose
how to operationalize the concepts of this study.

Operationalization
This study is based on two hypotheses: 1) The type of institutional arrangement leads to
different elite recruitment,26 and 2) These differences caused by institutions matter, since
they affect the characteristics and behavior of political elites.27 In the end, this affects
democratic quality. To test these hypotheses, I start with the operationalization of the
main concepts. By doing this, I will be able to find indicators for the types of

25

I follow Warner (2005) in defining the “misuse of public office for private or partisan gain” as
corruption.

26

And necessarily thereby to different configurations of legislatures independent of partisanship.

27

The argument is not that elites adapt themselves to the varying electoral rules, but that variations in
electoral rules attract different characters to politics. Thus the different behavior exhibited by politicians is
behavior by default and not by choice.
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candidates/legislators (i.e. elites) and some consequences for democratic quality. A
preliminary review of these is given below.

I operationalize the institutionalist concept of basis-democratic electoral rules and
partisan-democratic electoral rules by matching the degree of centralization and
exclusivity of electoral rules when it pertains to the nomination of political candidates.
When it comes to campaign financing laws, partisan-democratic electoral rules will
assign the party-elite the ability to channel money to campaigns, while basis-democratic
electoral rules leave campaign finances in the hands of the individual candidates.

With regard to the individual politician, I operationalize the concept of active-politician
and passive-politician by categorizing the socio-demographic data of politicians in
national politics alongside such variables that indicate active/ passive characterpredispositions of politicians. Thereby, it can be seen to what extent differing institutional
settings attract politicians with one or the other socio-demographic predisposition. In
Chapter Four, I provide a detailed operational definition for the concepts discussed in this
introduction.

Methodology
After the theoretical chapters two and three, and the operationalization of the developed
concepts in chapter four, I will statistically test in Chapter 5 the effects of institutional
rules on elite recruitment. The tests will utilize descriptive statistics and cross tabulations
as well as regression analyses (OLS and logit). The empirical research will continue in
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Chapter 6 by presenting the results of the interviews (about two dozen) with members of
the German Bundestag and the United States House of Representatives.
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CHAPTER 2 – THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL RULES AND POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR

In the previous chapter, I outlined the research question and elaborated on the research
problem, which now has to be analyzed. In this chapter, I go deeper into the theory of
institutions, as they are discussed in political science, to develop a comprehensive theory
of institutionalism and a catholic understanding of what institutions’ effects are. This
way, the theoretical understanding of institutionalism will be strengthened, and
hypotheses in regard to the effects of institutional rules can then be made. Later on in the
research, the evidence of the empirical analysis will then show to what extent these
hypotheses derived from institutionalist theory are validated.

Such validation augments and strengthens the scientific contribution of my dissertation.
Not only will I make observations on recruitment patterns for the Bundestag and the
House of Representatives, but I will move forward the theoretical discussion on the
relevance of institutionalism and institutional design. I will therefore review theories
regarding campaign financing rules, theories of candidate nomination rules, theories of
elite recruitment, and finally theoretical assumptions on the Bundestag and the House of
Representatives, all under the generic term of institutionalism.

With this, I pursue a path of research in political science that is rarely done. It is common
in political science research to test hypotheses that are derived from theories, rather than
to test the “theoretical terms directly” (Shapiro 2005: 84). By having empirical evidence,
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I will be able to test not just my hypotheses, but the theory on institutional rules itself.28
This will either validate the existing theory, or lead to the replacement of existing
theories with one that has superior empirical performance than the previous ones (Shapiro
2005: 84). In my research, I will engage in both theory testing and theory building. In
doing so, I aim not to simply add to banal findings, but will make new additions to the
understanding of political science. After all, the aim of science “is not to produce theories
but, rather, to accumulate knowledge” (Shapiro 2005: 87-88). Thus it will be seen how
institutionalism can cope with mechanisms of elite recruitment into national legislatures,
and it will be understood how the Bundestag compares to the House of Representatives in
its recruitment patterns.

The first task is to question how and why institutions would have an effect on human
behavior and/or attract and deter persons from politics. I rely primarily on Max Weber’s
work to answer this query and compliment it with works by other political scientists. The
first matter I evaluate is how rules can function as an agent motivating (and conversely
discouraging) a person who is interested in a political career.

2.1 Elite Recruitment and Institutional Rules

As the introductory chapter showed, the question at hand is “[w]ho belongs to legislative
assemblies and how they got there.” That such “political role of personality”
28

I.e., the theory if institutions are indeed the decisive factor in shaping the political actor’s behavior above
and beyond alternative explanations.
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(Loewenberg 1985: 17) constitutes a theoretically and practically relevant issue is
debated among political scientists. There are theories and their proponents who claim that
it does not matter who occupies a certain position.29 Thus politicians are regarded as
political automatons. Giovanni Sartori’s excellent work shows that such assumptions are
“demonstrably incorrect” (Sartori 1997: 27). Sartori eloquently and logically shows that
electoral rules are relevant as independent variables. He argues that such variations lead
to practical differences; nonetheless, he also states that the human factor cannot be
discounted.30

Sartori’s research agenda is different from mine. He explores the theme of how votes
translate into seats in parliament. Sartori studies how institutional rules can be an
incentive for voters to cast their ballot in one way or another. Thus, his research is about
post-facto events, after elections are concluded and results are in. But one crucial aspect
is not empirically analyzed by Sartori and most other institutionalists: How did the
candidates who compete in different electoral systems get to that point in the first place?
Sartori briefly touches upon this aspect by mentioning the dichotomy of the alternatives
between “self-appointment and party appointment”31 (Sartori 1997: 15). My research

29

A real life example can be found in the case of the Russian Revolution, where Lenin and his consorts
knew nothing about running the economy and consequently ruined it. Crucially, the task of running the
economy was dismissed as being not a difficult task (von Mises 2011: 13).

30

Sowell also emphasizes that it matters what type of person holds a position of power, by stating that
people “differ greatly from one another in insight, foresight, leadership, organizational ability, and
dedication” (Sowell 2011: 108).

31

The American primary is seen as the crucial divide between the former and latter mode of candidacy.
Sartori’s hypothesis in this instance is that the primary system weakens the party oligarchy.
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offers the opportunity to empirically verify whether different institutional settings32 for
elite recruitment actually produce empirically verifiable different recruitment patterns.

The crux of the matter is therefore: How and why do candidates end up standing for
election? Who gets elected in the end? It is not by random luck that one gets to be a
candidate for the Bundestag. It is not that every politically interested and active-person
becomes a candidate for the House of Representatives. If institutionalism is a powerful
predictor, then the way in which people become nominees and finance their endeavor for
the legislature, should be similar under the same institutional rules. Furthermore,
significant differences should exist between legislatures which employ different
institutional rules for their elite recruitment. I base this hypothesis on Katz’s logic that
“different modes of selection are likely to privilege different elements of the party and
[/or] different types of candidates” (Katz 2001: 277).

Logic entails that certain types of people can cope with certain institutional rules better
than others. Thus some measure of behavioral uniformity should exist among candidates
who successfully overcome the institutional gatekeepers and get into the national
legislature. The primary capacity facilitated by institutionalism is accordingly political
faculty and not political interest. The grandmaster of scientific political analysis, Max
Weber (2007), devoted much attention to this issue. His disquisition on the subject matter
constitutes the theoretical core of my present research.

32

Rather than cultural and/or ideological factors.
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If the notion that politicians “are the product of their total life experiences” is accepted,
then insight into their socio-cultural background would provide practical knowledge
(Loewenberg1985: 17). The underlying idea of this statement is that people are not
automata. Their social33 behavior is the result of their hitherto life-experience (Spengler
2007+2013, Tönnies 2005, Putnam 1993). Thus the hypothesis can be put forward that
“patterns of legislative recruitment” can be measured and observed. They are the
consequence of certain incentives, electoral rules being one example for this, as well as
that patterns of elite recruitment effect legislative performance (Loewenberg 1985: 18).
The idea that the behavior of the political elite depends on who the elites are, is common
sense and is acknowledged in American political science (Edinger and Searing 1967).

The first fact to be established is that in differently institutionalized political systems,
different pathways into politics exist (Loewenberg 1985: 18). A variation in electoral
rules implies that “self-selection” becomes either a viable pathway into politics or it does
not. Electoral rules can make it possible for self-starters to enter electoral politics without
the financial backing or official approval of a party establishment. Alternatively, electoral
rules can mandate (de jure) approval by a party establishment. The electoral rules in the
United States benefit active-type politicians. There are no institutional barriers to prevent
a self-starter to garner the selectorate’s support and thereby the party’s nomination. That

33

Which includes political behavior.
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is why it is characterized as an “entrepreneurial political system” (Loewenberg 1985: 19).
In the next chapter I will give details on this point.

What characterizes an active-politician will be elaborated on below. I will rely therefore
primarily on the concepts of Max Weber. (I will also elaborate on the importance of
institutional choice, whose significance was pointed out by Weber as well.) Weber speaks
of “wrong” political structures that can bring passive-politicians to positions of power.
He states that different institutional rules can bring different types of politicians to power.
Such variation in elite recruitment caused by different rules are then seen by Weber as
having consequences. The most significant consequence is that a wrong type of political
class will be promoted into positions of power, for which members of that class are not
prepared. For example, Weber states that only active-politicians are capable of assuming
“political responsibility,” while passive-politicians with their “bureaucratic” mindset are
misplaced in important positions of power (Weber 2006: 402).34

Weber provides a good determinative test for a distinction between active and passivepoliticians. An active-politician is someone who is skilled at and knowledgeable about
“public speech,” careful and conscious of its effects. Most importantly, an activepolitician has a sense of responsibility for his decisions (Weber 2006: 407-408). Weber’s

34

A similar conception is found with Fromm, who states that “[a]ctivity is usually defined as behavior
which brings about change in an existing situation by an expenditure of energy. In contrast, a person is
described as passive if he is unable to change or overtly influence an existing situation and is influenced or
moved by forces outside himself” (Fromm 1990: 85).
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emphasis on oratory skills, on precision in word choice and language35 as well as on the
personal capacities, charisma, and exerted authority of an active-politician (exemplified
by Bismarck) is present in his entire work and not just when he actually defines the
active-politician. Common sense demands that such traits are rather to be found with
someone who has extensive life-experience, gained in answerable positions of power and
responsibility. An independent entrepreneur would be likely the best example therefore.

It can be expected that more active type of politician would be found in the House of
Representatives than in the Bundestag, since in the American case, self-selection is a
more viable pathway into politics due to the existing electoral rules. These politicians
would exhibit a sharp difference with regards to their sociological background in
comparison with their counterparts in the Bundestag. The rationale for the permeability
of the American electoral system for active type politicians is that there are no (partisan)
veto players who are able to block an independent self-starter once that person has
secured financial resources and electoral support from the selectorate. Additionally,
besides the absence of such veto positions, the American electoral system in itself is
designed (whether by default or accident is a separate issue) to not favor a partisan

35

Similarly to this, George Orwell required clear and precise word choice, the avoidance of jargon and
metaphors in political discourse. Such habits constitute a “move away from concreteness” and towards
“insincere language” (Orwell 2002: 954ff.). Orwell furthermore writes that the “decline of a language must
ultimately have political and economic causes: it is not due simply to the bad influence of this or that
individual writer. But an effect can become a cause, reinforcing the original cause and producing the same
effect in an intensified form, and so on indefinitely.”
Orwell’s insights on the quality of the speech act and its connections to the intellectual capacity of the
politician are a most fascinating subject. It could be incorporated into the active/ passive-politician dualism
by distinguishing politicians on the basis of the quality of their speech acts. While I do limit myself to
clearly quantifiable statistics in this research, the far more sophisticated approach of Orwell would enrich
the active/passive-politician concept.

53

insider versus an outsider, once the outsider has secured the same amount of means
(financial means primarily) for a political campaign.

A passive-politician in contrast to the active-politician is marked by his willingness to
subjugate his convictions to his duty to obey.36 Weber compares such a political actor37
with an active-politician, who will publicly oppose a political act, if it goes against his
persuasion (Weber 2006: 407-408). Weber’s description of an active-politician can be
more likely found in a character type who is used to making decisions on his own and
who has learned to live with them; again, an entrepreneurial type active person. Most
importantly, the active type politician has the ability to accept the consequences of his
decision to his material livelihood. Thus political systems that have a lot of active type
politicians are hypothetically marked by weak political parties.

The favorable institutional environment for active-politicians would include an
“entrepreneurial style of primary nominations,” and “candidate-oriented election
campaigns.” Single member district constituencies would be the preferred mode of
election (Loewenberg 1985: 22). This system is more demanding on the individual
candidate to succeed. Politics as a vocation is more attractive to active type personalities,
who are experienced in succeeding in such individualistic settings (Lowenberg 1985: 22).
The following categorization elucidates this claim:
36

The submissiveness of the passive-politician is primarily due to the circumstance that his livelihood, his
material sustenance and existence are from politics and by partisan peers. Thus a cautious and opportunistic
behavior is exhibited to safeguard a continuous presence in politics.

37

In the technical terminology of political science, ‘actor’ means a participant, not a theatrical performer.
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Figure 2.1 Categorization of what type of representation in parliament provides what type of incentives
and opportunities for politicians

Individual‐based
representation

Party‐programmatic
representation

Reward for constituency service:

High

Low

Self‐recruitment chances:

High

Low

Note: Individual-based representation provides high rewards for constituency service as well as high selfrecruitment chances. It is therefore most favorable for active-politicians. Party-programmatic
representation, however, provides low reward for constituency service and less chances for selfrecruitment. This type of representation is therefore favorable for passive-politicians.

What does that mean then? It means that in the United States, with its entrepreneurial
political system, the predictor for success in politics is the politician’s individual
performance. This allows for cases where a political entrepreneur can get nominated and
elected without the consent of the party elites, and even against their expressed
opposition (Loewenberg 1985: 26). The term entrepreneurial is in this case quite
apposite. The definition given in Webster’s dictionary for entrepreneur is “one who
organizes, manages, and assumes the risk of business or enterprise.” In the American
electoral system, a candidate does all these. The candidate organizes his campaign,
manages his campaign staff, and bears the (financial and otherwise) risk of his campaign,
which resembles a business-like enterprise.

The contrasting paradigm is the political system in which the “unanointed candidate”
(Loewenberg 1985: 34) cannot advance. Being an “unscreened, unlabeled, and self-
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starting candidate” is a political non-starter to begin with. In the German case, an
American entrepreneurial type candidate would have to rely on the “anointing” by
partisan insiders. A candidate’s entrepreneurial skills would be of no use in this context.
On the basis of this description, I hypothesize that variation in recruitment opportunities
will favor one type of political personality over the other (Loewenberg 1985: 35).38

To draw “solid conclusions” from the above given theory (Hamilton et al. 2000: 33), I
have to empirically identify the “praxis” of insider nominations by party elites in
Germany and I have to empirically validate the weakness (if not absence) of party
influence in the United States (Loewenberg 1985: 35). This way, Sartori’s proposition
that electoral rules can axiomatically be treated as independent variables will be
verified.39 Such institutional rules as independent explanatory variables should then have
(logically) a uniform effect. Such effect is identifiable through an elite that has “similar
socialization experiences [and would] hold similar attitudes” (Edinger and Searing 1967:
430).

One theoretical proposition by American political scientists that explains what drives
politicians in and into politics is called progressive ambition. The idea is that politicians
38

Weber elaborates on this issue and argues that an institutional environment that is favorable to passivepoliticians is not sufficient, but that incentives for a political career in itself have to be there too. “Only”
when service in parliament is attractive to passive-politicians and provides leadership positions with true
responsibilities will great politicians, who want to live for politics, be interested in a political career.
Otherwise, “salaried party bureaucrats and lobbyists” will fill the ranks of parliament (Weber 2006: 397).
39

By primarily relying on quantitative analysis, the strongest explanatory power can be achieved to that
end. The quantitative analysis should furthermore cover as many places of political activity (local, state,
national) as possible (Edinger and Searing 1967: 429).
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will, quite like a natural law, run for the next higher office. A prominent proponent of this
view was Joseph Schlesinger, who said that “Politics is, after all, a game of advancement,
and man succeeds only if he advances as far as his situation permits” (Harrington 1997:
2). This perspective is closely connected with the game-theoretical view that politicians
“will always support those policies consistent with the ideology of the current median
voter to increase their (re-)election chances” (Harrington 1997: 3). The underlying logic
to this statement is that the behavior of politicians is not based on “their pre-political and
individual motivation” but on their “political aspiration” (Pomper 1975: 712).

This is a reductionist argument. It falls into the category of (soft) rational choice theory,40
which has one shortcoming. The formal modeling done in rational choice theory is based
on the axiom that all actors make decisions (1.) on the basis of the same cost-benefit
calculus, and (2.) that every player41 has the same perception of the equilibrium.
(Tsebelis 1991, Vanberg 2001). This is, however, factually mistaken. Wildavsky (1965,
see below) evidences that one and the same equilibrium would be differently evaluated
by different players. Psychoanalysis shows that people act and react differently. Freud
shows how cultural (and in extenso ideological) factors in particular condition players’
choices (Freud 2009, Freud 2009b).

40

Since my model is a single-player game, it does not constitute a game-theoretic model, which is
“contingent on the choices of more than one player (Brams 1975: xv).

41

In the technical terminology of rational choice theory, player indicates a participant who has to make one
decision (or one decision at a time, if the so called game is sequential).
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An adapted and modified version of rational choice theory is therefore necessary for two
reasons. First, my theory is based on the ideal-type categorization of politicians as active
and passive types. Thus the above-espoused assumption of one type of player runs
counter to my theoretical proposition. But beyond this theoretical rejection, the abovemade assertions are also too unrealistic. As said, Aaron Wildavsky’s work provides solid
proof for this conclusion.

Wildavsky shows that politicians are not automatons and are not rational actors. Instead,
Wildavsky argues that politicians can indeed be principled and forfeit electoral gains for
the sake of such principles (Wildavsky 1965: 390). Consequently, Wildavsky readily
acknowledges the possibility of creating a typology of politicians; for example, those
who are “purists” and those who are not (Wildavsky 1965: 394). Thus, the notion that
politicians are single-minded (re-) election seekers (Mayhew 1974: 5-6) is not
sufficiently realistic.

Furthermore, a “mathematization of social situations” has its advantages, in that it
provides a simple-to-understand description of a real-life phenomenon (Brams 1975: xixii). In contrast to game theory, where two or more players interact, my model is based
on the individual’s rational decision making. Thus the outcome does not depend on
another player but on one’s own personal predisposition towards the rules of the game.
Technically, this would constitute a game against nature (Brams 1975: 3).
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The adapted and modified rational decision-making process would be based on the axiom
that there exist different institutional settings that are advantageous or disadvantageous
for a politician, based on his faculties. There are conditions that are favorable for one
person, yet not favorable for another. Thus the same person would make different
decisions (such as going into politics or not) on the basis of the peculiar cost-benefit
calculation conditioned by the institutional setting. In other words, while the utility is the
same for each player, the costs differ. Such bivariate rational choices would be expressed
in the following utility function:

For a risk-acceptant, active-politician (P│), with institutional rules such as they are in the
United States (Rα)42 combined with his cost-benefit calculation (Cα),43 his preference
would be to enter the game, i.e. politics, since the payoff is higher than unity, the
threshold for entering the game. If however, the institutional setting is changed from Rα to
Rβ, i.e. an institutional setting like the one in Germany, the utility payoff falls below 1,
and thus P│ would abstain from the game. The formal model for this utility function for
the player P│ would be:
Rα + Cα > 1
Rβ + Cα < 1

42

Rα = Nα + Fα. The rules of the game are the combination of the candidate nomination rules (Nα) and
campaign financing rules (Fα).

43

In the sense of a mixed-motive game (Brams 1975: 283), whereby the player’s subjective assessment of
financial (career, etc.), reputational, and personal (family, etc.) costs for being a candidate in the first place,
and then defraying the costs of the entire procedure are weighed against the benefit of becoming a
politician. What is my risk? What is my gain? These are the questions a player asks in my model.
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If however, the player is not an active-politician but a passive-politician (P║), then under
the same conditions of Rα, the cost-benefit calculation would fall below 1 and the player
would abstain from entering the game, while the opposite effect would be expected under
the conditions of Rβ where P║’s payoff is above 1. The formal model for this utility
function for player P║ would be:
Rα + Cβ < 1
Rβ + Cβ > 1
Figure 2.2 Decision analysis for an active-politician and for a passive-politician.

Note: (DP = decision point).

This payoff function is a plausible explanation for the prevalence of active-politicians in
the context of a political system, since it explains why someone would enter or not enter
politics (see Figure 2.2). Yet also plausible is another utility calculus that would explain
why a certain type of politician would win or lose in a specific institutional setting.
Again, candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules would be at the costbenefit nexus. Yet rather than functioning as an incentive or disincentive, in this model
they function as game changers. Instead of the psychological effect shown in model
above, this second model shows the technical effect of the institutional rules.44

44

Psychological effect implying that the player personally thinks the “pros and cons” of a candidacy
through, and then arrives at a decision about entering the game or abstaining from the game. Technical
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P│ + Rα = 0 Rα = the rules in Germany

P│ + Rβ = 1

P║ + Rα = 1

P║ + Rβ = 0

Rβ = the rules in the United States

The first calculation shows that depending on the political persona partaking in the game
(P│ and P║), the candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules (Rα), cause a
distinct outcome, i.e. electoral loss or win. The second calculation shows that the game
under different rules (Rβ) leads to a different result. Figure 2.3 represents a typology that
is based on this.

Figure 2.3 Typology of Electoral Winners.
German setting
(Rules Rα)

American setting
(Rules Rβ)

Active‐
Politicians

lose

win

Passive‐
Politicians

win

lose

Yet in either case, the motivation of politicians is only relevant to my research as it
pertains to the institutional rules under scrutiny.45 My theoretical argument is not a claim

effect implies that the player enters the game and then wins or loses, on the basis of his or her capabilities.
(The terminology is thus different from Duverger’s mechanical effect and psychological effect.)
An analogy from sports can illustrate these two effects. If a 100 meters sprinter and a marathon runner have
to compete in a 5000 meter long distance run, each of them will have differing predispositions towards the
competition. The psychological effect can be that irrespective of their actual physical capability, the
athletes may enter the race or abstain from it. The marathon runner, for example, might think that if he can
run more than 42 kilometers, he can surely succeed in a five kilometer run. Or, he might think that the
sprinter is much faster than him, and would consequently abstain from the 5000 meter run, as being not
favorable for him. The technical effect exists if the sprinter is indeed better predisposed to win a 5000
meter run, when competing against a marathon runner (or vice versa).
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on what drives the progressive career steps in politics as a ladder of ambitious steps to
climb, but that politics is a “career choice” (Maddox 2003) that is guided by the
institutional framework. Politics is thus not the result of incentives based on “financial
compensation, achievement of policy goals, and general career satisfaction” (Maddox
2003) but an end in itself. A person, if he sees the institutional framework as congenial to
his personal predisposition, will choose politics as a vocation rather than a calling. I will
describe this distinction in the next section.

2.1.1. Corollary to Theory of Institutional Rules’ Effect on Elite Recruitment
If you recall the argument I made in the introductory chapter, I affirmed that rules can
encourage or discourage persons from entering politics.46 These candidate nomination
rules and campaign finance rules furthermore affect what type of political personality
type wins an election. Thus rules influence an entire process; a) self-selection, b)
nomination stage, and c) winning an election. At these three stages of the political
process, individuals with particular characteristics may have better chances. It is the third
step, the “end product,”47 that I analyze and where I argue that the socio-economic and
political profile of national legislators in the aggregate varies by institutional context.

45

And is empirically provable through political, educational, economic, and social-behavior.

46

Electoral rules have such regulatory function by regulating the likelihood of self-selection.

47

To statistically ascertain the second step is logistically prohibitive, as all candidates who lost out would
have to be included. Yet through interviews with national legislators, a verstehen of steps one and two can
be ascertained by approximation through the information provided by those who won.
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The variation within the recruited elite based on socio-economic and political experience
in turn, has an effect on democratic quality. This reasoning is paralleled by Weber, who
similarly observes that different “political characters” exist in politics, which affects a
state’s performance (Weber 2006: 354). In his article “Parlament und Regierung im
neugeordneten Deutschland” (Weber 2006: 349-462)48 this theorem is intensively
elaborated on and provides a good source of insight for my study.

The proposition that it matters who holds political office is exemplified by Max Weber
with the case of Otto von Bismarck whose (probably unintended) “political legacy” was
to deprive Germany of able political leaders. After Bismarck became Reichschancellor,
he hindered active-politicians from succeeding in politics so that he could rule unrivaled
as a “great statesman” (Weber 2006: 359). The rich pool of active-politicians in the
generation before Bismarck waned and were replaced by passive-politicians. Quality
candidates, as one would say today, were not attracted to politics anymore, since their
career prospects were severely limited. As a side-effect, the German populace got
accustomed to being ruled by a strongman, and “fatalistically” entrusted themselves to a
leader (Weber 2006: 359). This sociological example of Weber shows how important it is
to have rules of the game49 that are attractive for active-politicians to enter and succeed in
politics. It is of secondary importance if the gatekeepers are institutions – as in the case of
this research – or persons in a particular sociological context, as in this example. The
point made with this example is that active-type politicians, which are normatively
48

Originally published in 1918 in: Die innere Politik, München and Leipzig: v.S. Hellmann.

49

Be it institutionally or in this case personally.
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beneficial for the political process, can inherently be discouraged from entering politics
and/or succeeding in politics.

Another insightful and significant theorem of Weber is that the structure of the party is
relevant in determining who will join politics and who will refrain from doing so. Parties
that are led by a strong leader or a small oligarchic circle of bosses (Weber 2006: 363364), are less attractive for an active-politician since his political career is not in his own
hands but is largely determined by his party superiors. This elite party leadership
determines the party program, candidacy, and policies. The mass of the party
membership as well as ambitious active-politicians have little input and effect on the
party’s direction. Weber contrasts this oligarchic party with the American case, where he
observes that through regulation, opportunities for entrepreneurial personalities were
created with the reforms of the Progressive Era,50 giving the electorate en masse more
influence in the promotion of politicians (Weber 2006: 364).

Particularly useful is Weber’s categorization of parties into Weltanschauungs parties and
patronage parties. In the later case, the principle is that through elections, party leaders
gain political positions. In turn, this enables the party leaders to provide their supporters
with economic goods in the form of patronage. Weber ascribes this system to the United
States (Weber 2006: 365-366), where at the turn of the 20th century, patronage was still
prevalent in politics. Weber observes that the raison d’être of such a political party is to

50

Introduction of primaries, recalls, initiatives, referenda, etc. pp.
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get its leaders elected, so that in return economic benefits can be provided to the party
organizations. This is called “subaltern patronage” in the terminology of Weber. In
contrast, a party constituted by active-politicians, a Weltanschauungs party, is primarily
concerned with the implementation and realization of the political ideals of its members
(Weber 2006: 366).

A parliament that is predominantly filled with passive-politicians is not a parliament
where parler retains any meaning. Speeches end to be attempts to influence or convince
other members of the legislature and are not even expressions of one’s own conscience.
Instead, parliamentary speeches become canned, officiary declarations, which are agreed
on in the party’s parliamentary caucus (Weber 2006: 380). Weber observes parliaments
dominated by passive-politicians to exhibit a division of labor between “drones” and
“worker bees.” The dominant party elite constitute the worker bees while the passive
majority are the drones who fulfill a mere “representative” window-dressing function
(Weber 2006: 381). This is the consequence of politics dominated by passive-politicians.

An active-politician, who has an entrepreneurial-type character and is instinctively
seeking power and influence, will consequently shun a political system that surrenders
him to the will and fiat of an inner party circle. Translating this ideal-typical construct
into praxis, one can state that in the United States, an active-politician is largely immune
to the intrigues of party. The one reason given for this is that the active-politician can
always retreat and seek refuge with his constituency and appeal to them directly for
support. Yet the American politician does not rely on such fortunate electoral rules for his
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independence only. His hand is strengthened through Congress’ mode of operation as
well, which gives an active-politician enough power to act independently of party will.
Such dual “political independence” is missing in Germany, where legislators are seen to
constitute a “following” of the party elite (Weber 2006: 383).

On the basis of this delineation, two sets of rules become evident as influencing the
entrepreneurial independence of a politician. The first set of rules is what allows him to
stand for election and be elected (which is what I am analyzing in this dissertation). The
second set of rules is what determines how the politician can operate once in office. Thus
an active-politician will indeed not merely look for getting elected, but he will look ahead
at what the election will enable him to do. Thus two separate cost-benefit calculations are
plausible (Weber 2006: 383).

If the function of the legislature is largely “negative politics,” i.e. criticizing, debating,
and modifying governmental bills (Weber 2006: 385), an active-politician has no venue
for shaping politics, and thus has little to no incentive to become politically active and
will not run for reelection.51 A legislature that is doomed to “dilettantish stupidity”
(Weber 2006: 387), constitutes a good reason for dissuading active entrepreneurial-type
political characters from going into politics.

51

The withdrawal of Friedrich Merz is a good example for such resignation.
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In contrast to such legislatures (as in Germany) where legislators are bound by the strait
jacket of party-discipline, loyalty to the government, and accountability to the party-elite
for renomination and campaign financing, congressmen are purportedly free to act
without these strait jackets. Besides these factors, representatives and to an even greater
extent senators have considerable individual leverage on shaping the floor agenda as well
as vetoing legislative bills. Such autonomy makes first of all the office of congressman
attractive to an active entrepreneurial character. Second, this autonomy provides the
congressman with an office where he can build a reputation and a constituency base that
will help him get reelected.

Weber provides two other noteworthy observations that are still applicable today (Weber
2006: 388). Parliamentary committees in the Bundestag exist in the obscure darkness, out
of the public eyes. Their work is rarely noticed or even televised. In stark contrast to this
are Congress’ committees, which are well noted in the public and media in the United
States. Another interesting observation that can be applied to today’s politics is that while
in Germany politicians are “followers” of a “leader”, in the United States congressmen do
not constitute a “followership” but are rather organized like a “guild.” The
operationalization of this thesis would be that political leaders in the Bundestag can make
important decisions with “unlimited authority,” while congressional leaders could not
automatically count on the undivided support of fellow legislators (Weber 2006: 390).

Another observation of Weber that has influence on the attractiveness of politics for
entrepreneurial characters is his distinction between parliamentary and presidential
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regimes. Weber states that an institutionally separated political system (i.e. presidential
system) exists where the government (the executive in the American context) is faced by
a parliament, which is a “mere” (sic) representation of the governed. As such, the
legislature has a mere “negative” function on politics (Weber 2006: 393). One could
assume that this is the case in the United States with its presidential system where the
government is constitutionally separated from the legislature.

Through committee control, the budget process, and other shared powers, Congress is not
merely an assembly of the governed. It is quite influential in controlling the executive
branch. This contrasts with the parliamentary system of Germany. In Germany the
government has full control of the parliamentary process and the Bundestag is clearly
subjugated to it, since the majority of the Bundestag by default has to subjugate itself to
the government’s will to sustain it.

This leads to the dichotomous typology of political characters by Weber, which
resembles my dichotomous typology of active and passive-politicians. For Weber, there
are those who live for politics, and those who live of/ by politics.52 Those who live for
politics are not (permanently) dependent on politics as a vocation for their economical
sustenance. They are economically independent of politics. Thereby, such a politician’s
acts and thoughts are not influenced by personal material consequences (Weber 1992: 1617).

52

Which is not mutually exclusive, as he states.
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For such political personalities, a venture into politics is a casual and voluntary endeavor.
Weber contrasts these active-politicians with those politicians, who do not even have the
claim to be independent political actors. Instead, such vocational politicians (passivepoliticians), gladly submit themselves to the service of their political master, a
charismatic leader (Weber 1992: 14-15). For this type of politician, Weber points out that
plutocratic recruitment patterns are necessary, to weed out those who are
entrepreneurially independent political actors (Weber 1992: 18).

2.2 Theory of Function of Parties

In the previous section, I have delineated how the individual relates and responds to
institutional incentives for running and winning elective office. This interaction of the
individual political aspirant and the institutional rules is however ideal-typical. In reality,
this interaction occurs within the structure of the party (party in the broadest sense). My
conceptual framework of active-politicians and institutional rules (campaign finance rules
and candidate nomination rules) is embedded in the entity of the party. Thus my concept
is actually and theoretically an element of the party. In this section, therefore, I bring into
this research the pertinent theories on the function of parties in the context of my research
problem.
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While throughout this work, the term “party” is used, it is especially necessary in the
context of American political science to define the term from a global perspective.53 An
American political scientist (on the basis of his training) will very likely have a different
image in his mind when reading the word “party,” than a German, Turkish, or Chinese
person. This is due to the fact the function of a party varies from political system to
political system. By reviewing political science literature on parties and their definition,
this variation will become evident. It is therefore necessary at this point, to detail and
provide a definition of the theory and function of a party.

As the ideal typical definition of party, I use Max Weber’s definition (Weber 2006). His
definition is: A party is an association with the goal of getting its leaders elected into
positions of power. This is to enable the leaders to attain political goals and/or personal
gains for the benefit of the association’s supporters. These associations can be either
temporary or permanent. The followership can be comprised of charismatic followers,
traditional servants, or rational-ideological followers. The followers can either attain their
goal by just getting their leader elected or by being rewarded through patronage with
positions in the bureaucracy (Weber 2006: 211-214).54 This ideal type definition of

53

Converse and Pierce’s work (1979) is a good example to show that generalizations on party power and
legislators’ behavior have to be always made in comparative perspective. Their work shows that the
behavior of French legislators is diametrically opposed to that of American legislators. While their research
shows that American legislators are quite independent of their party and focus almost exclusively on their
constituency, this is not the case in France. French legislators align their behavior with the interests of their
party and not with that of either their constituency or their personal beliefs (Converse and Pierce 1979:
525).
54

§ 18. Parteien sollen heißen auf (formal) freier Werbung beruhende Vergesellschaftungen mit dem
Zweck, ihren Leitern innerhalb eines Verbandes Macht und ihren aktiven Teilnehmern dadurch (ideelle
oder materielle) Chancen (der Durchsetzung von sachlichen Zielen oder der Erlangung von persönlichen
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candidate selection as “one of the central defining functions of a political party in a
democracy” is thereby established (Katz 2001: 278).

Weber’s definition describes an organization whose activity is in the pre-electoral
process. Once the election is successfully concluded, the party has fulfilled its role.55 The
party is thus an electoral cartel. After the election, other forces are at work. This
definition contrasts sharply with that of the party in the American context. A good
example would be that of John Aldrich (1995). In his work, a completely different
understanding of party is given. When Aldrich thinks of party, he thinks of a “creature of
the politicians, the ambitious office seeker and officeholder” The party is an

Vorteilen oder beides) zuzuwenden. Sie können ephemere oder auf Dauer berechnete Vergesellschaftungen
sein, in Verbänden jeder Art auftreten und als Verbände jeder Form: charismatische Gefolgschaften,
traditionale Dienerschaften, rationale (zweck- oder wertrationale, »weltanschauungsmäßige«)
Anhängerschaften entstehen. Sie können mehr an persönlichen Interessen oder an sachlichen Zielen
orientiert sein. Praktisch können sie insbesondere offiziell oder effektiv ausschließlich: nur auf Erlangung
der Macht für den Führer und Besetzung der Stellen des Verwaltungsstabes durch ihren Stab gerichtet sein
(Patronage-Partei). Oder sie können vorwiegend und bewußt im Interesse von Ständen oder Klassen
(ständische bzw. Klassen-Partei) oder an konkreten sachlichen Zwecken oder an abstrakten Prinzipien
(Weltanschauungs-Partei) orientiert sein. Die Eroberung der Stellen des Verwaltungsstabes für ihre
Mitglieder pflegt aber mindestens Nebenzweck, die sachlichen »Programme« nicht selten nur Mittel der
Werbung der Außenstehenden als Teilnehmer zu sein.
Parteien sind begrifflich nur innerhalb eines Verbandes möglich, dessen Leitung sie beeinflussen oder
erobern wollen; jedoch sind interverbändliche Partei-Kartelle möglich und nicht selten.
Parteien können alle Mittel zur Erlangung der Macht anwenden. Da wo die Leitung durch (formal) freie
Wahl besetzt wird und Satzungen durch Abstimmung geschaffen werden, sind sie primär Organisationen
für die Werbung von Wahlstimmen und bei Abstimmungen vorgesehener Richtung legale Parteien. Legale
Parteien bedeuten infolge ihrer prinzipiell voluntaristischen (auf freier Werbung ruhenden) Grundlage
praktisch stets: daß der Betrieb der Politik Interessentenbetrieb ist (wobei hier der Gedanke an
»ökonomische« Interessenten noch ganz beiseite bleibt: es handelt sich um politische, also ideologisch oder
an der Macht als solcher, orientierte Interessenten).
...
Wirtschaftlich ist die Partei-Finanzierung eine für die Art der Einflußverteilung und der materiellen
Richtung des Parteihandelns zentral wichtige Frage: ob kleine Massenbeiträge, ob ideologischer
Mäzenatismus, ob interessierter (direkter und indirekter) Kauf, ob Besteuerung der durch die Partei
zugewendeten Chancen oder der ihr unterlegenen Gegner: – auch diese Problematik gehört aber im
einzelnen in die Staatssoziologie.
55

And the parliamentary caucus takes over.
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“endogenous56 institution” to the legislature, an institution that is there to help the
politicians achieve their goals (Aldrich 1995: 4).

Succinctly put, parties are for Aldrich a tool for politicians to overcome collective action
dilemmas in the legislature. A party is primarily a post-election organization. When
Aldrich writes that “parties are designed as attempts to solve problems that current
institutional arrangements do not solve and that politicians have come to believe they
cannot solve” (Aldrich 1995: 21-22), the ad-hoc character, the lack of reason for the party
to exist in its own right, becomes clear. This view of party as a vehicle created by the
politicians, rather than the other way around is profound (but not noted by Aldrich). The
logic of Aldrich’s argument is that if the institutional setting of Congress would be
altered, the reason for parties would go away.

This is a fundamentally different view of parties than in the German case. In Germany,
parties not only have a different role by default, they even have a constitutional basis.
Aldrich however, sees a party as an umbrella organization for the efficacy of legislative
accomplishments. Next, the party is there to maintain a productive relationship between
the separate branches of government. Finally, the party is an aide de camp to get elected
(mainly by providing an identifying party label).

56

Meaning internal to the legislature.
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The logic of Aldrich’s assumption of what parties are is found with David Mayhew, too.
As another well-known American political scientist, Mayhew (1974) makes the
reductionist claim that Congressmen are single-minded reelection seekers, pursuing the
three concepts of credit claiming, advertising, and position-taking to get reelected. What
is noteworthy for my study are not these claims made by Mayhew, but the evidence given
in the absence and irrelevance of parties in the sphere outside of Congress.

The entire process, based on Mayhew’s assumptions, of getting into Congress and staying
there, rests solely with the individual congressman’s faculties. The party is nowhere seen
as an agent in its own right. The only time the word “party” is used is when describing
the mode of organization of legislators inside Congress. Thus “party” is not a party in the
sense of the word as it is understood outside the United States, but as a vehicle of
coordination among congressmen at their convenience.

Steven Smith, mentioned earlier in the introduction, argues that congressmen “invent”
and “tolerate” parties (Smith 2007: 2). The semiotic relevance of this a statement is
profound. The logical consequence of Smith’s statement is that parties are the creation of
legislators for their convenience. Such marginalization of the party is taken to an extreme
in the work of Keith Krehbiel (1998). There, parties are figuratively thrown overboard,
and Congress’ actions are reduced to rational choice decisions of individuals.

The works of Cox and McCubbins (2005 and 2007) reveal how comparatively myopic
such understanding of the function of the party is. Cox and McCubbins argue against
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Krehbiel’s perspective that parties in America are irrelevant. To this end, they create the
“cartel theory” and define with this metaphor what a party is. A party is something akin
to a “procedural coalition” (Cox and McCubbins 2007). In developing the responsible
party theory, the party is likened to a law firm with senior and junior partners, out to
control the agenda. Agenda control (and not even the control of the vote) is what the
party is about. Yet even though Cox and McCubbins contradict those who are dismissive
of parties as functional entities in the United States, nonetheless Cox and McCubbins’
understanding of the party remains that of a legislative entity rather than a party in the
definition of Weber.

This state (and view) of the American party contrasts sharply with that of the German
party. The German party is an associational organization. It has dues-paying members,
decides whom it accepts as a member, and it has a defined local, state, and national
leadership which follows a party program. It has a hierarchically organized party
bureaucracy, and notably, German parties are even anchored in the constitution. In
Article One, Paragraph One of the German constitution, it is stated that parties participate
in the German peoples’ formation of a political opinion and mind.57 This and other legal

57

(1) Die Parteien wirken bei der politischen Willensbildung des Volkes mit. Ihre Gründung ist frei. Ihre
innere Ordnung muß demokratischen Grundsätzen entsprechen. Sie müssen über die Herkunft und
Verwendung ihrer Mittel sowie über ihr Vermögen öffentlich Rechenschaft geben.
(2) Parteien, die nach ihren Zielen oder nach dem Verhalten ihrer Anhänger darauf ausgehen, die
freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung zu beeinträchtigen oder zu beseitigen oder den Bestand der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu gefährden, sind verfassungswidrig. Über die Frage der
Verfassungswidrigkeit entscheidet das Bundesverfassungsgericht.
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definitions of parties emphasize58 the extra-parliamentarian role of parties and their role
as associational and collective bodies.

Consequently, I see that the syntactic logic of the term “party” is very different in the
view of American political science vs. the German understanding. In the former case, the
party is a candidate-centered entity, and increasingly, a legislature-centered entity. The
party in the American case is characterized as first, an impromptu creation to solve
problems between groups and/or individuals in a legislative body, and second, something
to be useful for getting reelected. The party and its rules are extraneous. In contrast, the
German party is an endogenous associational entity. It is an agent in its own right, thus
not a passive creation but an active creator.

2.3 The American case vis-à-vis Germany

In the previous section, I showed how different the understanding of the institution of the
party is in Germany and in the United States. Particularly in the American case, the party
is seen as a tool of legislative utility. A strong narrative in American political science is
that legislators behave in certain ways and pursue certain interests in the legislature. The
question is not asked, if the observation made might have anything to do with how
legislators were recruited into the legislature to begin with. It is plausible to assume that
the rules that determine who gets into the legislature and how he gets there might have an

58

N. b., in stark contrast to the above-given view of American political science.
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effect on who enters the legislature and how he acts there.59 One clue for who gets into
the legislature can be found in the notion of professionalization, which I analyze next.

In political science literature, “professionalization” is a popular term frequently used
when characterizing the American political class. This professionalization60 is contrasted
with pre-20th century American politics, where on average a third to a half of Congress
was comprised of first-termers, and thus a high turnover of congressmen existed. Not
until the 20th century did the average congressional tenure reach three terms (Borchert
and Zeiss 2003: 393).

It is clearly indicated that the composition of the political class underwent a transition.
The early political amateurism was welcomed as fitting for the American political ideal
of “classical republicanism.” This American political ideal called for politicians to be
recruited from the common people and to return to their regular lives after a brief stint in
politics. In this Weltanschauung, serving in Congress was a civic duty, not a career in its
own right (Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 393).61

This republican ideal came to an end around the turn of the 19th century. The reason
given for the demise of the republican practice of amateurism in politics is that national
59

Thus the focus is not just the rules that regulate action inside the legislature.

60

Representative Michelle Bachmann underlines this difference with her calling for “citizen legislators
rather than career lifetime politicians” (Michelle Bachmann, speech at 2012 Faith & Freedom Coalition
Conference).

61

In this context, the topos of Cincinnatus during the founding years of the United States comes to mind.
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politics became economically important. Not that Congressmen suddenly earned more
money, but that the legislative branch was appropriating, i.e. spending more money
(Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 394). This meant that what the Congressmen were doing
(spending money) became more important. Due to the change in the nature of
government, a change in its composition occurred. Ostensibly, different types of
politicians became attracted to politics, who liked to stay in Congress longer.

While the federal government spent merely five million dollars in 1792, its expenditure
had reached the billion dollar mark just before World War One. Throughout that era, the
federal government’s expenditure did not surpass five percent of the gross national
product and the federal government’s involvement in economic and domestic policymaking was very limited. Consequently, there were “few benefits to distribute” for
professional politicians in Washington (Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 394), making national
politics attractive for mostly those who had an interest in literally serving their country,
that is, idealists.

With the expansion of the federal government in the early 20th century, things changed
and the attractiveness and influence of a Washington career grew. This qualitative change
in the nature of government attracted a different type of legislator. The theoretical
explanation for this change is to be found with Max Weber. Weber theorizes that a person
with strong power instincts is detracted from an uninfluential and irrelevant office. Until
the change in the early 20th century, a “negative selection” would have occurred. But with
the rise of influence and relevance (such as distributing more benefits), entrepreneurial-
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type active-politicians would have become more attracted to politics. They could have
put to work their entrepreneurial skills and would not have been hindered by party control
in the legislature (Weber 2006: 382). In fact, the change in the nature of American
government was followed by a change in the relationship between the majority of
congressmen and the leadership (especially the speakership), as will be seen below.

This change in the nature of what it meant to be a congressman was accompanied by a
change in the type of representation. Initially, American politicians were “not merely
legislators, but rather party politicians” (Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 395). This hints at their
dual role as congressional politicians and partisan politicians where congressmen held
“numerous public and party offices, on the federal, state, and local levels”
simultaneously. The reason why so many different party offices were held at the same
time was due to the different functions of the party in the pre-Progressive Movement era.
The “hierarchically organized party machines on the local and state level worked as a
coordinating device” for elections (Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 396).

Thus different party offices had to be controlled to prevent challenges to one’s power and
seat in Congress. The crucial observation for American politics made in the preProgressive Era is that political offices were “handed over” to party-insiders by party
elites (Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 395).62 This starkly contrasts with the situation today,
where campaign functions are almost completely taken over by the deinstitutionalized

62

See Chapter 6 for the current praxis of this.
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campaign machines of the individual politicians, and the handing over of a political office
like an inheritance is in the United States a thing of the past.

This strong hold of congressmen on multiple party positions ends abruptly with reforms
begun in the Progressive Era. These reforms introduced the so-called Australian ballot
(a.k.a. secret ballot). Direct primaries, another reform, eroded the party elite’s ability to
control who became the candidate. This death blow to party power in the constituencies
was followed by an attack on party rule in Congress, from which the party “never quite
recovered” (Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 396). The combination of increased relevance of
national politics and the decreased ability of party elites to regulate entrance into politics,
lead to entrepreneurial-type active-politicians to enter American politics.

When factions of the Republican Party in collaboration with the Democrats curbed the
Speaker’s power in 1910 and shortly after that the direct election of Senators was
introduced, the last vestiges of party-power vanished from Congress. Instead of party
bureaucracies controlling political careers, politicians henceforth had to “develop their
own political organizations.” This allowed for entrepreneurial-type active-politicians to
compete in politics unhindered, where they were free to develop their own political
careers and strategies (Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 396).

The American political system, with its “abundance of electoral offices,” is particularly
suited for such active-politicians (Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 398). There are about 50,000
elected offices in the U.S. Then, there is the “very limited” existence of party
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bureaucracies that could influence candidate nomination procedures. These factors allow
politicians, who are “very independent-minded and act in their own interest and
according to their own conception of the public good” to be successful in politics. Thus,
these factors allow active-politicians to be successful in politics.

Crucially, in the American system party bureaucrats do not have a controlling influence
on the allocation of political offices. This means that there are no “safe fall-back
position[s] if one is not reelected or if a bid for higher office fails” (Borchert and Zeiss
2003: 399). Consequently, political and electoral decisions by American politicians have
to include a unique cost-benefit calculation, which is absent in partisan systems with
passive-politicians, where the party elite can reposition or “park” a politician in a
different venue.

In the American system, where primaries are (mostly) the real battleground, parties have
little say in the decision of who becomes its nominee. As numerous examples show,
running against the party insider or the darling of the party can indeed become an asset in
the American system. The primary interest of a politician is thus to be in a good standing
with the electorate and not with the party (Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 399). This favors the
prospects of active-politicians with their individual skills and capabilities to gain favor
with the constituency and overcome party resistance and control.

Hypothetically, this emphasis on individual accomplishments would favor a certain type
of person to the detriment of others. Gender-wise, it could be expected that women would
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be less likely to compete in this harsher environment (Matland and Montgomery 2003:
20-22). The 112th Congress is a case in point. It has 17 female Senators (twelve
Democrats, five Republicans) and 76 female Representatives (52 Democrats, 24
Republicans) (Congressional Research Service 2012).

While these numbers show that about a fifth to a quarter of national legislators are
women in the United States, this number is considerably lower than in comparably large
Western countries. The reason therefore is to be found in the electoral rules that favor
active-politicians and disadvantage those political aspirants whose predisposition is not
conducive for the respective institutional setting. The requirement for a candidate to build
his or her own campaign organization and fund it, works for experienced entrepreneurial
type males, disadvantaging women (but not just them).63 This “selection by selfselection” exemplifies the uniqueness of the American system, which is “unusually
permeable” (Borchert and Zeiss 2003:404). But this unusual permeability applies only to
a few who are able to cope with it.

Although party bureaucratic gatekeepers no longer exist (Norris 1995: 22), other
obstacles have taken their place. A prospective candidate has to calculate the costs of
achieving the goal of running for office and getting elected. He has to know how much of
his own financial resources he is able and willing to contribute and where to get the rest
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Ema Goldman’s treatise on the emancipation of women provides several arguments for why this might
be. She mentions the different nature of women, thus certain faculties not being – generally – in their
element. In addition, there is prejudice, both towards women as well as by women (Goldman 2003: 215222).
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from. So the role of gatekeepers in politics has moved away from the party and is now
either with the electorate (since they largely decide, with their votes and contributions,
who succeeds in politics) or with those who can rely on their own financial and
organizational capabilities (Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 405).

These observations can be summarized in this hypothesis: If the decision to run or not to
run rests exclusively with the individual candidate, then this means that the candidate’s
own assessment of his capabilities and capacities as well as his political knowledge and
experience will be decisive. He will make a decision on the basis of his own assessment
of his ability to raise funds and organize a campaign that will give him the nomination
and eventual electoral success. Active type politicians are clearly in advantage by having
established a reputation with the people rather than with the party and by having
gained in their professional life the skills needed to succeed in a undertaking like this.
Thus they will have a positive self-assessment of their chances to succeed in politics as
an entrepreneurial endeavor. The opposite observation can be made in the case of
Germany, where reputation with the party and not with the people is the key to success,
thus advantaging passive-politicians. The self-assessment for success in politics will not
be based on one’s entrepreneurial and organizational capabilities and achievements, but
on one’s standing with a group of partisans (whose size can vary considerably).

Another difference between Germany and the United States is that in American politics
the professionalization of politics and the disempowerment of the party machines allowed
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for active-politicians to enter politics, those who mainly live “for” politics.64 In Germany
however, the opposite trend occurred. Initially, entry to politics was costly in Germany.
People could simply not live by politics. Thus only people who were able to live for,
rather than by politics were able to compete in elections (Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 142).
This theoretical distinction has practical effects, too.

For Weber, only someone who lives “for” politics can become a “great politician.”
Someone who lives “of” politics is doomed to passivity, and is indeed inclined to the
comfort that such passivity provides (Weber 2006: 396). At this stage of research, it
suffices to clarify that normatively, living for rather than by politics in the context of
active versus passive-politicians does not imply that one is the better or worse when it
comes to delivering good politics for the polity.65

In the German case, during the Second Reich (1871-1918), a “certain financial
independence” was necessary to run and hold office. This was done on purpose. The goal
was to maintain a “socially skewed character of the membership;” i.e. having an
aristocratic legislature (Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 142-143).66 The electoral system was a
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They simply do not have the need to live by politics.
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There is, however, a lot of anecdotal evidence, which is suggestive of the fact that an active-politician,
i.e. someone who has made a living outside of politics, is someone to be preferred for political office. The
British journalist Jeremy Paxman described this in the following way: “I think you should have done
something in the world before you put yourself in the position where you’re making judgments that affect
the lives of all of us” (The Graham Norton Show, Series 14, Episode 4).
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Arguably either by default or design, this is still the case in the United States, where the campaign
financing rules and candidate nomination rules set such high entry costs, that they function as a de facto
gate-keepers for an exclusive club.
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majoritarian system with run-off elections. The electoral process was thus centered on the
candidate in the constituency. Only with the transition to the Weimar Republic was this
individualist system replaced with a proportional representational system. This new
system fundamentally altered the power relationship between candidate and party (for
candidate nominations and campaigns) giving power to the latter. Decisions over who
would become a candidate moved away from actors in the constituency and power was
concentrated in the party hierarchy. This ended the ability for entrepreneurial-type quality
candidates to act independently in politics, thus closing the door to politics for activepoliticians (Borchert and Zeiss 2003: 144).

It becomes clear that quite a lot of parallels exist between the modern Congress and the
Reichstag of the Kaiserzeit. Another similarity between the two is the role lobbyists
played and still play. During the Kaiserzeit, interest groups played a crucial role in
electoral campaigns, easing the burden of entering parliament on candidates by giving
them ample contributions. Today, in the American case, interest groups67 play the same
crucial role as financiers for political entrepreneurs’ political ambitions and (supposedly)
getting in return influence on the voting behavior of legislators (Borchert and Zeiss 2003:
144).

Based on these events, the argument can be made that the Progressive movement in the
United States diminished party influence and allowed for the progression of active-
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= lobbyists.
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politicians in American politics. In Germany, the opposite occurred. After the relative
independence of Reichstag members during the Kaiserzeit, a more party-centric electoral
system was introduced. After the interregnum of the Third Reich, the party-centric
system continued. While with the mixed system this was partially ameliorated in the
Bundesrepublik, political parties nonetheless continued to be at the center of politics and
not individuals. Therefore, parties were even made part of the constitution (Borchert and
Zeiss 2003: 144-145).

In this party-centric system, where the nomination, and more crucially the renomination
of the legislator is in the hands of the party, a significant problem is “mandateindependence” (Thaysen 1990: 68). Mandate independence refers to the problem that
since the party has – in one way or the other – the last say on a politician’s future, the
politician might not feel free to act, and especially vote, the way his conscience dictates
or the way the electorate wants him to vote, but instead the politician votes the way that
will garner him most sympathy from the party. Because of this problem, a base
democratic nomination system was advocated in the 1970s and 1980s in Germany
(Thaysen 1990: 70).

This issue has to be seen in the context of Germany being both a party state and a
parliamentary state (Thaysen 1990: 70); a party state, in the sense that parties are per
constitutio part of the political process, as mentioned earlier. Thus they are endogenous to
the state. The constitution, furthermore, prescribes that the Bundestag is the central
institutional organ of the state. The legislator is the person who brings these two
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institutional settings together. In this dual role, the German politician is not only a
legislator, but also a party member. The mandate is therefore strongly tied to one’s party
affiliation. Thus when legislators leave their party, they are called upon to resign from
their seat in the legislature as well. This view, of seeing the seat in the legislature as
somehow being the property of the party rather than that of the legislator, is not the
prevalent view in German political culture (Thaysen 1990: 73), but much more
pronounced than in the United States, for example.

Nonetheless, the question arises for the outside observer wether the German
parliamentary groups are “remote controlled.” What is alluded to with that phrase is not
the relationship between the individual legislator and the party, but rather the relationship
between two collectives: parliamentary groups and the party (Thaysen 1990: 76). In
comparative perspective between the United States and Germany, the significance of this
distinction becomes clearer. In the United States, especially due to the candidate
nomination rules and the campaign financing rules, the individual legislator is “remote
controlled” by his constituency, i.e. the people who give him their money and their votes.
The party, as it is understood in the American political science context, is the
parliamentary group, i.e. the party in Congress. Its power is almost completely limited to
having an influence on the individual legislator’s congressional activity (legislation and
committees) and functions as a problem-solving entity. The term and understanding of
“party” is therefore internal to the legislature.
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In the German context, the “party” is external to the legislature. Due to this, the
expression “remote control” makes sense. There is a organizationally remote entity that
influences the parliamentary group. The parliamentary group (equaling the “party” in the
American political science usage) is a separate collective entity, under the tutelage of the
party. The hierarchical party organization guides and supports the parliamentary group.
In a way, one could describe the parliamentary group (as a collective) as an appendix to
the party. In contrast, the American Congress is an aggregate of individuals who
represent their respective constituencies (district or state). It is then in this context, that
the individual legislator in Germany has to mind both the party and the parliamentary
group and thus the issue of “mandate independence” arises as a distinguishing feature of
German politics.

A last point that has to be made when comparing Germany and the United States is the
peculiar electoral system of Germany, with its mixed-member electoral system.68 Half of
the Bundestag is elected in single member districts, just as in the United States. The other
half is elected in a proportional representation system on state party lists. This is a well
known and well researched political phenomenon (Thaysen 1990). The focus of the bulk
of these studies is on the post-election effects and consequences of the German electoral
system. (Carlson 2006: 363). My work focuses on the pre-election stage and specifically
on how elite recruitment is conditioned by institutional rules. Thus this research sheds
light onto the less attended pre-election stage of politics.

68

By now there are many epigones of Germany’s system.
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2.4 Institutionalist and Behavioralist Theories

Having theoretically delineated the connection between the two institutional rules
(candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules) and elite recruitment, I want
to define what actually is understood under institutions and how candidate nomination
rules and campaign financing rules fit into the category of institutions. Thereby, I will
clarify what institutions are and how institutions function. The two electoral rules at hand
both formally organize an institutional procedure. Every participant of the game,
everyone who wants to enter the national legislature, is subject to these same institutional
rules.

Traditionally, theories of institutionalism, including new institutionalism, ascribe the
label of “institutions” narrowly to only “formally organized social institutions.” An
example will be a legislature or a court (March and Olsen 1984: 734). Yet the term
“institution” is theoretically applied to other formally organized social rules as well.
Campaign financing rules and candidate nomination rules are such formally organized
spheres of political action. They are not an institution like a legislature, yet in both cases
political behavior is performed under regulatory constrains. Thus the label “institution” is
apposite.

This theoretical postulate of (new) institutionalism contrasts with behavioralism, where
the assumption is that all political behavior is a consequence of individual choice rather
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than institutional rules that constrain behavior. My active/passive-politician model takes
both of these theoretical perspectives into account. Thus I state that both the individual’s
characteristics and institutional structures are simultaneously determinant of political
behavior. My model is not “reductionist” but “utilitarian,” in that I regard politicians’
actions as a result of a determined cost-benefit calculus (March and Olsen 1984: 735) in
the refined bivariate rational choice matrix.

I have to add that this self-interested behavior I argue for is free of Marxist terminology.
While “class, geography, climate, ethnicity, language, culture, economic conditions,
demography, technology, ideology, and religion” all are relevant for political behavior, I
do not see class differences, as it is argued for in Marxist political science, as a singular
noteworthy effect and as an explanation for political differences (March and Olsen 1984:
735).

My theoretical proposition on the two institutional rules at hand is as follows: Campaign
financing rules and candidate nomination rules limit free decision making of political
actors (i.e. active and passive-politicians in the case of this study). At the same time,
politicians act on the basis of “deliberate” and “calculated decisions” (March and Olsen
1984: 735) that include but are not limited to the institutional rules. This flexible,
succinct, and realistic description acknowledges the high-intensity interactivity between
rules and actors and puts this study’s theoretical perspective into the field of new
institutionalism. The claim that institutions are political actors in their own right is not
shared and is set aside as imprecise (March and Olsen 1984: 738).
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My reasoning fits into new institutionalism and its theoretical claim that “institutional
arrangements shape purposive behavior” (Brace and Hall 1990: 54). Such new
institutionalist theory is particularly useful for my work, since it “reconciles institutional
and attitudinal approaches.” Thus, “outcomes [are] not merely the collective expression
of individual preferences or the result of structural characteristics of institutions, but
rather a complex interaction” of them (Brace and Hall 1990: 55; March and Olsen 1984:
735).

This theory when applied to my research means that active and passive-politicians enter
politics both on their own volition, as well as on the basis of the opportunities provided to
them by the respective institutional setting. Every politician has his own idiosyncratic
reason why he wants to be in politics. Some go into politics for economic reasons, as the
monetary compensation is seen as attractive. Others do this for idealistic reasons. They
want to see their ideals realized in politics. Others can enter politics for purely power
motives. There can be many reasons. All this is covered with the “individual preferences”
aspect. The important point is that the institution setting these entrance conditions has –
metaphorically speaking – the last word.

By refraining from alluding to different motives for politicians’ actions, I am unhindered
in focusing on the “institutionalized form of political behavior” (Jackman 1987: 406) to
account for the “structural characteristics of institutions.” Yet I do not claim that
institutions are “political actors in their own right” (March and Olsen: 1984: 738), and
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actively and dynamically influence politicians. They are instead constants of political life,
which have to be accepted as they are. There is a logical difference between stating that
institutions are imperative in determining behavior (which I do) and imbuing them with
agency ex nihilo (which I do not do).

Another qualification to new institutionalist theory I make is in regard to rational choice
institutionalism, which I realign with sociological institutionalism. Rational choice
institutionalism has the following claim: “When making decisions, individuals do not ask
the question ‘how do I maximize my interest in this situation?’ but instead ‘what is the
appropriate response to this situation given my position and responsibilities?’” (Koelble
1995: 233). I argue that the two sides given in this definition are not mutually exclusive.
This interest-driven definition can be realigned into a statement like, “How can I
maximize my interest in this situation under the existing institutional constraints?”

In regard to rational choice institutionalism, I agree partly with the postulate that “even
small institutional details can have important and predictable results” (Tsebelis 1991: 97).
I concur with the assertion that even small institutional details can have important
effects.69 I disagree however with the assertion that institutional rules will have
predictable results. While I agree that generalizations are possible, they have to be
qualified. Institutional rules are not natural laws. They depend on cultural norms to be
enforced. Thus, institutions are the “formal rules of political or social games” and
69

In the case of my research, I will detail these differences in the next chapter. Then, I will be able to state
to what extent the institutional differences are small or large.
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therefore function as constraints on political actor(s) (Tsebelis 1991: 96), yet not always
and not on every actor.

I add another layer of realism to institutionalist theory and still keeping it succinct by
using the concept of hard and soft constrains which institutional rules exert (Strom et al.
1994: 307). This way, I achieve my goal of providing a plausible theory of attraction to
politics by institutional rules, yet keeping the theory economical (Strom et al. 1994:
307+309). In the work of Kaare Strom, the differentiation between hard and soft
constrains is to be found. Hard constraints are institutional rules that are “both specific
and enforceable.” Soft-constraint institutional rules are “less specific, less enforceable”
(Strom 1994: 309), or simply rules that are not legally enforceable, yet are still accepted
informally.

In Strom’s work, institutions are seen as agents in their own right and it is accepted that
institutions constrain and shape political behavior. Strom’s institutional emphasis is on
procedural constraints (Strom 1994: 305), in contrast to the electoral constrains of my
research. Strom’s aim is to show that political bargaining between political parties in the
process of coalition formation is influenced by the respective institutional setting (Strom
1994: 306).

I argue, paralleling Strom’s reasoning that one has to regard candidate nomination rules
and campaign financing rules as another area of constraints on party power, just as
procedural constraints on party power exist inside the legislature, as shown in Strom’s
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work. Being aware of this crucial distinction allows for the construction of more realistic
neo-institutionalist theories of behavior. In the next chapter, where I analyze the rules
used in Germany and in the United States, I will be able to state preliminarily to what
extent they are hard and soft constraints.

2.5 Analysis

In conclusion, I summarize the major findings of this chapter, for building a model of
institutional rules’ effect on elite recruitment. The underlying goal thereby is, as said, to
identify empirically verifiable recruitment patterns in the institutional settings of
Germany and the United States that can be correlated with the respective institutional
rules pertaining to candidate nominations and campaign financing. Logically continuing
this underlying goal, I made the prediction that that more active type of politicians would
be found in the House of Representatives than in the Bundestag, since in the American
case, self-selection is a more viable pathway into politics due to the American candidate
nomination rules and campaign financing rules. Thus the hypothesis that variation in
recruitment opportunities leads to variation in the recruited elite.

Additionally, this chapter provided indicators for the identification of the effects of the
theoretical effects of the analyzed candidate nomination rules and campaign financing
rules. These were that political systems that have a lot of active type politicians would be
marked by weak political parties. Also, I identified insider nominations by party elites in
Germany as an effect, and the absence thereof in the case of the United States. Based on
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the theory, my model proposes that the organization of Congressmen does not constitute
a “followership” but resemble something like a “guild.

With this, I am able to connect my model of institutional rules and their effect on elite
recruitment to the party. This is beneficial and crucial, since the institutional rules and the
recruited elite do not function in and of themselves, but are located under and within the
body of the party. The theoretical discussion of institutional rules effect on elite
recruitment is practically embedded within parties. Thus the understanding of the party
as a kind of umbrella organization helps to properly understand the particular case of
institutional rules and elite recruitment into national legislatures, which take place under
this umbrella.

It is therefore the result of this discussion, to show the importance of the organization of
“party” when trying to analyze institutional rules in either the post-electoral or preelectoral stage. Thus it is necessary to theoretically define the institutional function of a
party, too. This enables me to create a typology of a party, which I apply to the German
and American cases. The theory of the institutional function of a party was already given
in section 2.2. Yet as seen there, several theories exist, which are mutually exclusive.
Thus I combine them in a meta-theory of a function of parties that will provide me with a
typology,70 now in the context of institutional rules. The statistical analysis can
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A typology is inherently subjective. Making selections based on intuition is nonetheless useful for
scientific research as it provides a succinct and comparative explanation of a phenomenon. A typology of a
party can be made on the basis of many criteria, such as:
 Party program
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consequently show that the party typology correlates with the active/ passive-politician
model.

For the purpose of creating a typology of parties in the context of institutional rules,
parties can be categorized on the basis of their component parts and the functions of their
component parts. Stated in the form of questions, the typology would be created by
answering these questions: Does a national party structure exist, and what is its agency?
To what extent is the national party organization bureaucratically organized, independent,
and permanent? Is there an institutionalized party, which exists independently of the
“whim” (Bibby and Cotter 1980: 2) of candidates and politicians? To what extent are
local, state, and party organizations hierarchically organized and connected? To what
extent has the bureaucratic body of the party programmatic independence?

On the basis of these questions, a typology of parties can be created. There can be a party,
which has permanent party structures, versus a “continuing pattern of ad hoc staffing.”
Party work can be done by professional staff or, in contrast, such a function can be
performed by “notable” politicians (Bibby and Cotter 1980: 3). It can be differentiated
between a party leadership which is synonymous with political office-holding and a party
leadership that is functionally separated from political office (Bibby and Cotter 1980: 7).








Ideology
Origin and evolution of the party
Organization and structure of the party
Its electoral base
The sociological composition of its membership/ supporter base (Decker 2007: 62-63).
Or, as in the case of my work, a typology on the basis of the elite recruitment mechanisms.

95

The answers to these questions, cumulatively, are then conducive to creating a
categorization of a party, as said, and to gauge the institutional rules into hard and soft
constraints.

Such theoretical categorization has practical applications. For example, in the American
case, besides the election campaign, phenomena like the permanent campaign and the
preemptive campaign exist (Jacobson 1997: 76), while such is absent in Germany. In
comparative perspective, this difference is remarkable. It underlines how elections in the
United States are competitions between incumbents and challengers, versus a competition
among parties in Germany. The different organization and function of a party, they were
described in this chapter, can be seen as the explanation par excellence for this
dissimilarity.

With such a theoretical tool as described here, my model will also lead to a better
understanding on who controls the pre-electoral candidate nomination and campaign
financing processes. Thus the central goal of this study, to ascertain what the effects of
institutional rules are on elite recruitment will be understood in a broader and thus
thorough context. This in turn provides insight into who is involved in politics, who is in
the legislatures, and who has the power in the party. Thus, a lot of explanatory power is
derived from such a model. Such an institutionalist model is, however, not unrivaled. The
previously mentioned behavioralist approach is the significant alternative to
institutionalist explanations.

96

In either case, an almost exclusive focus was on legislative behavior. Institutionalist
theory was used to explain proportionality of representation, the number of parties in
parliament, government stability, and policy results (Hix 2004: 194). My contribution is
to extend this logic to recruitment patterns in an empirically solid manner.
Metaphorically speaking, I move the spotlight from post-electoral results to pre-electoral
outcomes. Having delineated the different views on political behavior of behavioralism
and institutionalism, I am able to analyze in the next chapter the institutional framework
for how candidates are nominated and how campaigns are financed in the United States
and in Germany, to show how the differences therein effect what has been discussed in
this chapter.

In conclusion of this chapter, I want to point out that the hitherto theoretical discussion
strengthened my model. First, my theoretical assumption that institutional rules have an
affect on politicians’ behavior was shown to be an idea that is common in political
science literature. Many political scientists concur that institutional rules influence
politicians’ behavior. Some see institutional rules even as determinative. Thus, I can
build on this axiomatic theoretical assumption my specific hypothesis on the effects of
candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules.

Secondly, my dichotomous categorization of politicians’ personality type is again an idea
that is common inside and outside of the political science literature. As the review
showed, many scholars provide a dual psychological division of political actors, to which
my active-politician and passive-politician distinction is akin. Consequently, I established
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that my core theoretical assumptions on which I build my model are common and shared
inside and outside the political science literature.
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CHAPTER 3 – THE GERMAN AND AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK FOR CANDIDATE NOMINATIONS AND CAMPAIGN
FINANCING: A COMPARISON

In the previous chapter, I reviewed political science literature on institutional rules and
how they relate to elite recruitment and party politics. I drew a number of hypotheses and
conclusions. In this chapter, the German and American institutional framework pertaining
to candidate nomination and campaign financing rules will be analyzed and compared.
Thereby it will become clear how the respective institutional system is built and why it is
favorable or respectively unfavorable for certain political characters.

I will detail the institutional setting on how a candidate is nominated and how campaign
finances are raised. Before going into the details of these two topics in comparative
perspective, first a general and praxis-oriented analysis of the political party in Germany
and in the United States is provided. This analysis allows for integrating the specific rules
of candidate nomination and campaign financing into the broader function of parties in
the respective political systems and sets the theoretical assumptions of the previous
chapter in conjunction with the practical reality of parties.

3.1.1 The Political Party in Germany

In Germany, political parties and election campaigns have a long tradition. Yet in
contrast to the continuous historical evolution of these institutions in the United States,
Germany’s parties and elections were affected by several disruptions and resets. Even
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before the Second Empire (1871-1918), parties and elections were widespread in the
German states. Elections and parties were heterogeneous in that different German states
had different parties and different electoral systems. After 1871, this did not change
much. With Austria excluded, the different German states organized themselves within
the Second Reich, while they maintained their respective electoral systems. Two
institutions were created: the national legislature, the Reichstag, and the Bundesrat(h),
which was the representation of the states in the Reich and had legislative, executive, and
judiciary functions.

The electoral rules for the Reichstag were considered to be the most progressive in
Europe at that time. All males above the age of 25 had the right to vote. Representatives
were elected in each of the 382 single member districts. With the incorporation of
Alsace-Lorraine, 15 additional seats were created. Representatives had to win a majority
of the votes, so run-off elections were used. In all, twelve elections were held for the
Reichstag between 1871 and 1912, the last election prior to the war. Voter turnout
increased during this time from 50.7 percent to 84.5 percent in 1912 (vide Infoblatt).

It was in this era that the modern German party system was established. The social
democratic party, the SPD, was already represented in the first Reichstag, and grew
steadily to become the largest party by 1912. Conservative, Catholic, and liberal parties
also have their roots in the Reichstag of the Second Reich. In the Reichstag, German MPs
did not initially receive any financial compensation for their tenure. This was changed
only in 1906, helping especially SPD representatives, who generally had a working-class
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background and therefore no personal financial reserves, which made them dependent on
aid from the party (James 2003: 7-8).

With the end of the Kaiserreich, the electoral system changed. Proportional
representation replaced the single member districts. The size of the Reichstag was now
dependent on voter turnout, as seats were allocated per 60,000 votes gained. During the
Weimar Republic, the party label became most important. Voters were now casting their
vote for a party rather than a person (James 2003:9). This system lasted until 1933, when
the March election was the last one held with more than one party. After that, only the
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) was allowed to participate in
the elections to the Reichstag (James 2003: 11).

After World War II, the German party system underwent fundamental changes. Parties
were founded in the respective zones of occupation under the guidance of the military
governments. With the establishment of the Federal Republic and the election of the first
Bundestag, many parties were represented both in parliament and in government. The
high number of parties abated over the course of the 1950s, until the German party
system balanced out at a two and a half party system71 by 1960. This partisan equilibrium
held until the 1980s, when with the Greens a fourth party established itself in national
politics (Decker 2007: 22). Thus the two and a half party system was replaced by a
dichotomous system, with the CDU/CSU and FDP on one side, and the SPD and the
71

The CDU/CSU (Christlich Demokratische Union and Christlich Soziale
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands), and (Freie Demokratische Partei) FDP.
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Union),

SPD

Greens (Die Grünen) on the other. This dichotomous system was short lived. With the
unification in 1990, the socialist Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS)
established itself as a fifth party in German politics72 (Decker 2007: 23).

This new and current German party system has been marked by increased voter volatility
(Decker 2007: 30). The SPD lost drastically in voter support and membership, while
other parties show strong growth and new parties arise. The SPD now lingers in the low
twenties; a novum in the history of the Federal Republic. While the FDP entered the 2009
Bundestag with almost fifteen percent of the vote, it failed to overcome the five percent
threshold at 2013 Bundestag election. The Greens on the other hand, were polling around
fifteen percent, in the end their vote share was almost half of what the party was polling
just a few years ago.

Another indicative example for the volatility of the modern German party system is that
new parties arise. The Pirates party polled strongly in 2011 and 2012 at over ten percent
in opinion polls. In several Landtag elections it managed to enter the state legislature. Yet
its support vanished quickly and at the 2013 Bundestag election it received significantly
less than five percent of the votes. Another new party, the Alternative für Deutschland
(AfD), which was established only in the spring of 2013, almost overcame the five
percent threshold at the 2013 Bundestag elections by gaining 4.7 %. One explanation for
this increase in voter volatility is a shortage of high-quality, competent politicians. This is
72

After the merger with the WASG (Wahlalternative Sozial Gerechtigkeit), the PDS changed its name to
Linkspartei, which literally means left-party.
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explained with, among other things, the shortcomings of the existing system for elite
recruitment (Leif 2009: 15).

Pertinent to understanding how and why German politicians relate to their party is the
fact that one half of the Bundestag is elected through proportional representation (PR)
state lists and the other half is elected in single-member districts (SMD), following the
first past the post (FPTP) rule. Thus the voter has two votes to cast; the famous
Erststimme (for the SMD candidate) and Zweitstimme (for the state party list). This
electoral system is frequently labeled as a mixed-member system and/or mixed-member
majoritarian system (MMS) in political science literature. The district magnitude is for
the SMD portion one of course. For the PR portion, the district magnitude varies, as the
Länder constitute individual districts and not the Bund at large. The legal threshold for
representation is thereby five percent in the PR portion. This threshold can be
circumvented however, if a party gains at least three SMD seats (see Cox 1997 for the
classification of the termini technici and Niclauß 2002 for the German case).

In the existing literature on this connection the proposition is made that the behavior of
the legislators will vary according to the way they were selected as candidates (Hix and
Jun 2010: 153). The idea is that when “senior party barons” have a say in who becomes a
legislator and who gets renominated, this circumstance has an effect on politicians’
behavior in office (Hix and Jun 2010: 154+157).
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The claim by Hix and Jun is that politicians who are “elected under candidate-centric
electoral rules…are more likely to be independent from their parties than politicians who
are elected under party-centric rules” (Hix and Jun 2010: 154). The thesis that political
behavior is correlated with the type of electoral rules has been tested frequently (Hix and
Jun 2010; Carey 2007; Shugart 2005; Shugart et. al 2005; Mitchell 2000; Samuels 1999;
Carey and Shugart 1995). Yet no one has analyzed if indeed different electoral rules
actually attract different types of people and if such differences are statistically
measurable. This is what I pursue with the present study, as mentioned in the first
chapter. Based on the theory I have developed, my prediction is that in Germany more
passive-politicians will be present in the national legislature than in the United States
Congress.

In the context of German parties, it is also necessary to elaborate briefly on theories of
state funding of the political system. State subsidies to parties are decisive for their
activities. State subsidies are for the most part either the most important or second most
important source of income for all major German parties. With these funds parties defray
most of their expenditures, particularly costs for elections. Furthermore, the half billion
dollar subsidy for partisan foundations (Parteienstiftungen) is another crucial and indirect
state support for the major German parties (von Aleman 2003: 90-94).

In the introduction I mentioned that state funding of parties is alleged to lead to a
disconnect of the party from its social base, a “lack of responsiveness to the electorate,
and declining competitiveness” (Young et al. 2005). This is plausible, assuming that if a
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party can fund its operations without public support, it has the luxury and means to act
independently of campaign donations. Another effect of state funding of parties is
arguably that it leads to a less competitive party system (Young et al. 2005), and to
plutocratic rather than democratic regimes (Scarow 2006: 619). Institutional means, such
as a minimum vote share to qualify for state funding and reimbursement of campaign
expenses, work to the disadvantage of small parties, impeding them from advancing and
of supporting independent candidates (Scarow 2006: 624). Thus such schemes can be
seen as working to the advantage of a party-centric rather than a candidate-centric
political system. The prediction based on my theory is that in Germany a party-centric
system exists.

As a result, German parties are at present (in their functions as organizations) strong and
influential in many respects. The role of the party, particularly in parliament, further
increased in the German case through the fact that in the multi-party Bundestag,
governments are usually coalition governments. Coalition governments decrease the
relevance of the individual legislator and increase the role of the party leadership, since
the government is a constant bargaining relationship between the leaderships of different
parties. In coalition governments, for example, one of the factors for assigning committee
chair positions is on the basis of party affiliation. Since ministerial positions are given to
representatives of one of the coalition parties, the other party tries to control the coalition
partner by placing a member of its party in a committee chairmanship that deals with the
corresponding ministry (Kim and Loewenberg 2005: 1106-1107). This not only shows
that the German party has functions that are alien to those of the American party, but also
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hints towards the practice of gentlemen’s agreements in the Bundestag, as there are no
formal rules for alternating committee chairmanships with ministerial positions.

To name another example that increases the strength of the party leadership at the cost of
the individual legislator: In Germany the governments are usually coalition governments.
Coalitions require two separate party caucuses to cooperate in order to organize a policy
agenda (Martin 2004: 446). The bargaining process between two (or more) party
caucuses is necessarily conducted by the selected few (i.e. the party leadership). This
functional distinction of a small elite in the position of leadership increases their power
and decreases that of the rank and file party caucus member.

A proper understanding of German parties requires one to note that in the German legal
system, parties can be outlawed. This idea of ruling parties and their operations is
included in the constitution (Article 21, Section 2, Sentence 1) (Decker 2007: 100). Thus
the German party is something larger than an electoral tool. It is there to organize,
influence, and guide the populace’s political will (Decker 2007: 79). Representation in
the Bundestag and the state legislatures is just one aspect of its task besides organizing
the people in an associational manner (Decker 2007: 81). In this associational task, the
German state in its function as lawgiver is forbidden to regulate who can enter and leave
parties (Decker 2007: 85).

Thus the resemblance of the German party is that of a création extérieure in the party
typology of Duverger (Duverger 1958: 14). The legal construction of the party and
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election system in Germany is built around the entity of the party rather than the
legislator. The legislator is perceived to be part of a whole (the whole being the party)
rather than an agent in his own right. While legislative work is one crucial aspect of the
party (through the representatives), it is not all of it. Instead, the party is there to organize
the political life of the citizenry, inside and outside of the legislative process.

3.1.2 The Political Party in the United States

In the case of the American party, the legal foundation is quite different from that of the
German party. In the U.S. Constitution, the party is not mentioned. The term is
prominently featured erstwhile in the Federalist Papers. Yet there, the term “party” has a
different meaning from what is commonly understood today. A party was not depicted as
an organization in and of itself, an institution with a membership and a hierarchical
structure, but rather in the sense of a Weltanschauung and its supporters being in
opposition to another party. Thus a party was something to be shunned; not in an
organizational manner but as a divisive intellectual existence.

Due to this creational ambiguity, parties are left to organize as they see proper, without
much legal interference. While some states tried to regulate how parties organized and
internally governed themselves, such attempts were overturned by the American judiciary
(Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 8).
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While the word “party” denotes an institutional structure in the German context, in the
American context “party” is an umbrella term or just an amorphous label. A
hermeneutical exercise in American political science literature provides evidence of this
nomenclature. Party, within the American language usage, refers to a multitude of legally
separate organizations. Indeed, some of the organizations carrying the label party are de
facto not even bureaucratically organized as such. Exemplary therefore is a statement like
this:
When the parties in a state are weak, the legislative parties are also likely
to be weak. The two parties are not likely to be very cohesive on issues,
and voting in the legislature does not often follow party lines (Jewell and
Morehouse 2001: 4).
This statement evidently describes an organic and institutional difference between a party
in the legislature and a party ambiguously located somewhere in the state. For that matter,
there is no book with a title like The American Party System or Political Parties in the
United States. Indeed, one of the most prominent political science books on parties by
John Aldrich asks Why Parties? In Aldrich’s study, parties are not an associational
institutions in the definition of Weber, but an ad hoc solution to an impasse73 in the
institution of the U.S. Congress (Aldrich 1995: 91). Party is understood as something in
the realm of party unity scores (Aldrich 1995: 176). This emphasis on the legislature as
the place of origin, solidly locates the American party in the category of création
parlementaire in Duverger’s typology (Duverger 1958: 14). Party is a word used to
designate legislative caucuses, and mostly the congressional legislative caucuses.
73

The impasse specifically being votes on “key issues” (Aldrich 1995: 82).
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Consequently, the definition of political party in the American context is rather different
from the German case. Seeing parties as “institutions responding to changes and
searching for roles,” Maisel (1994: 383) clearly shows the confusion and sketchiness
when trying to grasp the function of political parties in America. Ascribing to them the
“fundamental purpose…to elect candidates to a variety of offices” (Jewell and
Morehouse 2001: 47) clearly makes them objects rather than subjects.74 When it comes to
local elections, the significance of even the party label diminishes significantly, since
most local elections are non-partisan (Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 9). The subject in
American elections is then the candidate. The “ambitious candidate…creates[s] a
personal campaign organization rather than relying on the party” (Aldrich 1995: 269).
Thus parties remain as a kind of political service stations rather than a disciplined and
unified political organization.75
74

Something that could not be said about German parties.
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There are exceptions to this view (that the party has become irrelevant in American politics) among
American political scientists. Cohen et al. (2008), most prominently, argue that contrary to the popular
notion, the “demise of parties has been exaggerated,” and that “parties remain major players in presidential
nominations” (Cohen et al. 2008: 3). To support this view, however, the definition of party is changed.
Rather than party as a mass-organization, Cohen et al. redefine the structure of the party by limiting it to
“party insiders” (Cohen et al. 2008: 1). Instead of a party in the Weberian sense, the “party” becomes the
amalgam of “governors, big-city mayors, members of party committees, and legislators,” as well as others,
“such as organizers, fund-raisers, pollsters, and media specialists” (Cohen et al. 2008: 4).
After redefining the organization of the party, the function of the party is changed, too. The function of the
party, and thereby the evidence for the “invisible primary,” is the effort of everyone other than the
candidates themselves to influence the presidential candidate nomination process (Cohen et al. 2008:
187+195). The argument is then not about American parties in general, but is limited to presidential parties
(Cohen et al. 2008: 348).
While the authors say that the “invisible primary” is proof that American politics is still party-centric, in the
end they hint towards the fact that the presidential nomination process might be candidate-centered after all
(Cohen et al. 2008: 335). From a comparative perspective (and irrespective of the evidence for the
“invisible” primary), their argument evidences at most the influence of éminence grise in the pre-primary
stage of the presidential nomination process. This is, however, evidence for the strength of an oligarchy
and/or plutocracy rather than of a party in the Weberian sense.
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On the basis of this analysis, the argument can be made that parties in the United States
“no longer exercise control over those who seek office, as the traditional urban machines
often did, but rather” they serve the candidates’ needs (Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 48).
Put more bluntly:
The party is in service to its candidates and officeholders, it is structured
to advance the needs and interests of ambitious politicians…. A party in
service can only help the candidate, who in principle has other sources for
finding such help. The more effective and extensive the service the party
offers, however, the more important they are to their ambitious candidates
as they seek continual election and reelection…. The concern for the party
in service is to provide incentives for ambitious office seekers to align
with the party (Aldrich 1995: 289-295).

The usage of commercial language used by John Aldrich to describe the function of an
American party is noteworthy and revealing. It shows to what extent the perception and
understanding of American parties and their function have changed, even amongst those
who professionally deal with them. Repeatedly, parties are described as servicers of
individual egos. Indeed, parties have to compete for the attention and interest of the
politician with other organizations; they are at most primi inter pares. The above quote is
an up-front admission of the fact that the notion of party in the United States is a)
decidedly different from the German notion of party and b) shows that party is one
among other actors competing for influence over legislators. Such leveling of partyfunction is an interesting, and from a democratic theory standpoint, a noteworthy
happening.
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The American electoral process is rightly called “candidate-centered.” Candidates “create
and operate their own campaigns” (Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 48). Such a revealing
statement helps to understand to what extent political success and failure rests with the
individual politicians and to what extent a politician has his political career in his own
hands. This understanding explains a great deal if thought through. It epitomizes how
detached and separated (or emancipated) politicians have become from the party (in its
traditional and current European understanding) in the United States. This applies to
American politicians who are active in local and state politics, and especially in national
politics (Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 48-49).

One crucial factor for the independence of politicians from party elites is the weakness (if
not complete inability) of inner party circles to “protect their preferred nominee from a
primary challenge.” Whatever decision the party elite arrives at, whatever the American
equivalent of a politburo decides on with regards to the candidacy status of an individual,
its abilities to enforce such a decision are weak if not completely absent. The lack of
“sanctions” that could be used against rivals is decisive for the party’s helplessness
(Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 52).

To contextualize the assertion that a party has no ability to apply sanctions to a contender,
take the example of Marco Rubio. Rubio was able to challenge the popular Florida
Governor Charlie Crist. The sitting governor of America’s third largest state had no
means to preempt an inner-party challenger. Thwarting a German Landesfürst’s political
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ambition is unheard of and would be a more than difficult task. Similarly, six-time
incumbent senator, Richard Lugar, was challenged in the primaries and lost to Richard
Murdock, the state treasurer of Indiana. Again, it can be seen how political clout and
party seniority carry little weight in themselves in primaries. To give yet another
example, Eric Cantor, who was the House Majority Leader, lost in the primary against
Dave Brat.

There are more examples where it is evident that senior political officeholders, having a
prominent and successful political standing, are detached from holding sway in the party.
This reality is seen as alien and unfathomable to European party-careerists and party–
bureaucrats, yet common in the United States. While cases like the above (or of Christine
O’Donnell who ousted Michael Castle, former Governor of Delaware and an incumbent
representative) show how incumbency is neither an insurance for a continued political
career, at least within one’s own party, nor for controlling a party apparatus. There is just
no party apparatus in the United States that is to be controlled.

These above examples gained nationwide attention because of the prominence of the
politicians and offices involved. In smaller political races (state and local elections),
similar political dramas unfold without gaining national attention but prove how open and
unconstricted American political life is. This free-for-all enfeebles any attempt of
sustaining a disciplined party-machine in the European sense. The party has no means to
regulate who will gain its label for political usage. Thus free-for-all is indeed a precise
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and apposite description for the absence of any regulating mechanism for candidate
nomination and campaign financing processes.

This power-anemia leads to a notion of parties where they are described merely as
recruiting organizations and “service agencies” (Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 54-55, 61).
The procedure and process of becoming a candidate for a political office in the United
States is hermeneutically approached extrinsic to the body of the party. The following
thesis is then to be made: Either self-recruitment occurs, or extra-party quality candidates
are sought. An intra-party selection process is absent since it would be futile.
There is an obvious connection between the recruitment and
nomination of party’s candidates. If party leaders recruit the best candidate
they can find for a statewide, congressional, or legislative office, they
want the candidate to get nominated.… But of course the party’s ability to
influence the selection of nominees is seriously limited by the primary
elections used almost exclusively for nomination in the American states….
Today very few state and local party organizations have the political
power or resources to control nominations…. It is most important, and
most difficult, for a…political party to influence the nomination in
statewide and congressional races. Sometimes the party may persuade
someone who is challenging [the party apparatus’] preferred candidate to
drop out of the race by refusing to provide any funding. But this is not an
effective weapon when the challenger has enough funding to finance
primary and general election campaigns without any help from the party
(Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 56-57).

If the party apparatus has no means to control who runs under its label, as it is stated
above, several consequences arise. First, its label (a.k.a. corporate identity) will be
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diluted. The label of Democrat and Republican will be more of an identifier for a
Weltanschauung; a crude position-marker rather than an identifier for a political program
that is supported by a disciplined and effective political movement, i.e. the party, bound
to enforce the program upon gaining power. Instead, the party label becomes a flag
around which to rally against the other side. In Fenno’s famous work Home Style, the
electoral process is entirely reduced to a “representative-constituency linkage (Fenno
1978: xiii). The party organization, not to mention a partisan bureaucracy and
infrastructure, is not even mentioned in this American politics standard work. That is
quite telling about the relevance given to the party bureaucracy.

Second, the politician will be (pointedly stating it for argument’s sake) beholden to
anyone but the party. Without authority over the politician, the party cannot control his
actions. While there are several ways for a party to influence a politician, nothing trumps
the ability to decide his political future. Yet without a veto over his future, which means
without the ability to deny him future renomination and deny him his financial resources,
the party is a mere paper tiger vis-à-vis the politician. While the party admittedly can play
a crucial role in the electoral process, it is not irreplaceable, which is the key factor.

Such party weakness leads to “atomized politics with little joint activity between
candidates running on the party’s slate” (Jewell and Morehouse 2001: 62). But party
discipline is crucial in legislative assemblies. In the earlier-mentioned work of Aldrich,
the whole point of creating a party is for efficacy in congressional voting. Yet by
deferring to the interest of one’s own reelection prospects as a legislator rather than to the
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interest of the party-line, a party-elite cannot par ordre du mufti push through a
legislative agenda and blindly trust the legislators to vote as the party leadership has
decided on. An American legislator will be careful not to be beholden to the party
leadership, which when push comes to shove in elections, cannot save him from the
wrath of primary voters and campaign financing donors.

There are different explanations for this American phenomenon of weak parties. To
understand and describe this phenomenon, I have to outline some basic characteristics of
party strength in the American context. First, a variation in party strength has to be
precisely ascribed to a specific function of the party. That is, stating that America had
strong parties and now they are weak falls short of a comprehensive explanation. Instead,
it is necessary to precisely state that local parties and state parties were strong and now
are weak and that a strong national party structure never existed in the first place. From a
comparative perspective, such nuance is key to understanding the information conveyed
by statements of weak and strong parties. Additionally, as it was shown in Chapter 2,
what is generally seen as a “party” in American political science, is the parliamentary
group in the vocabulary of German political science. On the basis of such delineation, I
explain, drawing on American political science literature as well, why the American
parties are weak.

One proposition by Campbell (2007: 68) points to technological changes that allowed
candidates to appeal directly to the electorate and thereby sidestep the inner party circles.
In comparative perspective, this explanation fails to explain why in other political
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systems the same effect did not materialize, despite undergoing the same technological
changes. A parallel logical shortcoming is to be found in the work of Dalton and
Wattenberg (2000) as well as in Aldrich (1995). Dalton and Wattenberg observe a decline
in partisanship among Americans. This, they then argue, explains why campaigns became
more candidate-centered. Yet again, one has to point out that partisan de-alignment exists
in Europe as well. (Halving of the membership among the German Volksparteien is one
example.) Such de-alignment was however not followed by more candidate-centered
elections.76

Cox and McCubbins, in both Setting the Agenda and in Legislative Leviathan, discuss the
decline of American parties. For them party strength and party weakness are things
pertaining to the “electoral” and “legislative side of the story” (Cox and McCubbins
2005: 2). The institutional (bureaucratic and organizational aspects) side is absent. Thus
party vote is, among others things, understood in the terms of roll call voting. In
comparative perspective, not “party” strength or weakness is observed by Cox and
McCubbins, but the cohesiveness of the “parliamentary group.”

Their explanation for why party strength has declined over time, is that “decentralization”
occurs in the way committees operate in Congress (Cox and McCubbins 2005: 2-3). Thus
what is denoted as “party” is located within the legislature, and pertains to legislative
business. Parties are defined as “collective action” problem-solving entities for legislators
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One could indeed argue the contrary.

116

“who face a chaotic and unpredictable agenda” (Cox and McCubbins 2005: 17). Cox and
McCubbins, partitioning each and every aspect of “party” work, do so by exclusively
listing legislative processes (Cox and McCubbins 2005: 19-20). This evidences that what
is comparatively labeled and understood as the parliamentary group and internal
workings of a legislature is synonymous with the morpheme “party” in the usage of Cox
and McCubbins, as well as others (Krehbiel 1998).

In the work of Hershey (2009), a more catholic understanding of “party” exists. There,
the party also functions to nominate candidates, to organize election campaigns, and to
“promote ideas about public policies” (Hershey 2009: 6). Hershey divides “party” into
three different parts. 1. party organization, 2. party in government, and 3. party in the
electorate. This division is peculiarly American. In the German context, one would not
divide in such a way. Furthermore, the distinction between the party organization and
party in the electorate is noteworthy, as one would not expect extra-legislative party
divisions. This division is owed to the circumstance that in America a party membership
in the comparative sense does not exist. This is why the party in the electorate is defined
as those people who support a party and distinguished from the party organization
(Hershesy 2009: 9).

When it comes to the functions of parties, Hershey provides a threefold explanation.
Parties help candidates in getting elected, educating and propagandizing to citizens, and
governing (Hershey 2009: 10). The question thereby is what the magnitude of the “party”
is within all these functions. If a health care bill is passed, to what extend is it written by
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the party and by outside groups, politician’s staff, and lobbyists? If candidates are
elected, what is the share of the party’s effort compared with the efforts of the candidate
and the efforts of outside groups? Lastly, do citizens get more educated and
propagandizing by the parties or by the Tea Party and MSNBC? These questions
highlight how ambiguous the term “party” is in the American context. It is therefore
apposite to primarily identify American parties as “symbols” and “emotion-laden objects
of loyalty,” giving citizens as well as politicians a “social identity” (Hershey 2009: 13).

This does, however, still not answer the question of why in comparative perspective the
American parties are the way they are. By approximation, I will provide an answer.
Aldrich states in his work that American parties are “endogenous” (Aldrich 1995: 19).
What he means is that parties were created by legislators inside the legislature. The
argument of Aldrich is that parties were created by office-holding politicians within
Congress, and then spread out to the people. This historical narrative is different from the
German genesis of parties, where parties were created by interested people and then
politicians got elected.

This is not merely a question about causality à la what came first, the chicken or the egg,
but has profound implications for the organizational foundation of parties in a political
system. A top-down approach,77 as it is argued by Aldrich, will lead to a different partybureaucratic organization than is the case with a bottom-up approach in the case of
77

Even though in the case of the Republican Party at least, a bottom-up creation is more realistic (Gould
2012).
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German parties. Such top-heavy American parties will be less likely to have all the
functions of a party as they are defined by Max Weber. Yet this approach by
approximation is still too imprecise to comprehensively answer why American parties are
“weak.” I therefore combine the foundational explanation with the organizational
explanation.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the changes made in the Progressive Era are seen
as the executioners of party power (Hershey 2009: 18-19).78 Yet this explanation does not
precisely and specifically state what level of party power was weakened in the
hierarchical structure of a party. The answer to this question is to be found in the
narrative of the decline of American party power.

Immediately preceding the Civil War and even more after it, the United States received
massive immigration from Europe. Political parties “played an important role in
assimilating these huge waves of immigrants” with the help of a peculiar type of a party
organization, the “city machine” (Hershey 2009: 18). Therefore, local parties were the
source of party strength in America, similar to what exists in German today. In the
“golden age” of American parties, the party bureaucracy was the “dominant segment of
the party,” exerting a disciplinary effect on Congress (Hershey 2009: 18). This strength
was based on the machine’s ability to control government jobs as well as political
careers.

78

Even though party-machines lingered on up until the 1960s.
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With the reforms of the Progressive Era, such “boss rule” came to an end and the party
was weakened in both aspects of controlling entrance into politics79 as well as providing
jobs (Hershey 2009: 19). The immediate consequence of this was to end the raison d’être
of the local party in the early 20th century. The consequence in the longue durée was the
preemption of a hierarchically organized bureaucratic party structure, such as found in
Germany that could cover and address all aspects of the political process. It has to be
noted, however, that a weakness of the institutional function of parties does not
necessarily have an influence on the ideological function of parties. Partisanship and
partisan identity in the United States are very strong and vibrant, while in Germany the
opposite trend can be observed.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the candidate nomination process in the United States
has assumed the character of a “plebiscite” in which media coverage and public
performance, i.e. “professional political marketing,” and the availability of money,
trumps links to a national party.80 Such a power constellation in the United States, with
its “participatory peoples’ democracy,” contrasts with the custodial role in the nomination
process in Germany (Neisser and Plasser 1992: 24).
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Leading to the previously discussed candidate-centric politics in the United States.
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RNC and DNC, for example.
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3.2.1.1 Becoming a Candidate in Germany

The German candidate nomination procedure for entering the Bundestag foresees two
different pathways. A candidate can either stand for election in one of the 299 single
member districts in Germany, or the candidate can be put on a state party list. This
procedure has its origins in the German constitution. The constitution tasks the political
parties in Article 21, Section 1, Sentence 1 (Grundgesetz 2007), with partaking in the
forming of the political will of the German people (Kremer 1984: 15). It is further
detailed in the statutes on parties (Bundeswahlgesetz), where in Article 1, Section 2,
parties are tasked with actively promoting to the citizenry the partaking in political life
through nominating candidates for federal, state, and local elections (Kremer 1984: 18).
Numerically, only an infinitesimally small number of the German people actually partake
in determining who the candidate for a parliamentary seat will be.

In the 1980s, significantly less than five percent of the electorate had de jure influence on
the nomination process by being party members (Kremer 1984: 12). With the drastic
decline in party membership, this base has shrunk even further. Today, merely 2.16
percent of the electorate are members of a party and have de jure the ability to influence
nominations for nationally relevant parties.81 Considering, however, that in a quarter of
the constituencies (Wahlkreis) merely 0.1 to 0.15 percent of those entitled to vote in the
election actually participate in the candidate selection process, it becomes evident how
81

There are ca. 62.2 million Germans entitled to vote. Of these 1.343 million are members of the nationally
relevant parties (CDU 485 000, SPD 485 000, CSU 150 000, 70 000 Linke, 63 000 FDP, 60 000 Greens, 30
000 Pirates), i.e. 2.16 percent of the electorate.

121

exclusive and narrow the basis in the German candidate selection process is. This small
fraction would be even smaller if the term participation would have to represent even a
minimal amount of influence on the nomination process rather than merely casting a vote
in local party ballots (Kremer 1984: 12).

Yet these statistics do not tell the full story. They disclose only the superficially
measurable aspect of the German nomination process. What has to be reckoned with in
addition is on what grounds votes are cast for a nominee by the few who do so (Kremer
1984: 12). Some vote on the basis of nepotism and favoritism. Others follow the lead of
opinion makers. Others act independently and make up their own mind. Duverger
provides a theoretical framework for these divergent degrees of participation (1958: 133137). He points out some are active and some are passive82 in their decision-making
process.

One crucial proposition in the German nomination system is the concept of reward. This
means that nominations, both on state party lists and in the district, are made to reward a
party “soldier” for his or her service to the party. Thus, years of putting up campaign
posters, attending to information stands, organizing party events, and attending party
meetings are crowned by being elevated to candidacy for the Bundestag (von Alleman
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Nota bene: The active/ passive distinction of Duverger I use here is not be confused with my theoretical
dichotomy of active and passive political behaviors.
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2003: 132-141). The colloquial term for this onerous procedure is Ochsentour83 (Leif
2009: 59). The time-consuming service for the party is thusly recognized by one’s peers.

A prerequisite for a successful bid for the Bundestag is therefore not just experience in
local politics (Kommunalpolitik), but also in party politics (Parteipolitik). An aspirant
Bundestag member has not only to climb the political career ladder, he has to
simultaneously climb the party ladder; complete the earlier mentioned Ochsentour.
Thereby, a candidate achieves the informal recognition of the party oligarchs. (Leif 2009:
63). The gatekeeper oligarchy has thereby the chance to get to know the person and
gauge to what extent he is willing to submit himself to the party line and party
leadership84 (Leife 2009: 65). What is evident is that in the German candidate nomination
process, informal rules are very important.

As for the formal nomination rules, the German law and constitution provide the parties
with a near monopoly. Elite recruitment is a party selection process in Germany. Either
party members or delegates choose the candidate (Leif 2009: 63).85 Candidate nomination
rules in the single member district follow §21 of the Bundeswahlgesetz. Only party
members can nominate, either directly or indirectly through delegates, their candidate for
the electoral district. Partyless, independent candidates can be nominated by a group of
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Literal meaning: “tour of the ox.

84

The relevant German expression is “Linientreue belohnen, Anpassungsfähigkeit honorieren.“

85

See Chapter 6.1 for more details.
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voters in the district by gathering 200 signatures. Nominations for the state party list are
reserved entirely for parties. Thus only parties can campaign for the Zweitstimme (Decker
2007: 107). A corollary to this is that according to German party law, only parties that
compete in either national or state elections are considered legally to be a party. Parties
that only compete in local or European elections are not considered to be parties in the
understanding of §21 of the German constitution (Decker 2007: 82-83).

The legal requirements of German party law dictate that candidate nominations by parties
have to be democratic. Every dues-paying member of a party has to have the hypothetical
opportunity to partake in the nomination process86. Therefore, a written invitation, sent
out in time (eight days before the scheduled meeting) has to notify all party members in
the Wahlkreis of an upcoming election for either delegates or the candidate himself
(Kremer 1984: 23).

The Wahlkreis (electoral district) is generally composed of multiple Ortsverbände or
Ortsvereine, a Kreisverband or several Kreisverbände or Unterbezirksverbände (local
party organizations). The important party oligarchs, the gatekeepers, are party executive
committee

members

of

these

organizing

units.

These

units

comprise

the

Wahlkreisvorstand, which proposes and recommends a candidate for the district (Kremer
1984: 13-14).87 While their recommendation is not binding, de facto it has most of the
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Art. 6, sec. 2, nr. 9, German party law (Kremer 1984: 23-24).
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For example, the SPD in Germany is composed of 12 500 Ortsvereine (local party offices). Next, there
are 350 Unterbezirke or Kreisverbände. These are party units that encompass several smaller local party
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time determinative weight. The delegates or party members in the Wahlkreis are therefore
influenced if not guided by the proposals of the party leadership.

For state party lists, the power concentration is even stronger. As in regional conferences,
local party elites nominate candidates for the state list, which is then reviewed and
brought together by the state party leadership. While this list is voted on by delegates
picked in the districts at a later state party conference, where changes are possible, the
role of the leadership is nonetheless most relevant (Leif 2009; Decker 2007: 109-110).

Politicians, who have overcome these entrance barriers, can then feel quite safe in their
Bundestag seats. Two thirds of the Bundestagmembers either have safe districts or have a
safe party list position. Thus as long as these legislators continue to receive support of the
party leadership and/or delegates, they can be assured of their Bundestag seat (Kremer
1984: 11).

3.2.1.2 Financing a Campaign in Germany

Nowadays, parties in Germany are among the highest publicly subsidized parties in
Western countries. Only in Sweden (and with smaller parties in Italy) a public funding

offices. Thus, a number of small cities, or a rural region can constitute a Kreisverband. Bigger cities can be
a Kreisverband on their own, or even contain more than one. Next, there are 25 party Bezirke and
Landesverbände (regional and state parties). Large states are composed of several party districts. Smaller
states have just one state-wide Landesverband. These party units comprise and elect the national SPD
(Niclauß 2002: 156). The make-up of other German parties varies, but still conforms to a large extent to
this schema.
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scheme exists where more taxpayer money is given to parties (Naßmacher 1992: 8).
Financing a campaign in Germany is thus party-centered and not candidate-centered;
meaning that the finances derive from the party and are largely spent by the party. Yet
public campaign financing (the prevalent source of campaign financing today) in
Germany is a recent occurrence. In earlier times, parties had to rely on other means of
funding.

Prior to the evolution into mass-parties, German parties were resembling gentlemen’s
clubs.88 Only with the introduction of free, fair, and direct elections in the North German
Bund in 1867, and then in the German Reich in 1871, did the German parties open up to
the masses. Before this, party finances were no significant matter. Elections were a
formality, in which the party dignitaries would meet “ad hoc” as electoral committees and
dissolve immediately after the election. The financial means of the candidate himself
were the only relevant aspect for election funding. Not only had the politician to finance
his own campaign, he had to sustain himself while in office, too (Adams 2005: 17).

Over the course of the Kaiserreich, politics became increasingly more expensive. The
average expenses for a Reichstag campaign rose from 1000 Marks in 1880 to about
20,000 to 30,000 Marks in 1912, the last Reichstag election before the end of the
monarchy. The way politics was financially organized in the German Reich resembled
the case today in America, where individual politicians bear the financial burden on their

88

Honorationenpartei.
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own (Adams 2005: 17). Just like in present day America, political campaigns became
prohibitively expensive in the absence of public funding and decisive party financial
support. Thus the individual aspirant had to fund his campaign either on the basis of his
own means or on the basis of his skills to solicit campaign donations.

As for party organizations as a financial support base, these were largely absent,
especially on the conservative side. Partisan voters organized themselves into local clubs,
which constituted the functional equivalent of a party organization.89 Clerical and
vocational organizations were examples for such organizational substitutes (Adams 2005:
18). With the increasing costliness of electoral campaigns and the rise of the SPD,
electoral funds were created by numerous interest groups. Industrial and trade
organizations contributed money into these funds that were distributed among liberal and
conservative parties and their candidates (Adams 2005: 24).

These funds became more important during and after World War I. Industrialists
financially helped those parties that shared their economic interests and philosophies both
in building their party apparatus and in financing election campaigns. In the early years
of the Weimar Republic, such funds aimed especially at combating socialists and
Bolsheviks at the ballot box (Adams 2005: 25). The idea for such a close relationship
between industrial interests and politics came from America, as was acknowledged by the
German industrialists (Adams 2005: 26).

89

Again, quite similar to modern American local party organizations.

127

This cooperation between conservative and liberal parties and business organizations led
to the financial dependency of these parties on these funds. Up to 80 percent of
conservative and liberal parties’ election expenses were paid through the funds made
available by corporations. In election years more than 90 percent of party expenses were
matched by funds made available by business organizations (Adams 2005: 28). This
financial dependence on business organizations led to having parties (especially those of
the center-right) accepting the candidacy of someone who did not conform to party
policies but who had an abundance of campaign funds supplied by business organizations
(Adams 2005: 28). The SPD, devoid of such contributions by business circles and largely
dependent on member contributions had to turn to the unions for help in matching the
electoral funds’ challenge posed by the liberal and conservative parties (Adams 2005:
32). The Catholic Zentrum party had to prominently rely on priests, who would actively
raise funds in their parishes for specific candidates’ election campaigns (Adams 2005:
35).

State funding for parties during the Weimar era was largely nonexistent. In 1920, the
state began to reimburse the parties for their ballot expenses. Parties had to produce and
pay for their own ballots. The idea behind this scheme was to allow all parties to
participate in elections irrespective of their financial means (Adams 2005: 39-40). Then
with the introduction of the uniform ballot in 1924, this form of state funding became
obsolete (Adams 2005: 40-41).
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Another instance of indirect electoral campaign funding by the state was the introduction
of salaries for members of the Reichstag in 1906. The legislators remunerated a portion
(varying from party to party) of their salaries to the party. The party used this money to
finance its activity and pay for campaign expenses. Until salaries for Reichstag-members
were introduced in 1906, the SPD had to actually pay its legislators, since SPD legislators
were salaried workers who had no financial means on their own to sustain themselves
(Adams 2005: 41).

In contrast to the haphazard financial situation of parties during the Kaiserzeit and the
Weimar Republic, the financial basis of parties was put on a more solid and legally
defined foundation in the Federal Republic. Since political parties were assigned a crucial
and constitutional role in the operation of the Federal Republic, they were supplied with
guaranteed and calculable financial means, which were nonetheless well regulated and
required transparency about party finances in an unprecedented way (Adams 2005: 49).

In the early years of the Federal Republic, member contributions played a significant role
in political finance, especially for the SPD, which had close to a million members.
Additionally, the SPD relied (and continues to rely) on its businesses, consisting mainly
of newspaper and publishing houses. Lastly, the SPD was able to receive significant aid
from the unions (Adams 2005: 65). The liberal and conservative parties (CDU, CSU,
FDP, and DP) continued to rely on contributions from business organizations, similar to
the financing during the Weimar Republic (Adams 2005: 80). This source of income was
increasingly augmented with individual contributions, aided by the fact that party

129

contributions (50 percent up to a limit of ca. USD $2,000) are tax-deductible and thus
benefit the conservative and liberal parties with their well-to-do donors (Adams 2005:
110).90

In the 1960s, the party financing system significantly changed with the goal of
strengthening the parties’ efforts for political education.91 The state was not just to
finance the parties’ election campaigns (by then, after the consolidation of the 1950s,
only three parties were left), but also their educational efforts. Without doing too much
injustice, it can be said that the taxpayer started to pay for partisan propaganda (Adams
2005: 114).

Today, the German parties draw from a number of financial resources. Financial support
comes from dues-paying party members, contributions from legislators,92 revenue from
investments, donations, and from the state. State support is twofold, direct and indirect.
Direct support is the money given to the party directly from the state’s revenue in the
form of subsidies. By statute, annual contributions to the parties by the state are limited to
about 150 million Euros (Decker 2007: 94; Deutscher Bundestag). Indirect support exists
by the state either taxing contributions at a lower rate or not at all. Thus the state supports
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When Germany introduced public party financing, it was among the first to do so. By 2002, almost two
thirds of those countries labeled free and partially free by Freedom House had introduced public financing
for either candidates and/or parties (Koß 2012: 1).
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Politische Bildung.

92

Mandatsträgerbeitrag. Most parties have a non-binding gentleman’s agreement with their salaryreceiving legislators, which require them to pay ten to 15 percent of their remuneration to their party.
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the party by allowing the party not to pay taxes on its income (Decker 2007: 88). Most
noteworthy, especially in comparative perspective with the United States, is the legal
limitation on donations to politicians. Donations directly to the candidate are not tax
deductible and thereby not foreseen in German party law.

3.2.2.1 Becoming a Candidate in the United States

After having analyzed how the two institutional rules under examination function in
Germany, I will now look at the same institutional processes in the American case. For
this purpose, the following has to be remembered. While the United States enjoyed
constitutional and institutional stability93 like no other republic and is thus unique among
Western democracies, the areas in its democracy that have undergone several drastic
changes are its campaign finance rules and candidate nomination rules.

The way to become a candidate for political office in the United States is decidedly
individual: Individual in the senses of choice and capability. If then a politically
interested person wants to stand for election under a party label, he can do so by
concentrating on one event: winning in the primary.94
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Unlike Germany.
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In 27 states, the primaries are open, i.e. requiring voters to register as a Democrat or Republican, the two
relevant American parties, before voting in the primary of one’s registered party. In the remaining 23 states,
the candidate has to win in an open primary where each registered voter can vote (Jewell and Morehouse
2001:43).
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The distinction with regards to candidate nomination rules is however not merely the
distinction between open and closed primaries. The regulation of parties is left to the
states. Thus, there exist 50 different ways on how candidates are nominated. Recalling
that attempts to regulate party laws were struck down by the courts, the corollary has to
be made that within a state, differences from party to party can exist (Neisser and Plasser
1992: 7). This apparent heterogeneity of party rules can be qualified by the simple
statement that in the end, nominations, even in closed primaries, are wide open to the
general public. This openness is one feature which differentiates American parties from
their German counterparts when it comes to candidate nomination rules.

Limited in their scope of action, American parties do not have inscribed, dues-paying
members like German parties. Instead, any sympathizer with the Republicans or
Democrats can register easily and without any cost and thus become a member of the
party and have a say in it. With a costless registration, a voter can participate in a party’s
conventions and primaries. Not only can a person participate in the candidate nomination
process but he can also become a candidate himself. This leads to the assumption that
American parties have a limited role in the recruitment and nomination process (Neisser
and Plasser 1992: 8).

In historical perspective, this was not always the case in the United States. Indeed, the
American parties were once considered to be among the strongest and most powerful.95
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Max Weber makes numerous remarks about the strength of American parties in his work, as an example.
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In their heyday, the American party machine, party boss, and precinct captain were
within the taxonomic group of American party strength (Neisser and Plasser 1992: 9).
Only in the aftermath of the Progressive Movement did this change. The Progressive
Movement, a reaction to political corruption, cronyism, property speculation, personal
intimidation, and electoral fraud, led to a number of reforms on how candidates were
nominated. The reforms were begun with the introduction of the Australian ballot (to
limit electoral fraud). Then “direct-democratic instruments” were introduced, like
initiatives, referenda on the state level, and the recall vote. In local politics, elections
became nonpartisan, as party labels became outlawed. When strict state regulations of
political parties were introduced and direct primaries became widely used, the power of
the American party ended (Neisser and Plasser 1992: 9-10).

The aim of the Progressive Movement was to strengthen and broaden the ability of
politically interested citizens to participate in the nomination process and in political life.
The explicit goal was to reduce the influence of “exclusive circles of functionaries” and
bring an end to the infamous smoke-filled rooms as decision organs for candidate
nominations. Intentionally or unintentionally, this enabled self-starters to enter politics at
their own volition, without having to earn the laurels of nomination through years of
party service. Thus, a strong and close bond between the constituency and the politicians
replaced the relationship of the politician and the party apparatus (Neisser and Plasser
1992: 11).
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Such change meant that the bureaucratic party had to compete for influence over the
elected official with extra partisan entities in the United States. Nowadays, American
parties have to compete with political action committees, pressure groups, professional
political consultants, and interested citizens for influence (Neisser and Plasser 1992: 12).
The unrestrained access to the nomination process has watered down the meaning of
party membership to such a degree that it has become meaningless in a comparative
perspective. Parties have no control on who can participate in primaries, open or closed.
The so-called crossover voting in open primaries blurs even the remaining line between
party identities (Neisser and Plasser 1992: 17).

This calamitous situation for party strength is something laudable of course, from a
purely democratic standpoint. While the primaries have distorted the function and
understanding of parties in the American case, they have significantly increased the
selectorate. Theoretically, the entire American electorate could be the selectorate. In
practice, however, only about a quarter of the electorate participates in the nomination
process. Yet this is still considerably more than the very small number of persons
involved in nominations in Germany (Neisser and Plasser 1992: 18). In fact, in some
regions of the United States, particularly in the Deep South, participation in the primary
is higher than in the actual election. In areas with safe seats, the decision in the primary
antedates the actual election when it comes to definitely selecting the officeholder
(Neisser and Plasser 1992: 21).
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Since the party has no word in picking the candidates for either primary or election, the
little influence it has on the primary ballot access remains as an explanation for variation
in party power. Such ballot access depends mostly on states’ statutes. In some cases,
ballot access is achieved through local party caucuses and regional pre-primary
conventions. In these cases, the vote of approximately 20 percent of the delegates is
required to gain ballot access. This is the best (and only) chance the party has to influence
the nomination process. Yet even at this early stage, this is not a significant hurdle for a
so-called quality candidate (Neisser and Plasser 1992: 21). In other cases, the requirement
for ballot access is merely the candidate’s ability to deposit a required security deposit,
thus a mere financial issue. In this case, party influence abates completely. While in the
former case a pre-primary endorsement of the party establishment can potentially guide
the primary ballot in the desired direction, in the latter case money is the only issue
(Neisser and Plasser 1992: 23). Consequently, it can be argued that the American
candidate nomination process is a) most democratic, and b) puts the onus almost entirely
on the candidate.

3.2.2.2 Financing a Campaign in the United States

In the case of the American party, campaign financing is an issue that has been
outsourced to the candidate (or, in the case of think-tanks as functional equivalents to
Parteienstiftungen, to private entities.) Legislators’ district offices are the main, if not
only, official party outlets that are available locally. Thus the local party presence in
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America is a personal rather than a partisan office. The non-office-holding party96 in the
meanwhile is left to be organized like a private club (Naßmacher 1992: 5-6). With the
one exception of presidential elections, there is no public funding available for elections,
which could put a party bureaucracy in a regulating position vis-à-vis candidates.

The lack of a strict and hierarchic party structure that distributes funds among the party’s
candidates for office means that the individual candidates have to come up with the
money on their own. It should not be a surprise to learn that these funds would be used
for the sole benefit of the politician rather than for any altruistic party interest. This also
means that the politician in America has to spend more time on fund raising, as the
financial burden is completely on the candidate (Hamm and Hogan 2007: 2). On the basis
of this peculiar challenge, American politics has a special appeal to a certain type of
political persona, and indeed requires a certain type of political personality to overcome
these challenges. Thus the creation of the concept of the active-politician.

The challenge of getting money for electoral campaigns means that the American
candidate has to have fundraisers and directly solicit by mail, phone, or through the
internet. The candidate can also appeal for support to individuals he knows, to specific
groups, and to the general public (Hamm and Hogan 2007: 3). Due to contribution limits
(at USD $2600 per election per donor), funds have to be obtained from a wider range of
donors. With higher contribution limits, a few large donations would provide the same
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Mostly called local Executive Committee or Central Committee.
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amount of money needed for a campaign as well, and would decrease the amount of time
candidates spend on fundraising (Hamm and Hogan 2007: 3). Yet irrespective of
contribution limits, a candidate in the United States has to have before anything else a
convincing and trustworthy record to run for office, since either the general populace or a
few wealthy donors have to be persuaded to provide the candidate with their money.

These facts have profound consequences. If someone is interested in politics and
understands that to be successful the foremost personal quality he has to bring to the table
is to have the ability to have others give their money to him, then this would weed out
those political personas that do not have this per se apolitical quality (Hamm and Hogan
2005: 3). The strict campaign finance rules, regulating what corporations, labor unions,
PACs, individuals, and political parties can financially funnel towards a candidate, do not
merely decide how much money is spent in an election but furthermore decide who will
stand in that election (Hamm and Hogan 2005: 6). Soliciting private money is a peculiar
and a difficult task that not everyone is up to, as it is primarily an individualistic and
entrepreneurial task (Adams 2007: 2).

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) is currently the most relevant
institutional legislation with regard to campaign financing rules. In that context it is
noteworthy that the BCRA treats campaign finances for primaries and the general
election separately. Thus the law acknowledges selection and election as “two separate
phases of recruitment” (Katz 2001: 278). For each recruitment phase the USD $2,600
limit does apply (Jacobson 2005: 3). The noteworthy part for this is that in comparative
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perspective the candidate selection process and the election are treated equally in the
United States. (If one runs against wealthy self-financed candidates, higher contribution
levels apply.) (Jacobson 2005: 3)

The theoretical conclusion of this and the previous section on candidate nomination rules
and campaign financing rules is that these institutional rules are advantageous to the
active, independent, and entrepreneurial political persona. Such “experienced” and
“strong” candidates ostensibly make a calculated decision in deciding whether to stand
for office (Bertelli and Carson 2007), since candidacy involves potential material losses
as well as loss in reputation if an election or primary is lost. Consequently, “quality”
challengers will wait for the right time to run in the United States (Bertelli and Carson
2007).

I will extrapolate the above proposition in my research and see if previous office-holding
in general indicates a difference among national legislators in the Bundestag and the
Congress. One of my empirical goals will be to establish “candidate entry patterns”
(Bertelli and Carsons 2007). But more importantly, I argue as a corollary to this thesis
that the theoretically crucial aspect is not running for election or refraining from doing so.
The important aspect in the American case is that the decision to run for office is made
by quality candidates not on the basis of opportunities that arise within the party but
within the electorate.
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3.3 Analysis

When comparing American parties to their German (and in general European)
counterparts, it is possible to state that American parties can be categorized as electionand campaign-focused types, while German parties are apparatus-parties and massparties.97 German parties cover all aspects of political (= party) work, while American
parties are a primarily a provider of a label and the term “party” is frequently equated
with the parliamentary group and its leadership. While political financing encompasses
all aspects of political party functions in Germany, in the United States political financing
is money spent on campaigns and elections (Naßmacher 1992: 5).

The structure and function of a party are consequently different in Germany and in the
United States. This is particularly visible in the cases of candidate nomination rules and
campaign financing rules. In Germany, the party does not merely provide an identifying
label for elections but it is also a training ground for new cadres and a facility where new
political programs are created. There is an entire party bureaucracy. These functions
inside the party apparatus require funding as well. Thus political money is not limited to
candidates and elections, but includes a party bureaucracy, a party press, etc. pp., which
requires constant public funding (Naßmacher 1992: 5) and therefore differentiating the
nature of American and German parties.
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“Wahlkampforientiert” vs. “Massen- or Apparatenpartei.”
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The historical development of parties in Germany is different as well. In Germany,
parties grew continuously in strength in the Kaiserreich, the Weimar Republic, and in the
Federal Republic. While initially candidate centered, the national parties grew in power
and influence. In the Federal Republic, where the national party retained its dominance,
in the recent decades the local and state parties grew in strength and influence as well, yet
only when it comes to candidate nomination. In contrast, the American parties, which had
developed strong local parties, lost their local foundations and are today institutionally
top-heavy.

Knowing the different structure and function of the political party in Germany and in the
United States, and having outlined the campaign financing rules and candidate
nomination rules in Germany and the United States, I can compare and contrast them.
Doing so, I can establish who the “veto players” in each system are. I will utilize the veto
players conceptualization not as a theory but as an analytical tool. With such an analytical
tool, I can predict who, on the basis of what institutional rule, can block, thus “veto,” the
progression of a politician. Identifying the points of blockage and outlining their
differences between the United States and Germany would strengthen the hypothetical
claim of active and passive-politicians (Bawn 1999: 708).

In both Germany and the United States, the ambitious politician has to ask others for a)
financial supports and b) their nominating votes. One theoretical assumption deriving
from this observation is that there has to be an incentive for those who provide a) and b)
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to do so.98 In both Germany and America, informal rules are very important, if not
decisive, for gaining this support. Yet the consignees for the candidates’ courtship, the
veto-players, are two axiomatically different audiences – the electorate at large in the
U.S. case, a small number of partisan insiders in the German case.

In the United States, professional political marketing to the masses is the key technical
term necessary for analytically grasping the candidate nomination and campaign fund
raising process. In the German case, candidate nomination and campaign financing is a
process that involves fewer actors than in the U.S. Indeed, it can be assumed that
candidates and nominators are acquaintances, based on cooperative party work.

Yet with the atrophy of the American political party, the candidate has to be a political
entrepreneur who is at the center of politics that cannot draw on years of a party work
record. There are good examples for this assertion of candidate detachment from the body
of the party. American politicians, who are so dependent on extrapartisan support for
both financial as well as electoral reasons, constantly direct their public posture, even
their speeches on the floor of Congress, to their independence from the party (Martin and
Vanberg 2008: 503).
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This is an area that is under-studied, especially when it comes to Western democracies, as the incentive
usually ascribed to the problem is seen as “corruption.” Corruption is thereby defined as “getting something
specific in return.” (Warner 2005). In the case of this definition, it does not imply a priori illegal activities.
Instead I allude to the different incentives given, respectively promises made, to the masses to vote for
someone in a primary vs. the incentives given, respectively promises made, to a smaller number of partisan
activists.
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This is markedly different in Germany, where distance from the party99 is not possible,
since the party, especially its elites, is crucial in the nomination and renomination
process. Yet beyond that, the success of the party is crucial for the politician in Germany,
as its electoral system allows for freeriding on the national campaign. Irrespective of
one’s efforts, one can enter the Bundestag through the efforts of other candidates on the
state party list.100 To a lesser extent, candidates in the single member district can take
advantage of the nationwide success of the party, too.

The clearest difference between the German and American systems is evident when
describing the function and organization of the party. In the U.S., the party is a party of
particularities. It is a utilitarian tool in resolving specific problems in the legislative
process and in providing a label in the electoral process. This contrasts with the German
case, where the party is not pars of the political system, but is toto. The German party
encompasses the entirety of political life. Its disciplined party program contrasts with the
American “platform” (Niclauß 2002: 11). The institutional rules express and explain this
difference. The American Allerweltspartei, the “catch-all-party” (Niclauß 2002: 29)
contrasts with the German staatstragende party; a party with “political centrality”
(Niclauß 2002: 30).
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Running against the party, as it is said in the U.S.
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This is the stereotypical free-rider phenomenon. Candidate A can rely on candidate B’s popularity,
campaigning efforts, etc. to haul him into the Bundestag.
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An analogy for the difference between the American and German electoral processes can
be found in the metaphor of hiring. In the United States, the politician does not get hired.
Instead, as a political entrepreneur, he hires. The politician hires by getting the support of
the people, making people want to come and join him (with their votes and donations).
Quite literally, the politicians hires his campaign staff. In contrast, in Germany the
politician gets hired. The politician has to pass a “job interview,” in which he is evaluated
by the party for his qualifications. In this hiring process, a typical partisan office holder
would not want to hire someone who is evidently superior to him and could rival him.
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CHAPTER 4 – RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY

So far in this research, I made the argument that institutional rules influence elite
recruitment. I corroborated this thesis with theories and hypotheses. These I derived by
reviewing other scholars’ research and developing my own arguments. I also reviewed
research that proposes theses alternative to mine. In this chapter, I will first, combine the
theoretical assumptions I made into a comprehensive and general theory of the two
institutional rules of candidate nomination and campaign financing rules and their effect
on elite recruitment into the national legislature. Thereby, I will create a testable model.
Second, I will bring this conceptual model into operation through empirical measures of
economic, political, social, and educational behavior. Thus, I will bridge the gap between
theoretical and empirical research on institutional rules’ effect on elite recruitment.

4.1 Theory of Institutional Rules’ Effect on Elite Recruitment

To recall the theoretical premise of my work, which is derived from Giovanni Sartori, I
had stated that institutional rules have an empirically measurable effect on elite
recruitment. Different candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules will lead
to a different type of political elite in the Bundestag and in the House of Representatives.
The elite in one legislature will exhibit some measure of behavioral uniformity in contrast
to the elite in the other legislature due to institutional rules, more than to cultural and
ideological factors.
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The categorization of the electoral rules in the United States as favorable for activepoliticians and the categorization of the electoral rules in Germany as favorable for
passive-politicians, logically entails that more politicians in the House of Representatives
can be characterized as exhibiting the behavior of active-politicians, and that more
politicians in the Bundestag will be exhibiting the behavior of passive-politicians.
Therefore, indicators have to be found that reflect the behavior ascribed to the ideal-types
of active and passive-politicians. If I then find that there are indeed statistically
significant more active-politicians in the House of Representatives than in the Bundestag,
I will have evidence that in this context the institutional rules with regard to candidate
nomination rules and campaign financing rules have indeed an effect on elite recruitment.

The hypothesis had been that there are different personality types, with different
psychological predispositions. There are risk-acceptant personality types and there are
risk-averse personality types (i.e. active-politician and passive-politician in my model).
My argument is that a particular institutional setting of candidate nomination rules and
campaign financing rules will be more favorable either to active-politicians or to passivepoliticians. Thus, a different distribution of active-politicians and passive-politicians will
be found in a national legislature on the basis of differences in the said institutional
rules.101

101

A corollary to this hypothesis is that the political system that is favorably disposed to the prevalence of
passive-politicians, will be marked by the existence of weak parties.101 The political system that is
favorably disposed to passive-politicians will be marked by the existence of informal practices in the
operation of the party. Politicians in the House of Representatives will have much looser institutional
organizations than politicians in the Bundestag.
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My theory is a general theory,102 which is applied to the particular cases of the Bundestag
and the House of Representatives. The theory of institutional rules’ effect on elite
recruitment and the methodology used in this research can be used universally.

4.2 Analytical Approach

In this section, I detail how I will empirically test my theory of elite recruitment. An
empirical test is formally expressed in the following way: X→Y. In the language of the
natural sciences, it is stated that X causes Y (Gerring 2001: 129). Applied to this
research, the meaning is that institutional rules (X) cause the preponderance of active or
passive-politicians (Y) in the House of Representatives and the Bundestag. There are two
basic problems with this approach that I have to address. The first is, is the causality I see
the only explanation, or are there alternatives? Second, how are X and Y observed and
measured?

The first question I have already answered theoretically by noting that ideology and
culture are inseparable in causing elite recruitment, and they will be duly considered. In
the context of this research, I claim that institutional rules influence elite recruitment for
brevity’s sake. Yet realistically, a multi causal explanation (Boix and Stokes 2007: 29)
includes such rules, as well as culture and ideology. The second, how X and Y are to be

102

This means, it is not case-specific. The method used to create the original data set can be applied to any
case. The theory is testable, has internal consistency, is deductive, has “elegance,” and is parsimonious (in
the sense of economy and simplicity) (Lebow and Lichbach 2007: 180).
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measured, requires more elaboration. While institutional rules are well-defined
regulations and thereby self-evident, active and passive-politicians are concepts. The
operationalization has to follow different logical pathways for the two concepts.

Operationalizing the Independent Variables
Based on the available data on the House of Representatives and the Bundestag, there are
two ways to operationalize the independent variable. One way, is the comparative case of
the United States and Germany. The institutional setting in Germany and the institutional
setting in the United States (as the X) are measured through the dummy variable of the
respective country. Since all legislators in one political system are, at least pro forma,
facing the same candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules, the equation of
the political systems of Germany and the United States with the respective institutional
rules is apposite. A second way to test the effects of institutional rules’ effect on elite
recruitment is by utilizing the SMD – PR division in Germany, which provides for an
almost natural experiment.

Operationalizing the Dependent Variable
By themselves, concepts have no a priori real-life meaning and therefore need a
definition (a.k.a. operationalization). An exemplary path which I follow has been given
by Przeworski (2000). Przeworski’s argument was that democracy causes well-being, an
arguably much more ambiguous term than that of active and passive-politician.
Przeworski looked therefore for “observable indications of well-being” to link it to the
existence of democracy (Przeworski 2000: 5&10).
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For the ideal typical concepts of active and passive political behavior, an observable and
measurable real life effect has to be identified. Since the active/ passive dichotomy entails
risk-acceptant and risk-averse behavior, the real-life effect has to correspond to such
personal and characteristic choice. In the previous chapters, I had already given several
different models for a dichotomous classification. A common thread among those was the
economic ability of the politician to live either for or by politics. Using these models, the
linking of active and passive-politicians’ behavior to economic behavior is plausible. The
causal relationship of X→Y103 would be operationally translated into variation in
institutional rules leads to the preponderance of one or the other political personality
type; the personality type being economic behavior through vocational choice.104 The
formal model would be X1→Y1 and X2→Y2, meaning that in a political system with the
institutional rule X1, politicians with the economic trait of Y1 will be more prevalent than
in the institutional setting of X2, where politicians with the economic character trait Y2
will be prevalent.

103

X standing for electoral rules.
Y standing for type of politician.

104

I will specify this further below.
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Table 4.1 Summary of the empirical propositions of my research.
Description
Generalization
Electoral rules, being
institutional rules, affect
the composition of
national legislature,
thus elite recruitment.

Classification
There are two types of
electoral rules; one
favorable for active‐
politicians, one
favorable for passive‐
politicians.

Prediction
Introducing electoral
rules in Germany that
are favorable for active‐
politicians will lead to an
increase in active‐
politicians in the
Bundestag.
Introducing electoral
rules in the United
States that are favorable
for passive‐politicians
will lead to an increase
in passive‐politicians in
the House of
Representatives.

Causal Inference
The reasons for the
preponderance of
passive‐politicians in the
Bundestag are the
candidate nomination
rules and campaign
financing rules in
Germany.
The reasons for the
preponderance of
active‐politicians in the
House of
Representatives are the
candidate nomination
and campaign financing
rules in the United
States.

At this stage, the causal relationship between institutional rules and the active-politician
and passive-politician conceptualization has to be addressed. To do so, I rely on the
necessary and sufficient conditions paradigm in political science. Its basic assumption is
that “if the removal of a condition prevents the occurrence of an outcome, then it must be
considered the cause of that outcome. If its removal has no such effect…, then it cannot
be considered a cause” (Gerring 2001: 133).106

105

Derived from Gerring 2001: 119.

106

This definition is, however, of little use in the social sciences and needs qualification. While in the
experimental natural sciences, different elements can be added and removed in an experiment, this is not
possible in the social sciences. In fact, laboratory experimentation can be “grossly misleading” in the social
sciences, particularly if the results of the experimentations are “extrapolated to the environment” (Meehan
1971: 124). I cannot remove the cause, institutional rules, and then look for behavior. First, the cause is a
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The logic of my theory entails that measurable differences exist between members of the
Bundestag and members of the House of Representatives. To validate this theory, I have
to find statistically significant behavioral differences between the group of Bundestag
members and the members of the House of Representatives. In the previous chapters, the
groundwork for this approach was laid with the theories that conceptualize politicians in
a dichotomous way. I do so as well, with the ideal-type of active and passive-politicians.
The task now is to find empirical evidence that is indicative of this hypothesized
behavior.

pattern of human organization for a certain goal. Thus the only logical tool at hand is not a removal of the
cause, but its replacement. I cannot ask the Germans to not have institutional rules to pick politicians so I
can observe the effect. There would be no effect to observe in the first place. The independent variable in
my research design has an inherent effect on its cause, determined not by natural laws but by human
interaction. Human beings have to choose “alternative modes of behavior,” thus a cause cannot be simply
removed for experimentation’s sake (Meehan 1965: 83). The only tool at hand is, then, to ask Germans to
use a different method of candidate picking, to see if a different effect is observable. Since I cannot do that
either, I have to work with what I have. Thus social science empirical evidence contains subjectivity, since
the behavior of human subjects goes “beyond direct observation and measurement” (Meehan 1965: 179).
I have two options to argue the causality between X and Y. I can state that only when X is present, Y
occurs. This constitutes the necessary condition. Or, I can state that if X is present, then Y occurs. This
constitutes a sufficient condition (Goertz and Starr 2003: 56). Applied to my work, and social science work
in general, the necessary condition for a causal relationship would be the statement that “if and only if”
certain types of institutional rules are present, Y occurs. Yet I had shown above that such a statement is
under all circumstances unrealistic, since culture and ideology always have an effect on behavior (Goertz
and Starr 2003: 49). The logical argument remaining is that culture and ideology are constant and fixed
variables, so a variation in X is a sufficient condition to lead to variation in Y (Goertz and Starr 2004: 27).
The research problem I address is coincidentally and fortunately quite conducive to addressing this issue. I
compare the cases of the Bundestag and the House of Representatives. In the case of the Bundestag, half of
its members are elected in single member plurality districts, while the other half is elected from state party
lists. Thus while culture and ideology (within each party) are constant, variation in institutional rules exists.
In the case of the House of Representatives, the institutional rules are constant, yet significant differences
in culture and in ideology exist (Gerring 2001: 133).
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Therefore, I have to identify the attributes for this concept (Gerring 2001: 44). On the
basis of the observable and measurable real life attributes, the concept of active-politician
and passive-politician has to be operationalized. In doing so, I have to be mindful of
retaining “conceptual validity” and avoiding conceptual stretching (Gerring 2001: 49). To
that end, the indicators have to be plausible and “consistent with generally accepted
principles” (Lebow and Lichbach 2007: 159). Thus, if I want to identify traits of the
recruited elite, which correspond to the concept of active-politician and passivepolitician, the options are the following characteristic attributes of a politician:


economic characteristics and attributes of a person



social characteristics and attributes of a person



educational characteristics and attributes of a person



political characteristics and attributes of a person

From these options, the theory, particularly Max Weber’s, points to pre-political
economic behavior as the key differentiating indicator for those who can live for politics
and those who know “nothing else than politics” (Allen 2013: 7) and thus live by politics.
It suggests itself then to find in a person’s vocational choice the linchpin for active and
passive political behavior. Thus my operationalization is a decidedly economic one.107
Both in the reviewed literature and in my argumentation, the idea is that economical

107

Similar to this economic approach, James Madison argued that “differences of property are the causes
for differences of opinion” (Lippmann 1997: 117).
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behavior108 is most indicative about a person’s personal character traits that can be
categorized into risk-acceptant and risk-averse personality types, i.e. active-politicians
and passive-politicians.

If statistically significant differences in the economic character traits between Bundestag
members and members of the House of Representatives exist, this would be the evidence
of the respective institutional rules’ impact on elite recruitment, with the disclaimer that
alternative explanations exist, which would have to be controlled.109 Additionally, with
the quasi natural experiment of the Bundestag, the opportunity exists to check for
differences on the basis of the respective mandate of the legislators. In a first scientific
step, this is evidence of covariation. Covariation implies that “two or more phenomena
vary together” (Nachmias and Nachmias 2000: 93). In the case of my research, the
evidence would be that the measured statistical difference between the Bundestag
members and the members of the House of Representatives covaries with changes in the
institutional rules that determine who gets into the national legislature. There will be
more members of the House of Representatives who exhibit risk-acceptant economic
behavior, while in the Bundestag risk-averse behavior will be prevalent.

108

In particular through vocational choice.

109

The alternative being cultural and ideological explanations. The cultural explanation would be that the
Bundestag is as it is because it is comprised of Germans, who have a certain culture, which determines the
measured character traits. The ideological explanation would be that differences among parties exists
because of the respective ideology a party has, conditioning the character traits of its members.
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In the case of my research, the theory implies covariation. My theory and the political
science theories I reviewed all imply that institutional rules cause a change in behavior. If
one variable changes, the other changes, too. Applied to my research problem, this would
mean that the phenomenon of candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules
has an effect on the phenomenon of elite recruitment in the form of active-politicians and
passive-politicians.

The assertion of this causal relationship is not just evidenced in the many works
reviewed, where it is argued that institutional rules do cause behavior to change and
adapt, but also in the time order of the two phenomena. This observation adds to a logical
causal relationship between the two phenomena. The institutional rules (campaign
financing and candidate nomination) are prior to the effect of elite recruitment into the
national legislature, thereby satisfying the scientific requirement that a phenomenon in
the future cannot determine a phenomenon in the past (Nachmias and Nachmias 2000:
93).

Alternative Explanations
What remains is the issue of nonspuriousness. A nonspurious relationship exists if two
variables cannot be explained by a third (Nachmias and Nachmias 2000: 93). Yet in
meaningful and significant social science research, the factor of a nonspurious
relationship has to be conditioned. As stated above, the causal direction in my research is
clear and self-evident. Elite recruitment is the dependent variable. Something causes this
phenomenon. In my model, I regard institutional rules as causing variation in elite
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recruitment. Yet alternative explanations exist that must be taken into account.
Realistically, it can not be expected that in real life no other variable has an effect on the
dependent variables. These alternatives, in the case of my work, cannot be labeled as
control variables.

A control variable is there to “test the possibility that an empirically observed relation
between two variables has not been caused by the independent variable identified in the
hypothesis.” If this is the case, a spurious relationship exists between the independent and
dependent variable. The control variable influences both the independent and dependent
variable, according to the above given definition. The causality rests with the control
variable and not with the assumed independent variable (Nachmias and Nachmias 2000:
50-51).110

There are two alternative explanations to my causal model that are a priori plausible;
culture and ideology. Both are plausible explanations for the dependent variable of elite
recruitment. Culture as well as ideology are regularly used in political science research.
In the case of my work, it is indeed necessary to recognize them as significant factors in
elite recruitment. It would be reductionist to argue that the German culture or the
110

This methodological definition has to be applied, in a sense translated, into my social science research.
A valid control variable in my research would have to be a phenomenon that would explain both the
institutional rules and the elite recruitment, if the referred-to methodological definition is correct. There is
no plausible explanation that would explain both phenomena. What exists are alternative explanations for
the independent variable. If the logic of control variables is extended to not just being seen as a variable
that explains both the independent and dependent variable, but as an alternative independent variable, then
it is useful in social science research. Sartori convincingly argues that the “scientific method is not
unalterable; it is one, but also many, and in continuous evolution” (Sartori 1974: 133). Thus I adapt the
technical meaning of the control variable to the present research.
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ideology of the Greens have no effect on elite recruitment. Proper methodology
necessitates “accurate reasoning” (Sartori 1974: 133) and it is therefore reasonable to
acknowledge the control variables of culture and ideology not as a substitute to
institutional rules but as complements.111

By recognizing culture and ideology, together with institutions, as concomitant factors in
elite recruitment, I avoid the “two unsound extremes” of research. There is the one
extreme of being a “pure and simple unconscious” thinker, who discards a scientific
causal model. Then there is the extreme of the overconscious thinker, who only relies on
“method and theory drawn from the physical, ‘paradigmatic’ sciences,” and thereby
postulates unrealistic and illogic causal relationships (Sartori 1970: 1033). Thus one
cannot “ignore history and historical experience” (Sartori 1974: 135), of which culture
and ideology are epiphenomena, for the purpose of political science research.

On the one hand, “institutions as a subject of inquiry and institutionalism as a method of
inquiry” have “visible characteristics” that can be analyzed. Yet this has to be reconciled
at some point in the research process with culture and ideology. While culture and
ideology are “objects of analysis” that are more ambiguous by containing notions such as

111

Additionally, it has to be noted that institutions, after their creation, will indeed influence and become
part of the culture based on the Baldwin effect (Baldwin 1896). Thus an initially mechanistically
superimposed institutional rule onto a political system, will over time become a natural part of the political
culture of that system. In elegant prose, Rumi described the interrelation between cause and effect in the
following way: “This world and yonder world are incessantly giving birth: every cause is a mother, its
effect the child. When the effect is born, it too becomes a cause and gives birth to wondrous effects. These
causes are generation on generation, but it needs a very well lighted eye to see the links in their chain”
(Fromm 1990b: xiv).
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“ideas, beliefs, and meanings” (Ethington and McDonagh 1995: 86), they are still
necessary for political science, which is a science of man (Sartori 1974: 137). By
recognizing culture and ideology, my research evidences a “hermeneutical analysis,” the
combination of disparate explanations (Ethington and McDonagh 1995: 89). I recognize
culture and ideology by coding on the individual level the cultural and the ideological
character traits of the recruited elite,112 in the same manner as I code the active-politician
and passive-politician concepts.113 The Bundestag offers thereby the best way for
controlling for culture and ideology, as these two independent variables are the same, yet
variation on the basis of institutional rules exist.

It is thus relevant to include culture and ideology into the formal model created earlier
and control for the effects of culture and ideology by substituting institutional rules with
112

Ideology is identified by the respective party label of the legislator. For brevity’s sake, I use a dummy
variable for right and left therefore.
113

I employ therefore the logic of “induction, observation, and experiment,” which is the scientific logic,
rather than the mathematical “rigorous, deductive logic” (Sartori 1973: 13). Accordingly, I build an
institutionalist theory, which I test with my research (data and interviews), “which feeds back on theory.”
My research is an “instrument” for the validation of theory (Sartori 1974: 142). The “observational
understanding” I use is, per definitionem, science (Sartori 1974: 144) and I look for statistical “regularity
and uniformity” (Sartori 1974: 150).
To strengthen the explanatory power of my research, I am mindful of the limitations of social science
research. With the exception of psychology, the experimental method cannot be used. Thus statistical
research becomes crucial. Yet quantitative data is mostly “trivial, and frequently of dubious validity” in
political science research. Thus quantitative political science research is criticized by one the leading
scholars of the field as a tool that discovers “‘more and more’ about ‘less and less’” (Sartori 1974: 150151). [This sentiment is repeated by Shapiro, who argues that there is no point in having good statistics,
models, theories, if the underlying argument is not persuasive (Shapiro 2005: 61)]. This is why political
science is often reduced to “trivia” in the name of “being scientific” and is characterized as practice
resembling medieval scholasticism (Meehan 1965: 181).
Mindful of Sartori’s observation, I can argue that my work is relevant, by both avoiding trivial data and by
studying a most relevant research problem. The data set I created encompasses the important aspects of life:
economic behavior, social behavior, educational behavior, and political behavior. The research problem of
institutional rules’ effect on elite recruitment is of high practical (ergo, political) relevance. Consequently,
my model of elite recruitment is a logically sound tool to research the effect of institutional rules without
being unrealistic by excluding the agencies of culture and ideology.
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them. The ideal typical causal relationship of X→Y changes to C→Y (for culture) and
I→Y (for ideology). The full, more realistic causal model would be then be:
X+C+I=Y.114

My hitherto disquisition shows that my research program is theory-driven. Yet I want to
go beyond this limited research design and add to this the evidence-driven research
program. Then I will not only engage in theory testing but in exploratory scientific
research (Lebow and Lichbach 2007: 181). I do not regard the scientific process as a
dialectic between theory and praxis, but as a simultaneous and sequential process (Lebow
and Lichbach 2007: 183-184). Since I have a complete data set, I will use it not only to
test the hypotheses derived from my theory, but will use the data set in an exploratory
fashion to search for untheorized evidence, which in turn can be conducive to either
modifying existent theories or the creation of new theories. Consequently, my research is
both a hypothesis testing and a hypothesis generating undertaking (Boix and Stokes 2007:
99f.)

114

Thanks to this formal modeling and testing of the data, I can in fact test the theory. This is different from
most comparative qualitative research, where theories are not tested but merely “interpreted” (Ragin 1987:
11). My research design involves therefore the construction and testing of a predictive theory and of
inferences on causal mechanisms. [If the causal mechanism I propose is “considered inconsistent with
generally accepted principles and is implausible,” it has to be rejected (Lebow and Lichbach 2007: 159).]
My scientific work is different from such works which limit themselves to mere inference (Lebow and
Lichbach 2007: 2).
Combining these two approaches not only increases the explanatory power of my work, but it combines
both legs of solid social science research. It unites the verstehen and erklären tradition as it was used by
Dilthey and Weber. Both understanding and explanation are crucial for knowing (Lebow and Lichbach
2007: 92-93). If one does not understand what one explains, the results will be weak. If one is not able to
explain what one describes, the gain in knowledge will be limited. Using “reasoned argument supported by
evidence,” my goal is thereby to avoid “empty speech” (Lebow and Lichbach 2007: 97). I explain what
happens and why it happens (Gerring 2001: 128). [This assertion has a linguistic component to it, too. The
frequent occurrence of “muddled terminology and poor syntax” has to be reckoned with and avoided
(Meehan 1965: 217).]

157

4.2.1 Data Collection

In this section, I explain how I gather and operationalize data for the concepts of
economic characteristics, social characteristics, educational characteristics, and political
characteristics of the observed legislators, which allow me to measure the effect of
institutional rules on elite recruitment. The first step towards creating data is determining
the necessary concepts. It is generally accepted that concepts are abstract symbols rather
than empirical phenomena (Nachmias 2000: 24-25).

In the case of this study, the concepts are the active-politician and passive-politicians,
which I have introduced earlier. The operational definition is necessary to make out of
the abstract concept of active-politician and passive-politician an empirically observable
entity, i.e. “what to do and what to observe” in order to know that a case at hand
resembles an active-politician and passive-politician (Nachmias 2000: 28). This then
constitutes the operational definition of the concept. In the case of the institutional rules,
they are already real life entities that can be observed in and of themselves. This means
that the operational definition of the candidate nomination rules and campaign financing
rules are these rules themselves.

Next, the unit of analysis has to be established. In the case of this research, the options
are at the individual and at the group level. At this stage, it is important to avoid
ecological fallacies. If measurements are made at a specific level of analysis, they should
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not be used at another level (Nachmias 2000: 48). In the case of this study, measurements
will be made at the individual level (legislator), yet statistical tests will be done at the
group level, too.

An ecological fallacy is in this case not present, and it is not likely that an individualistic
fallacy will occur. An individualistic fallacy would be the case if measurements made at
the individual level would lead to mistaken inferences at the group level (Nachmias 2000:
48-49). In this research, I focus on the individual level. At the group level, I merely
compare the aggregates of the measured individuals, and thus do not make inferences
beyond the classification of the groups in accordance to their genus.115

Therefore, I measure the individual member of Congress and the Bundestag member. The
aggregate of the individuals will furthermore provide comparative insight when
comparing the individual groups in the form of party factions (i.e. Republicans, CDU,
etc.) as well as at the institutional level (House of Representatives and Bundestag). The
controls of culture and ideology can indeed only be operationalized in the aggregate.

After establishing the unit of analysis, the variables have to be determined. Therefore,
“properties and attributes that can be clearly identified and measured” have to be
established (Nachmias 2000: 49). Hereby, the assumption is that one variable causes an
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In this context, I follow Fromm, who states that “findings won by the observation of individuals can be
applied to the psychological understanding of groups. … Any group consists of individuals and nothing but
individuals, and psychological mechanisms which we find operating in a group can therefore only be
mechanisms that operate in individuals” (Fromm 1994: 136).
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effect on another variable. The variable, on which an effect is induced, is called the
dependent variable or response variable. Response variable is an apposite label, as the
idea is that this variable responds to an effect (Agresti and Finlay 1999: 211, Nachmias
2000: 49).

The variable that executes such effect is called the independent variable, also called the
explanatory variable. The label explanatory variable is again most apposite, since this
variable explains why the response variable reacts the way it does through measurable
variation (Agresti and Finlay 1999: 211, Nachmias 2000: 49). The problem with this
dichotomy is that it is useful in natural sciences, where clear natural laws exist. In the
human sciences however, the implied dynamism of this approach is unsatisfactory, since
most observations are static. “In the real world, variables are neither dependent nor
independent” (Nachmias 2000: 50).116

In the context of this research, the dependent variable, the variable that responds to an
induced effect, is the recruited elite in the national legislatures. The independent variable,
the variable that explains why the dependent variable is as it is, is the respective
institutional settings of Germany and the United States pertaining to campaign financing
and candidate nomination rules. As mentioned above, the institutional rules are not
concepts but are concrete real life entities. On the basis of my research design, there are
two ways to observe the effect of institutional rules on elite recruitment. In the first case,

116

The earlier discussion by Ian Shapiro expands this point.
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this is done through the dummy variables of Germany and the United States. The
composition of the recruited elite in the Bundestag and in the House of Representatives is
vicariously accepted as the effect of the institutional rules in effect. This is done both for
argument's sake and brevity. Yet the observed differences between the House and the
Bundestag could also be attributed to cultural factors and to ideological factors, since
their effects cannot be separated from the data. A second test for the effects of
institutional rules, whereby cultural and ideological effects can be largely controlled, is
the comparison of the SMD and PR legislators in the Bundestag. While in this case, the
differences between the candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules are not
as pronounced as in the case of the German – American comparison, there are still
notable differences.

Operational Definition
What remains to do now is to find detailed real-life character traits of the recruited elite
that would correspond to the phenomenon of active-politician and passive-politician,
which then could be measured. Previously, I concluded on the basis of the literature
review that economic characteristics are the prime indicator for such personal
characteristics that point towards the ability to live for politics or to live by politics, as
well as being indicative of a risk-acceptant or risk-averse personal disposition. I
concluded that vocational choice is the best option to empirically observe and measure
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such personal character traits, which are indicative of a politician’s persona and ability.117
The operational definition of an active-politician would then be a person who made in his
or her early adulthood a specific economic decision and on the basis of this decision
engaged in a vocation that is indicative for an active-politician. Further below, I detail
which vocational choices correspond to a risk-acceptant personality, thus to an activepolitician, and which vocational choices correspond to a risk-averse personality, thus to a
passive-politician.

While I am not concerned at this point with psychoanalysis, the logic behind my decision
is that different institutions present different types of hurdles to overcome in order for a
candidate to become a national legislator. Accordingly, different personality types must
be better suited to cope with the rules in one institutional setting compared to a different
institutional setting. If this is not the case, then, as mentioned earlier, institutions do not
function as gatekeepers, and apparently have no influence on who becomes a politician.
Consequently, institutional design would be futile, at least if the aim is to control who
rules.

It is plausible to assume that it makes a difference what type of political personality types
rule. The psychological predisposition of a person (e.g. risk-acceptance and risk-
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In this context, Thomas Sowell makes an interesting observation, in that he points out that among the
post-colonial political leaders in the Third World few were “engineers or economists, or professional
administrators.” Instead, “soft-subject intellectuals” dominated among those professional revolutionaries of
the left. Sowell thus argues a dichotomy between those who choose to learn technical and entrepreneurial
skills and those who studied “social theories and ideologies in vogue among” intellectuals (Sowell 2011b:
406-407).
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averseness) guides his or her decisions. At this stage of the research, I am not concerned
with answering the question, does it matter who rules? Instead, one’s political experience
can inform the reader if it makes a difference if there are more “Obamas” or more
“Romneys” in politics. My focus here is to see if there are differences in the first place,
what their causes can be, and if these differences are statistically significant. Below, I list
the variables that I will use for the statistical testing. The list includes the operationalized
concepts for the independent variables, as well as the variables that will be used as
dependent variables.

4.2.2 Behavioral Indicators

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The first indicator that I bring into operation is the one for the active-politician and
passive-politician concept118 by identifying a politician’s economic choice. As stated in
the theory, economic behavior is most indicative of a person’s personal character traits,
among them being risk-acceptant and risk-averse. Such psychological faculties can be
measured by dichotomously coding a politician’s vocational choice into risk-acceptant
and risk-averse categories. On the basis of such operationalization, I identify indicators
for active-politicians (AP) and passive-politicians (PP), which I use to gather and analyze

118

In the context of this research, I use the AP/PP concept both as an independent variable and as a
dependent variable. First, I want to know the effects of institutional rules on elite recruitment. To this end, I
use the AP/PP conceptualization as a dependent variable, to measure the effects of institutional rules. In a
second step, my interest is to know to what extent this conceptualization of AP/PP matters and has an
effect. Thus I utilize it in this step as an independent variable to see to what extent it has more explanatory
and predictive power on other behaviors and character traits of politicians. For more detail, see Chapter 5.
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data. Additionally, indicators for culture and ideology will be provided, too. Due to the
Bundestag’s division into SMD and PR legislators, the indicators for mandate-type
conclude this listing of independent variables.

Vocational Choice (Active-Politician, Passive-Politician Concept)
Vocational choice is a key indicator in the data set. It is the indicator par excellence for
having an active or passive political personality. The vocational background of a
legislator is the best and strongest indicator for economic behavior by indicating riskacceptance and risk-averseness on the side of the politician. Thus vocational choice
indicates the propensity for autonomy, independence, active-political personality, and in
turn, for obedience, dependence, and passive political characteristics. Vocational choice
indicates to what extent a person is salaried or to what extent he is master of his own
fortune.

From this vocational choice, it can be inferred to what extent a person can live for politics
or has to live by politics. Either way, his or her political behavior is predictable. A person
who can live for politics, does not need the material benefits that come with the office to
sustain himself and secure his future. A person who lives by politics, sustains himself
through the economical benefits that are attained by being in politics and guarantees his
material future by being in politics. There are therefore different rational choices to make,
depending on one’s starting position.119

119

Refer to Chapter 2, and the detailed rational choice discussion there.
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Paul Herrnson, as one example in that context, states that a politician who enters politics
has to ask himself: “Can I win? Is this the right time for me to run? Who is my
competition likely to be? These are the kind of questions that go through the minds of
prospective candidates” (Norris: 1997: 187). Herrnson, and many others, however,
overlook more important questions by eliding basic economic questions that a
prospective politician will ask. How will my decision to run affect me economically?
Will I be able to sustain myself, my wife, my children, if I compete and lose? Can I
afford this undertaking?120

The work of Schlesinger and Rohde, with their ambitious politicians, and Herrnson’s
concept of the self-starters, evade a central tenant of decision making, namely the
person’s economic situation at the point where a decision is made. Vocational choice is
the primary conditioner of the ability to go into politics and to perform in it independent
of economic calculations. It is therefore necessary to provide a dichotomous classification
of vocational choices that indicate active and passive political behavior, which is as
follows:

Vocations that are entrepreneurial, medical, military, agricultural, managerial, as well as
vocations that are in engineering and require high skills, are indicative of an activepersonality that is risk-acceptant, and independent-minded. Therefore, this type of

120

See Chapter 6.1 for evidence for this.
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vocation would be associated with an active type politician. Such persons are (generally)
materially independent of remunerations from politics. These differing vocational choices
are therefore combined in a dummy variable for vocational choice as standing for an
active-politician.

Other types of vocations, such as teachers, academics and scientists, administrators and
bureaucrats, workers, secretaries, students, lawyers,121 social workers, community
organizers, and those engaged in union work, or who work for a party or a politician,122
are, following Weber, indicative of a cautious and risk-averse political personality. These
vocational categories represent economically risk-averse behavior. These vocational
groups are dependent on continued salaried remunerations, including the transitional
phase from employee to political officeholder. These differing vocational choices are
therefore combined in a dummy variable for a passive-politician. A number of other
vocations, but also in law enforcement, entertainment, and sports, are less easy to
categorize into one of the two concepts and have to be handled separately and excluded
from the dummy variable.123

121

See the discussion in Chapter 5 for why this occupational category is excluded from the passivepolitician concept for the purpose of the statistical analysis.

122

Characterized as the “talking professions” (Allen 2013: 3).

123

See Appendix A for a complete list of vocational choices of German and American legislators.
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Culture
My analytical approach to culture is that I am interested in it’s function and measurable
effect. I am not looking at this point to determine why a certain – cohesive – culture leads
to a specific outcome. That is outside the scope of my study. I do however recognize the
epistemological relevance of culture as an agent in conditioning behavior. While culture
is an ambiguous term, it is evident that it is shaping political behavior (vide Putnam
1993). Cultural factors both condition who enters politics and what that politician’s
chances are. Among other things, culture provides a standard124 according to which
potential politicians and politicians are screened and measured (morals–ethics continuum,
as one example).125

For the purpose of this research, it suffices to operationalize culture as a group’s common
behavior. As such, culture is the statistically measurable behavior of a discrete group visà-vis other groups. The operationalization of culture in the comparative cases of the
Bundestag and the House of Representatives is, however, in conflict, with institutional
rules. The German and American legislators stand for both, the effects of culture and of
institutional rules, as the separation of the effects of the respective explanatory variables
is not possible (see discussion above). The clearest operationalization of culture exists in
the sole case of the United States, since culture is clearly separate from the effects of

124

Litmus test.

125

In the terminology of science, culture can be an independent variable as well as a dependent variable.
Culture can decide who, or what type of political personality is allowed into politics. Culture can also be an
outcome, in that a group of politicians, belonging to one or the other culture, vary in their numerical
dominance in the legislature on the basis of other factors.
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institutional rules. In this case, I operationalize what is labeled ethnicity and race in the
American context, as standing for culture. The terms “White” and “African American”
accordingly do not imply a racial (in a scientific manner) distinction, but a distinction on
the basis of cultural differences. Similarly, other ethnic labels, such as “Asian American”
and “Hispanic,” are again subsumed under the blanket term of culture.126,127 Due to the
fact that this study is focused on the effects of institutional rules on elite recruitment, I
abstain from a thorough discussion of cultural effects in a system where institutional rules
are constant. Instead, I will briefly mention the effects of culture further below for
illustrative purposes only.

A more detailed description of what culture is and that goes beyond the definition used
here, is not necessary for the purpose of this research. My epistemological goal in this
study is to statistically ascertain the value of culture in comparison with institutions and
ideology. Culture can therefore remain in an unopened metaphorical black box. My
epistemological interest hoc momento is to know what the quantifiable comparative effect
of culture is.128

126

A further breakdown of the cultural variable of White into more detailed categories like Catholic,
Evangelical, liberal, etc. would have brought too much coding ambiguity into the data set.
127

Since the groups of Hispanic and Asian-American legislators, as well as others (Pacific Islanders, etc.)
are numerically too small, they are subsumed into a dummy variable.
128

The more sophisticated definition of culture by Tönnies (2005) and of cultural morphology by Spengler
(2007, 2013) constitute the epistemological underpinnings to my more economical definition. On the basis
of them, it can be analyzed why the observed behavior is there; i.e. an explanation for the peculiarity of
African-American or German political behavior can be given. For example, Tönnies’ theoretical dichotomy
of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft can be applied to the cases and they can be categorized into one of them.
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Ideology
The logic behind my methodological approach to ideology is the same as it is in the case
of culture. As such I am interested in the statistical effect ideology has on elite
recruitment in comparison to the explanatory variables, culture and institutional rules.
Why a peculiar effect is produced by a certain ideology remains outside the scope of this
study. That question has to be addressed in a separate study. Therefore, I succinctly
define ideology as a Weltanschauung.

Partisan affiliation is in parallel with these Weltanschauungen. In the American case,
with its two party system, the Republican and Democrat distinction can be translated into
ideological affiliations with the right and the left. By default, distinctions within each
ideology are necessarily pretermitted. For example, Republican conservatives, whose
Weltanschauung is focused on an attachment to certain mores and customs, are
considered in the same ideological camp with Republican libertarians whose selfperception revolves around fiscal matters and the federal government’s capabilities vis-àvis the individual. These are two quite separate world views. In the German case, with its
multi-party system, a dummy variable is needed to recognize the axiomatic ideological
division into leftist and rightist ideologies. Consequently, the CDU, the CSU, and the
FDP are grouped as right, while the SPD, the Greens, and the Linke are grouped as left.

This critical tool in analyzing (and understanding) peoples’ behavior goes beyond the scope of this
research.
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Implied in the concept of ideology is also “agency,”129 where a Weltanschauung is
translated into political behavior.130 As in the case of culture, the epistemological
relevance of ideology for the present study is that ideology exists and that politicians can
be categorized into an ideology, and that their behavior can be measured. What the
genesis of a particular ideology is goes beyond the scope of this research. The research
focus is instead on ideology as an indicator for behavior vis-à-vis culture and institutional
rules.

Mandate (German legislators only)
The candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules are about the same for
German politicians who get elected in either single member districts or through state
party lists. While in the case of the former the selectorate are local party members or
local party delegates, in the latter case the candidates are nominated by state party
delegates, and the party bosses have more influence on the nominations than in the single
member districts.

Furthermore, German single member district candidates are more involved and more
exposed to their particular electorate. While not at the nomination stage (like in the
American primary), German single member district candidates face a similar electoral

129

Agency is hereby used as an adjective. It implies activity on the basis of ideology.

130

„Vor Zeiten war ein jeder ein Esel auf seine Faust und ließ die Welt in Frieden; jetzt dagegen hält man
sich für 'gebildet', flickt eine ‚Weltanschauung‘ zusammen und predigt auf die Nebenmenschen los. Lernen
will Niemand mehr, schweigen noch weniger, einen Anderen in seiner Entwicklung anerkennen am
Allerwenigsten“ (Burckhardt 1921: 276).
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situation as their American counterparts. Thus one can expect to find more active-type
politicians among single member district representatives than among those elected
through state party lists.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
In this section, I list those dependent variables, which will be used for the statistical
significance tests for the independent variables listed above. The function of the
dependent variables is to statistically evidence differences in behavior and personal
character traits of national legislators on the basis of the independent variables. Thus, the
dependent variables enable me to conduct two analytical steps:
1. The statistical significance of the active-politician conceptualization is tested.
2. The predictive power of institutional rules and the active-politician concept is
tested in comparison to other explanatory variables, such as culture and ideology.

Years Spent in pre-political Vocation
With this scale variable, I measure the number of years a national legislator has spent in
his pre-political career. This variable is logically a corollary to the vocational choice
variable. If of course a politician has not learned a vocation outside of politics and has
never worked outside of politics, then the years the politician has spent prior to elected
office working for politicians is used.
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The years-in-office variable deepens the explanatory power of the vocational choice
variable. It is one thing to have one or the other vocation. It is another thing to actually
endure and work in it and make a living from it. Thus the time spent in one’s vocation is
crucial in understanding the relevance of the vocational choice made by the political
actor. An entrepreneur who succeeded for several decades in his vocation has a different
life experience and a different record to run on than a lawyer who moved straight from
law school into politics. Equally, someone who spent only a few years in job as a social
worker, or even moved straight from the classroom into national politics, will have a
different socialization and therefore a different worldview from someone who worked for
decades as a doctor in a hospital. Someone who has no other means of material
sustenance, and someone who has never known any other means of material safety than
by advocating an ideology has a different outlook on life than someone who is the master
of his own destiny.

For gaining and retaining a seat in parliament, which has a lot of material benefits, a
politician will do everything to gain and retain the continued material benefit from his
profession as a politician. This can be done by either yielding to the constituents’ wishes,
the demands from the party, or wishes of his financiers. A politician who does not depend
for his livelihood on income as national legislator, however, can pursue politics as a
calling, and act on his own will if necessary. Not only is there a), a difference in the
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motivation to enter politics, there is b), a difference in the motivation on how to act in
politics.131

Years Spent in Local Politics
This scale variable measures the years a national legislator has spent in local office before
entering national politics. This could have been as a local council member or a mayor. It
accounts only for elected office and does not include local party office. This last position
is, however, quite relevant in the German case. Note that in the German institutional
setting with its emphasis on the Ochsentour, partisan reputation building in local politics
is a steppingstone in gaining support for a nomination for national office and receiving
financial support. Such reputation building can, however, equally be earned by serving
within the local party structure. In the American case, activity in local office is of less
importance, since local party structures have atrophied and there is very little benefit to
be gained.132

Years Spent in State Politics
This scale variable measures the number of years a national legislator spent in state
politics. This can be either in the legislative branch or in the executive branch (e.g.
131

Based on the previous discussion, the hypothesize connected to this variable is that in the United States,
where candidates generally run on their record, active-type politicians who have spent many years in their
extra-political career will be more abundant than in Germany, where politicians build their reputations
within the party and thus have shorter extra-political careers.
132

Based on the previous discussion, the hypothesis is that in the German case more politicians will have a
background in local politics compared to American politicians. This local service will have been longer
than in the case of the Americans since local party service pays off, while in the U.S. such service is
generally a thankless and minimally rewarded service.
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Ministerpräsident or governor). In the German institutional setting, such service is
connected with high partisan visibility as well as high financial remuneration. The latter
factor especially makes this service an end in itself rather than a means to move further
up in paid politics. In contrast, American state legislators’ remuneration is lower than that
in Germany. What state politics provides American politicians with is sufficient political
clout to use it as a stepping stone into Congress by gaining the attention and support of
contributors.133

Age upon Entrance into the National Legislature
With this scale variable, the age upon entrance into the national legislature is measured.
In the German case, with its plutocratic selectorate, the party leadership is able to
influence candidate selection for the purpose of achieving descriptive representation that
is in accordance with the particular ideology of the party. Furthermore, candidates have
to gain favor with a small inner party circle to be nominated. It is therefore hypothesized
that on average German legislators will be younger than Americans,134 since for
descriptive purposes younger legislators can be promoted. In the American case however,
extra-partisan reputation-building is important in attracting support from the electorate at
large. Such reputational credit-building takes more time. The words of Job, “Days should
speak, and multitude of years should teach wisdom” (Job 32:7) is a principle of American
politics that applies to most districts. Furthermore, age in itself is perceived to be

133

Based on the previous discussion, the hypothesis is that fewer Bundestag members will have a
background in state politics than in the American case.
134

Especially those on the left.
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associated with maturity and experience. This is relevant in an institutional setting where
the selectorate is the electorate at large. Thus American legislators will on average be
older than Germans when first entering national politics.

Years Spent in National Legislature
This scale variable measures the years spent in the national legislature. In most case, it
measures the consecutive years a politician has spent in the national legislature since
election. In some cases, politicians have served non-consecutive terms in the national
legislature.135 Hypothesizing that passive-politicians depend on being in parliament for
their material well-being, while active-politicians are less reliant on being national
legislators, German legislators will have longer tenures than American legislators.

Relative(s) who served in Politics
The theoretical prediction with regard to having relatives who have served or are serving
in politics is that in the case of America there will be more national legislators who have
or have had relatives in politics than in Germany. The institutionalist logic is that in the
United States, to become a candidate and then to be elected, one needs to have broad
support among the (s)electorate. This is achieved through name recognition. While there
are many means to achieve that end, they all require financial resources, which are not
supplied by the party in the case of the nomination process and not sufficiently or at all in
the case of the election.

135

Due to having lost reelection, renomination, or having withdrawn from reelection for different reasons.
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If a politician is not self-financed, it becomes quite handy if the prospective politician has
a network of donors that he can rely on. In the case of a political novice, this is
particularly important. As such, it can be presumed that family ties will be a reason to
recommend a scion to prospective donors. Alternatively, simply bearing the name of a
known politician will provide a type of political brand recognition, which can result in
both attracting financial support from the public at large as well as their votes. In the case
of Germany, support needed for nomination is limited to that of partisan insiders, and the
favoritism and support are gained from a comparatively narrow plutocratic circle. The
way support is gained is by having a record of party service and of attachment to the
party ideology and not by party patronage of family members. These are features that are
difficult to pass on and inherit. This is why the expectation is to find fewer German
national legislators who had relatives in politics.

Military Service Record
Military service is a noteworthy behavioral indicator in the comparative context. Due to
conscription, all Germans had to serve (until recently) in the military or they had to
actively choose to partake in a community service program. Thus inferences about a
man’s persona (since only men were conscripted) can be made on the basis of his
choosing to serve in the military or to do his duty in the civilian service alternative. Since
military service is associated with a conservative and patriotic ideology, it can be
expected that politicians on the right have this experience rather than those on the left,
where such values are frowned upon.
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In the case of the United States, military service is also associated with a more
conservative Weltanschauung. However, due to the more widespread patriotism in the
U.S., military service is less likely to be an exclusive indicator for the right. This is why a
less skewed service record can be hypothesized to be found between left and right in the
U.S. While military service is connected with prestige in American public life and, in
extenso, in politics, this is not the case in Germany. Thus in comparative perspective,
more military veterans should be present in Congress than in the Bundestag.

Marital Status
Marital status is indicative for cultural and ideological behavior. Institutional rules are,
however, important to the extent that these cultural and ideological factors are significant
in a person’s political career. The argument here is that depending on cultural and
ideological worldview, certain behaviors (vis-à-vis marital status) are condoned and
others are disapproved. Depending on culture and ideology, the same behavior can be
either an asset or a stumbling block.

An unmarried woman can, depending on the selectorate, gain or lose support with the
selectorate. The institutional design can increase or decrease such an effect. Depending
on the ideology of the party, marital status can have a minimal effect or it can be key in
picking a candidate. Sexual orientation can be included in this context as being of equal
relevance. In the American case, where the selectorate approximates the electorate, such
personal factors are of greater significance than in Germany, where such personal factors
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have only to be addressed with a small circle within the party. The hypothesis is then that
in the American case, there will be more politicians who exhibit personal traits that are in
accordance with what is popularly labeled family values than in the German case.
Furthermore, due to ideological differences, politicians of the left will be less likely to
exhibit traditional family values.

Number of Children
Similar to the case of gender, number of children is a variable whereby cultural and
ideological sentiments with regards to having children are measured. Having children in
the first place, as well as how many, is a strong indicator for social behavior. The cultural
norms and ideologies that are metaphorically at play here are similar to the ones
pertaining to marital status and gender. The way institutions influence this variable is by
conditioning if either a plutocratic political elite (Germany) or the electorate at large
(America) chooses, and with whose cultural norms and ideology the potential candidate
has to find favor with. This is why American politicians, especially in House races,
advertise their families and their children, even if the children depicted in the campaign
are not even his own as in the case of a Congressman during the 2012 elections. In the
German case, a candidate’s family and children do not have the same significance as a
factor in gaining support and votes. Thus the hypothesis is that more American legislators
will have children in the first place, and secondly, they will also have more children than
their German counterparts.
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Executive Experience
This is an exploratory variable and no theoretical predictions are made. I measure if a
national legislator had any executive experience, meaning if he was governor or village
mayor, for example.

Having Lost Reelection or Renomination
This is another exploratory variable and no theoretical predictions are made. I measure if
a national legislator had, after being elected to the national legislature, ever lost
reelection, voluntarily withdrew from the legislature, or if he failed to gain renomination.

Years Spent in European Parliament (German legislators only)
This is an exploratory variable and no theoretical predictions are made.

4.2.3.1 Data Collection for the Bundestag and the House of Representatives

Here I want to briefly mention how the data was gathered. In the case of the German
Bundestag, exhaustive data is already existent in the form of the Kürschners
Volkshandbuch. This publication, in existence since 1890 (Kürschners Volkshandbuch
2012: 7), lists all members of the Bundestag (and before, members of the Reichstag) and
is updated over the course of a legislative period to keep track of changes in the
membership. The Volkshandbuch provides biographical information on each of the
Bundestag members.
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This information is, however, not standardized and the number of facts differs from
member to member. Data that was not attainable through the Volkshandbuch, were
attained from the biographical entries on the website of the Bundestag and the respective
websites of the individual Bundestag members.136 In only a handful of cases, where some
data was still not attainable, media reports were used to get the data.

In the case of the House of Representatives, most of the data was attainable from the
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. Besides this source, the respective
websites of the members of Congress provided the remaining data. In the very few cases,
where data was still missing, it was acquired from websites such as opencongress.org and
ballotpedia.org and news articles. Consequently, the data gathered for this original data
set for the Bundestag and the House of Representatives, all from public records, is
“reliable and accurate” (Nachmias 2000: 278).

4.2.3.2 Coding Scheme

In this section, I describe the coding scheme used for the original data set. For the scale
variables,137 numbers were entered for the respective years a legislator spent in his
vocation, local, state, and national offices, and the age he entered national office as well
as a number for the amount of children. All other codes are entered as nominal scales.
136

http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/abgeordnete18/alphabet/index.html

137

A.k.a. interval variable.
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The only variable where an ordinal scale might have been used is the variable for
education. Yet I intentionally left it as nominal, since attained degrees are no longer
indicative of education and erudition (see Bloom 1987, Tocqueville 2003 65). This is
why I refrained from using this variable in the statistical tests in Chapter 5.138 While
academic degrees may not be indicative of erudition, they are, however, even more
valued as status symbols that may be utilized for advertising, in the sense of Mayhew’s
(1974) definition.139

138

See Appendix B for a complete listing of the education background of German and American
legislators.
139

This might explain why there are more than five times as many PhDs in the Bundestag than in the House
of Representatives. Ostensibly, in the American electoral environment, such a title does not “pay off,”
while in the case of Germany this titles is quite rewarding.
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CHAPTER

5

–

STATISTICAL

ANALYSES

OF

THE

HOUSE

OF

REPRESENTATIVES AND THE BUNDESTAG

In this chapter, I present the results of the statistical analysis of the data gathered for the
House of Representatives and the Bundestag. In the first section, I present the effects of
institutional rules on elite recruitment in the comparative cases of Germany and the
United States, whereby each country represents a dummy variable for the respective
institutional rules in effect in each political system. In this case, I am interested to see if
the different institutional rules in Germany and the United States lead to differences in
the types of politicians in the national legislature, i.e. active or passive-politicians.

In the second section, I focus on the German case, thereby affording the opportunity to
test the hypothetical effects the institutional rules on elite recruitment, while holding
culture and ideology constant. I model the SMD – PR division in the Bundestag as a
dummy variable to see if a pattern emerges where institutional rules account for having
more active-politicians in the Bundestag.

As explained in the previous chapter, I utilize a two-step analytical approach in sections
5.1 and 5.2. In the first step, the institutional rules at hand are the independent variable,
while the active-politician (AP)/ passive-politician (PP) concept is the dependent
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variable. In the second step, I use the AP/PP division140 as an independent variable, to see
what its effect is (if any) on other personal traits and behaviors of politicians. The
analysis will also allow to see if this conceptualization has more or less explanatory
power than culture and ideology on politicians’ personal character traits.

A third possible test would have been the sole case of the United States. Yet, while there
are significant cultural and ideological differences in the case of the U.S., all legislators
are, de jure at least, elected under the same candidate nomination rules and campaign
financing rules. Accordingly, I would not be able to attribute observed differences among
legislators to institutional rules. Such an analysis (while being highly informative on the
effects of culture and ideology) lies therefore outside the scope of my research.

5.1.1 Testing the Direct Effect of Institutional Rules on Elite Recruitment: A
Comparative Analysis of the Bundestag and the House of Representatives

In this section, I present the results of the statistical analysis for the comparative data on
the House of Representatives and the Bundestag. As stated earlier, my argument is that
the institutional candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules in effect in the
United States are more favorable to active-politicians than the institutional rules in effect
in Germany. Evidence that corroborates this hypothesis would be found if significantly
more (in statistical terms) active-politicians would be present in the House of
140

The operationalization for this was, as detailed in the previous chapter, the identification of a politician’s
vocational choice as being either indicative for an active-politician or passive-politician.
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Representatives than in the Bundestag. In Table 5.1.1, I present the cross tabulation
results for representative type by country.

Table 5.1.1. Distribution of Active-politicians and Passive-politicians among members of the Bundestag
and the House of Representatives.

GER

USA

Total

Active‐
politicians

28.1%

45.2%

34.5%

(158)

(155)

(313)

Passive‐
politicians

71.9%

54.8%

65.5%

(405)

(188)

(593)

Total

100%

100%

100%

(563)

(188)

(906)141

141

The excluded cases in Table 5.1.1 are 180, 16.6% of the original N of 1086. Almost all of them belong
to the judicial category. Lawyers and judges constitute 10.1% of the Bundestag membership and 18.9% of
the House of Representatives. When included in the data set as passive-politicians, the proportions change
in the case of Germany to 25% AP to 75% PP, and in the case of the U.S. to 36.1% AP to 63.9% PP.
While the change for the German case is miniscule, the change in the American case is conspicuous. This is
due to the fact that almost one fifth of the House members are lawyers. The decision what to do with this
group may therefore have a strong effect on the data analysis for the House.
Max Weber regarded lawyers as one example for an occupational group that would fit into the concept of
passive-politician. Yet I still refrain from doing so for several reasons. Lawyers constitute such a strong
occupational category in both legislatures, that they disproportionally skew the results. There is either
almost parity between active-politicians and passive-politicians in the House, and thus clearly
distinguishing it from the Bundestag, or (when lawyers are included in the PP category) the difference
between the House and the Bundestag is much less pronounced (yet still statistically significant!). For
illustrative purposes, the exclusion of lawyers is in consequence apposite.
Another reason for excluding the occupational category of lawyers is that some lawyers enter politics
immediately after law school. Without making a living as a lawyer, the degree functions in a sense as an
attribute of prestige for reputation building in politics. At the same time, there are some who successfully
practice law and live by it for many decades before going into politics. These are very different life
experiences. Thus assigning this category into passive-politician category, and considering that it
constitutes a significant proportion of the legislatures, inherently contains a degree of equivocality (vide
soft data discussion).
In either case, the AP/PP dummy variable performs its illustrational function very well, informing the
reader about the different composition and economic background of the political class.
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The results in Table 5.1.1 show that the proportion between active-politicians and
passive-politicians is about the same in the case of the House of Representatives. There
are slightly more passive-politicians (at ca. 55%) in the House than active-politicians (at
ca. 45%). In the case of the Bundestag, the ratio active-politicians to passive-politicians,
with 28.1% to 71.9%, is very disparate. This means that the ruling elite in Germany and
in the United States is composed of people with very different live experiences, which
guide and inform their political decision makings.142 Thus, the data offer strong evidence
for the hypothesis that institutional rules, as they are designed in the United States, are
significantly more favorable to active personality type politicians than the institutional
rules in Germany. In and of itself, this finding validates the high explanatory power and
utility of the active-politician concept, too. In the following, I strengthen this observation
with additional data.

Further analysis of the data reveals an indirect effect of the institutional rules at hand.
Table 5.1.2. shows that almost half of the German Bundestag members have served in
local office, while only a quarter of American legislators have similarly served in local
office. Very interesting is the second observation that in the United States half of the
legislators have served in state office, while in the German case only one sixth of
legislators have served in state office. The elite recruitment patterns in America are the
very reverse of the German case.

142

The underlying argument (as discussed in the previous chapters) being that a person’s faculty of
judgment (Urteilskraft, Urteilsvermögen in German) is based on his knowledge and acuity. This in turn is
informed by life experience and formal education. Thus, the operationalization through economic choice as
being exemplary for varying degrees of life experience.
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This fascinating political phenomenon is indicative of the indirect effects of the differing
candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules. One of the key theoretical
assumptions points at the different emphasis on party service as a means to increase one’s
recruitment opportunities. The notion of the Ochsentour implied that German politicians
could earn their way in to the Bundestag through service to the “party,” a relatively
passive mode of recruitment. Within the ambiguous entity of “party,” this party service
refers specifically to local and state party service. In contrast, self-recruitment was argued
to be the viable pathway for American politicians, a mode that can be described as more
active. I had used the analogy of hiring and being hired in this context.143

Table 5.1.2 Recruitment Patterns into National Legislatures.

USA

GER

Local
Office

27%

46.6 %

State
Office

52.3 %

16.4 %

Percentage of legislators in national assemblies who had held either local and/or state elected office.

The statistical evidence presented in Table 5.1.2 confirms my expectation for the
importance of local party service for the purpose of the Ochsentour. Local office is then
much more important in German politics for a political career than it is in the United
States. Only a quarter of American national legislators have a background in local politics
(N.B., this includes school boards). In Germany however, almost half of national

143

See Chapter 3.
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politicians have served in local politics (N.B., this excludes holding local party office,
which is of high utility, too).

The bottom row of statistics in Table 5.1.2 reveals that more than half of American
national politicians have a background in state politics, while only one in six German
national legislators have passed through state politics before going into national politics.
It is quite interesting to note that state politics is ostensibly an important stepping stone
into national politics in the United States, while it is not in Germany. While it is a “must”
to have local political connections for a successful political career in Germany, in the
United States it is a “must” to have state political experience.144

These are extremely important findings for a political scientist. The explanation for such
a discrepancy is to be found in the different institutional settings in Germany and the
United States, as analyzed in the previous theoretical chapters. Candidate nomination
rules in Germany are party-centered. For the single-member districts, there is rarely an
interference with the nomination process by either the state or national party, and if there
is, it is generally counterproductive.145 As for the state party lists, the selectorate are state
party officials in conjunction with local party leaders, who in the aggregate create a list
that primarily addresses local and regional interests rather than those of the state. Thus
the overwhelming importance of local party politics and the underwhelming relevance of
state politics in Germany characterize the pathway to the Bundestag.
144

There is no previous research on this phenomenon in comparative politics that addresses this issue.

145

See Chapter 6.1.
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In the American case, it was pointed out in the previous chapters that in a successful bid
for office, a politician has to find favor with his electorate, as this is his selectorate as
well.146 This is also the source from which to raise funds for the campaign if one cannot
self-finance. Yet local politics provides less clout than state politics for significant
fundraising for a congressional race. Thus a detour via state politics is a good way to earn
respectability as a serious contender for a congressional race and attract the necessary
financial contributions from donors. Active-politicians, who had been operationalized by
identifying such economic personal character traits of a politician that are indicative for
an entrepreneurial, risk-acceptant persona, are better prepared to organize and manage
their bid for elected office in the institutional/ electoral setting of the United States. Yet
going beyond the mere economic managerial skills, the personal traits identified for
active-politicians, also condition the social behavior of a person. On the basis of this
social behavior, persons acquire a certain social status,147 which is essential for earning
the support of the American (s)electorate. In section 5.1.2, I will show the effects of this.

We also need to keep in mind that state politics in Germany provides significant
remuneration. Thus there is less incentive to move from state politics, where one has
146

See Chapter 6.2.
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Social status is important, since on the basis of the perception of the candidate, the (s)electorate gives
their support to the candidate (by nominating and financing, and eventually voting for him). The logic is
not that a certain vocational type leads to a certain social status. Instead, the underlying psychological
condition that leads to the economic choice early on in life, is furthermore expressed, in other behaviors
and traits (as observed in the next two sections). Since vocational choice is the” harbinger” for such
behaviors and traits, it is methodologically utilized as an independent variable.
Practically put, one does not work for decades in one’s vocation, marry and have many kids, just because
one chooses to become a medical doctor instead of a social activist.
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established oneself, to national politics. In the American case, state politics rarely
provides significant economical sustenance. Thus state politics is not an end in itself but a
means to an end in the American case. Consequently, the comparison of the frequencies
of active-politicians in the Bundestag and the House of Representatives showed that, at
least, a covariation exists between institutional rules pertaining to candidate nomination
rules and campaign financing rules. Yet there is strong evidence that this observation is
no mere correlation but includes causation. As Table 5.1.2 evidences, politicians in
Germany and the United States clearly adapt their behavior based on incentives that
foster a path into the national legislature. Thus it is plausible that the indirect effect
observed in Table 5.1.2. as well as the effect observed in Table 5.1.1. point to electoral
rules’ capacity in influencing elite recruitment,

5.1.2 Institutional Rules’ Effect compared to Culture and Ideology.

In section 5.1.1., I showed that the institutional rules in Germany and in the United States
lead to a different distribution of active-politicians and passive-politicians in the
Bundestag and the House of Representatives. In this section then, I want to learn if it
makes a difference to have more or fewer active-politicians in the national legislature. I
answer the question, does it matter to have more or less active-politicians. For that
purpose, I am able to draw on a number of indicators that present behavioral and
characteristic traits of national legislators, which are indicative of their recruitment paths

189

and patterns into the national legislature.148 Consequently, I transform the dependent
variable of active-politician/ passive-politician into an independent variable. I use, again,
the dummy variables of Germany and the United States, to see if the variation in the
distribution of active-politicians among the two countries leads to statistically significant
systemic differences.

The first indicators I look at are differences in local and state offices between the cases of
Germany and the United States. I conducted independent sample t-tests to compare the
difference between German and American national legislators’ behavioral backgrounds
in local and state politics as indicated by years of service. There was significant
difference between Americans (M = 1.91) and Germans (M = 4.21; t (1084) = -7.70, p =
.00, two-tailed) with respect to their tenure in local politics. Not only did more Bundestag
members serve in local politics than Representatives, but they spent more than twice as
much time in local politics.

There is also a statistically significant difference between Representatives and Bundestag
members regarding their tenure in state politics. Germans (M = 1.43) spent significantly
less time in state politics before moving on to national politics than Americans (M =
148

The rationale for why the economic behavior (observed through the active-politician/ passive-politician
concept) is related to further social behaviors (as analyzed in this and the next section) is as following. The
inherent psychological precondition of the person, leading him to make a certain economic choice (i.e.
AP/PP), continues to influence his behavior “further down the road.” Such behavior is observed with the
variables presented here.
If one accepts that politics is more of a craft, rather than a profession, than the “tools” an AP has (lifeexperience, social status, intellectual capacity) are superior to that of a PP in a specific institutional setting
(and vice versa in a different institutional setting). Succinctly put, a psychological condition leads to an
economic condition, which in turn leads to a political condition (Fromm 1994: 5&12).
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4.86; t (1084) = 10.57, p = .00, two-tailed). This shows that the Representatives who take
the route through state politics to Congress have to build their clout in state politics over a
course of some years, while in the case of Germany, the clout earned in local politics
suffices for a successful bid for the Bundestag.

Table 5.1.3. Independent sample t-tests for years spent in local office and/or in state office for Germany
and the United States.
Sig.
Values
Group
n
Mean
SD
t
(two‐tailed)
Years
in
Local Office

GER
USA

646
440

4.21
1.91

5.98
3.83

‐7.11

0.000

Years
in
State Office

GER
USA

646
440

1.43
4.86

3.71
6.08

10.57

0.000

Consequently, it can be stated that the American candidate nomination rules and
campaign financing rules put the onus on the individual politician to raise funds and
organize a campaign organization. This requires political aspirants who are not selffinanced to gain sufficient political reputation to become a “viable candidate.” The way
this is done is through state politics, which accordingly can be characterized as a stepping
stone into Congress. The German candidate nomination rules and campaign financing
rules, however, concentrate political reputation-building in local politics. From local
politics, political aspirants can then move directly to the Bundestag with its high
remuneration (or state politics as the alternative).

Additional statistical analyses reveal that there are significant differences with regard to
other personal characteristic traits of politicians as well. In the previous chapters, I argued
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that American institutional rules are favorable for active-type politicians. These political
personalities would spent more time in their extrapolitical professions and thus enter
politics at a later age. The statistical results confirm this hypothesis (see Table 5.1.4). On
the average, American legislators, with the preponderance of active-politicians vis-à-vis
their German colleagues, spent 14.6 years in their profession, considerably more time
than German legislators who averaged 10.8 years. Consequently, the average age of
American politicians upon entrance to the House of Representatives is 47.4 years, while
Germans are younger – 42.5 years old on average – when first elected to the Bundestag.

Table 5.1.4. Independent sample t-tests for how many years legislators spent in their vocation, their age
when they entered the national legislature for the first time, and the years they have spent since then in the
national legislature.
Sig.
Values
Group
n
Mean
SD
t
(two‐tailed)
Year in
Profession

USA
GER

440
646

14.62
10.83

9.62
8.20

6.77

0.000

Age in
Parliament

USA
GER

440
646

47.4
42.5

8.36
9.07

9.16

0.023

Years in
Parliament

USA
GER

440
646

11.78
10.47

9.41
6.97

2.49

0.000

So far, the empirical evidence confirms the hypotheses made in the previous chapters.
Yet, I stated in Chapter 4 that I do not limit my research to theory-testing but instead
conduct exploratory research as well. The following analysis is therefore exploratory,
since no theoretical concept was utilized hitherto for this. The cross tabulation given in
table 5.1.5 shows that less than one percent of Bundestag members had relatives who
served in either national or state politics. The corresponding number for the House of
Representatives is, however, ten times as high. A Chi-square test for independence (with
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Yates continuity correction) indicates a significant association between being an
American legislator and having had relatives who served in prominent elected office, χ²
(1, n = 1086) = 46.0, p < .001.

Table 5.1.5. Number of legislators in the Bundestag and the House of Representatives who had either at
least one relative who served in elected office or who had none.

GER

USA

No relative served

640
(99.1%)

398
(90.5%)

At least one
relative served

6
(0.9%)

42
(9.5%)

This finding can be explained in the framework of the theoretical conceptualization of my
study. A plausible explanation would be, in the American context at least, that success is
based on attracting financial contributions149 in both the primary and the general election.
The candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules in the United States favor
informal political relationships between candidate and donor, which is of course most
beneficial for those who can be introduced into such informal structures by their relatives.
In addition to this, another factor that is relevant in the American case is name
recognition. In a system where the electorate is the selectorate, name recognition is of
great utility in the candidate nomination process, as it provides an “economic” way for
the (s)electorate to inform themselves about the candidate.

149

Always in the absence of self-financed candidates, who do not rely on outside contributions.
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In the case of Germany, where less than one percent of members of the Bundestag are
found to have had relatives in elected office, the candidate nomination rules concentrate
the decision-making process strictly within the party bureaucratic structure. Such a
political climate is conducive to favoritism based on party service rather than informal
family ties. Name recognition with the electorate at large has no effect in the
bureaucratically organized party. Consequently, it can be said that it matters to have more
or less risk-accepting, active-politicians in political life. These politicians will have quite
different backgrounds and quite different life experiences in comparison to passivepoliticians.

5.1.3 The Effects of Institutional Rules compared to Ideological and Cultural
Factors

The statistical techniques used so far were chosen to analyze comparative relationships
between groups (in this case the German and American legislatures). To clarify the
understanding of the effects of institutional rules150 in comparative perspective, I want to

150

With reference to footnote number 2 in this chapter, I want to emphasize that the mandate type
(SMD/PR) in connection with the electoral rules has an independent effect, too. Single member district
focus the “attention” of the (s)electorate much more on the individual than in the PR system. Consequently,
the personal predispositions of a politician, as explained in the footnote, have different valence in either a
SMD or PR system.
This does not mean that a person behaves differently just because he is in a SMD or PR system. Instead, the
different qualities of a candidate, which were already mentioned in the context of the AP/PP concept, come
to fruition. The independent effect thereby is similar to the one observed in the case of the candidate
nomination rules and campaign financing rules (since these relate to what type of mandate-type exists). The
entrepreneurial “spirit,” which was emphasized for the type of candidate nomination and campaign
financing procedures, which are favorable for active-politicians, is also important in the case of elections in
a single member district. While the effect of candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules can
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know the predictive power of them in comparison to the other explanatory variables of
culture and ideology mentioned in the previous chapter. Multiple linear regression (a.k.a.
OLS regression) and logistic regression (a.k.a. logit regression) analyses enable me to test
which of the independent variables has the strongest predictive power151 on legislators’
behaviors and recruitment patterns.

For culture as an independent variable, I use a concomitant variable. The German and
American legislators stand for their respective cultures. At the same time, these
legislators represent in the aggregate the results of their specific institutional settings.
Since I account for the institutional effect of candidate nomination rules and campaign
financing rules with the first variable, I ascribe to this variable the label of “culture” for
argument’s sake, and also for brevity. A more detailed analytical delineation between
culture and institutions is not possible. I would have to experimentally measure the
outcome while holding culture constant and changing institutions to measure differences,

only be observed indirectly (through the AP/PP conceptualization), the mandate-type’s effect can be
observed directly.
151

To avoid multicolinearity, I measured the Spearman rho rank correlation coefficient for the independent
variables. They are presented in the table below:
AP
SMD
USA
Right

AP

Correlation
Coefficient

1.000

.185**

.175**

.469**

SMD

Correlation
Coefficient

.185**

1.000

.569**

.250**

USA

Correlation
Coefficient

.175**

.569**

1.000

.017

Right

Correlation
Coefficient

.469**

.250**

0.17

1.000

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two‐tailed).
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which is not possible. Yet realistically, one can expect that both institutional and cultural
factors influence this “culture” variable.

For ideology as an independent variable, I use a dummy variable. I have on the one side
politicians of the left (Democrats, SPD, Left, Greens) and on the other side politicians of
the right (Republicans, CDU, CSU, FDP). For the third independent variable, electoral
rules, I differentiate between single member district and state party list legislators. While
all American legislators are elected in SMDs, only half of the German legislators are
elected in such districts, while the other half is elected on the basis of PR. This third
independent variable combines the German and American SMD legislators, even though
they are subject to very different candidate nomination and campaign financing rules.
Thus this independent variable combines both the effects of said rules as well as the
effects of district magnitude. The indirect effects of candidate nomination rules and
campaign financing rules can be inferred in this case only by approximation. A
statistically significant effect would imply difference with regard to the reference
category, the German PR-elected Bundestag members.

Lastly, I have the opportunity to use the active-politician variable (which I had linked to
institutional rules) as an independent variable for the regression analysis. Thus, I can test
not only, as I did in the previous section 5.1.2., to see if this concept matters in
influencing politicians’ behavior and character traits, but I can now see what the
predictive power of this concept is in comparison to the other three explanatory variables.
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I use multiple linear regressions to assess the ability of these independent variables to
predict number of years a legislator spent in his pre-political occupation. Preliminary
analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity,
and multicolinearity. All four variables were entered at the same step. The model as a
whole explained 18.7% of the variance in years in profession, F(4, 901)= 51.98, p <.001.
The active-politician concept was found to be the strongest statistically significant
predictor (beta = .39, p < .001), followed by culture (beta = .16, p < .001). In other words,
being an active-politician and being American was found to predict more years in
profession. Ideology and institutional differences were not found to be significant
predictors of years in profession. See table 5.1.6 for details.

Table 5.1.6. Beta Coefficients for legislators’ age when entering the national legislature for the first time,
the amount of years legislators spent in their respective vocation, the years they spent in state office, local
office, and in the national legislature, and the number of children legislators have.
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Age In
Years in
Years in
Years in
Years in
Children
Legislature Profession
State Office Local
Legislature
Office
Right
‐.18***
‐.00
‐.02
‐.01
‐.03
.07*
U.S.
.25***
.16***
.31***
‐.31***
.04
.21***
AP
.18***
.39***
‐.07*
.06
‐.12***
.17***
SMD
‐.02
‐.09
.05
‐.16***
.13***
.05
R2
.10
.19
Model Fit
24.09***
51.98***
* ≤ .05 ** ≤ .01 *** ≤ .001

.12
30.22***

.06
15.67***

.05
12.73***

.12
31.27***

With years spent in the national legislature, there are similarly significant coefficients in
the expected direction for the active-politician variable. With regards to the remaining
variables, being an American compared being a German politician has higher predictive
power, even though the AP concept is significant, too. The directions of impact are as
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expected, with one exception. The regression analysis predicts that an active-politician
spends more years in local politics than a passive-politician. Yet inherently, passivepoliticians are expected to spend more time in politics than active-politicians, since
passive-politicians live by politics rather than for politics, as mentioned earlier. When the
means are compared, however, it becomes clear that the difference is not that large.
While active-politicians spent on average 3.63 years in local office, passive-politicians
spent an average of 3.33 years in local office. If it is additionally considered that local
office is frequently unpaid or very low paid, it is not too surprising to see that the
entrepreneurial active-politicians are able to spend more time in local office. Thus this
result does not affect the underlying reasoning that passive-politicians live by rather than
for politics.

As reported in Table 5.1.7, I used direct logistic regression to assess the impact of
ideology, culture, the active-politician conceptualization, and of mandate type on the
likelihood of a legislator to be married or widowed. The results are reported in Table
5.1.7. The four independent variables were all entered at the same step. The full model
containing all predictors was statistically significant, χ2 (4, N = 906) = 57.25, p < .001,
indicating that the model was able to distinguish between being married or unmarried.
The model as a whole explained 9% of variance in marital status, and correctly classified
73.4% of cases. As shown in table 5.1.7, all four independent variables made a unique
statistical contribution to the model. The strongest predictor for marital status was
ideology, recording an odds ratio of 2.50. This indicates that being a conservative
politician means that one is two and a half times more likely to be married, controlling
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for other factors in the model. As an American politician, a legislator is still almost twice
as likely to be married in comparison to a German politician, recording an odds ratio of
1.78, controlling for other factors in the model.

Another interesting finding is seen in Model 9, the propensity for having children in the
first place. The direct logistic regression analysis in this case shows that the full model
containing all predictors was statistically significant, χ2 (4, N = 906) = 53.32, p < .001,
indicating that the model was able to distinguish between those who had children and
those who had none. The model as a whole explained between 9% of variance in having
children, and correctly classified 76.6% of cases. As the table below shows, all four
independent variables made a unique statistical contribution to the model. The strongest
predictor for having children was being American, with an odds ratio of 2.77. Thus being
an American legislator, one is almost three times as likely to have children compared to a
German legislator,152 controlling for other factors in the model. Ideology, in comparison

152

Number of Children
GER

USA

None

31.0 %

12.0 %

One

17.0 %

10.7 %

Two

29.3 %

32.3 %

Three

13.8 %

25.9 %

Four

6.8 %

10.5 %

Five or more

2.2 %

4.8 %

Not only are Americans more likely to have children, but they tend to have more children than Germans,
too. The mean being 2.5 for Representatives and 1.6 for Bundestag members.
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to culture, is only half as likely to predict one’s propensity to have children, with an odds
ratio of 1.30.

Table 5.1.7 Odds ratios for legislators’ likelihood for having served in the military, having been married
(or widowed), having children, having served in executive office, and for having a relative who had been
elected into political office.
Model 7
Model 8
Model 9
Model 10
Model 11
Military
Being
Having
Executive
Relative in
Service
Married
Children
Office
Right
.61*
2.50***
1.30
.74
.80
U.S.
.11***
1.78**
2.77***
1.56*
9.43***
AP
1.32
1.10
1.61*
1.36
.70
SMD
.41***
1.14
1.02
.68
4.21
R2
.40
.09
Model Fit
317.83***
57.25***
* ≤ .05 ** ≤ .01 *** ≤ .001, N=906

.09
53.32***

.02
9.14*

.19
51.82***

Employing direct logistic regression analysis to assess the impact of ideology, culture, the
active-politician conceptualization, and of mandate type on the likelihood of a legislator
for having had a relative who served in politics, yields important findings as well. Again,
the four independent variables were all entered at the same step. The full model
containing all predictors was statistically significant, χ2 (4, N = 906) = 51.82, p < .001,
indicating that the model was able to distinguish between those who had relatives in
politics versus those who did not. The model as a whole explained 19% of variance in
having relatives in politics, and correctly classified 95.7% of cases.

The strongest predictor for having a relative who served in politics was culture. Being
American recorded an odds ratio of 9.43, thus signifying that being an American
politician means that one is about nine times more likely than a German politician to have
a relative who had served in politics. All other independent variables’ results were not
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statistically significant. In all cases, the directions of impact were in line with the
theoretical expectations. This finding is in accordance with my hypothesis that having a
relative in politics and/or name recognition is in the context of the American candidate
nomination rules and campaign financing rules very useful, while the same factor in the
context of the rules in Germany is of little use, due to the narrow partisan composition of
the selectorate.

On the basis of the three-step analysis, it can be stated that institutional rules concerning
candidate nomination and campaign financing lead to different type of elite recruitment.
As seen in section 5.1.1., there are significantly more active-type politicians in the United
States House of Representatives than in the German Bundestag. As evidenced in section
5.1.2., such a specific makes a difference, as active-type personalities and passive-type
personalities exhibit significantly different types of behavior and bring different life
experiences into politics, which shape a person’s faculties of judgment and discernment.
Lastly, as seen in section 5.1.3., the effect of institutional rules is important in
understanding elite recruitment. Yet the influence of ideological and especially cultural
factors is of at least equal importance in shaping elite recruitment.

5.2 Testing the Effect of Institutional Rules on Elite Recruitment: The Case of the
Bundestag

In this section I focus on the case of Germany. With the Bundestag, I have the
opportunity of an almost “natural experiment” to observe the effects of institutional rules
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on elite recruitment. As discussed in the previous chapters, half of the Bundestag is
composed of legislators who are elected in single member districts, while the other half is
elected through state party lists and thus by proportional representation. The differences
with regards to candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules are much less
between these two modes of elections in comparison to the cases of Germany and the
United States. However, I can automatically control for culture in the case of this
analysis, since all SMD and PR legislators have been socialized in the same cultural
environment. A statistical analysis of the Bundestag is therefore most informative on the
effects of institutional rules.

As in section 5.1., I look first for the effects of institutional rules on the prevalence of
active-politicians in the national legislature to see if a change in institutional rules leads
to a change in elite recruitment. Table 5.2.1 attests that there is indeed variation between
legislators elected either directly or as list candidates. In accordance with the theoretical
expectations, there are significantly more active-type political personalities to be found
among legislators from a single-member district than those who are elected via state party
lists. While more than a third of the legislators elected in single member districts fall into
the active-politician economic categorization, among state party list legislators only one
fifth fit into this categorization.
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Table 5.2.1 Distribution of Active and Passive-politicians among members of the Bundestag by mandate
type.

SMD

PR

Total

Active‐

35%

22.3%

28.1%

politicians

(89)

(69)

(158)

Passive‐

65%

77.7%

71.9%

politicians

(165)

(240)

(405)

Total

100%

100%

100%

(254)

(309)

(563)

The next step is to see, as I did in section 5.1.2, if it makes a difference being an activepolitician or passive-politician in the Bundestag. In Table 5.2.2., I present the evidence
for differences in recruitment patterns on the basis of the active-politician and passivepolitician conceptualization. The table shows that politicians who are in the category of
active-politician have very different life experiences prior to entering the Bundestag than
those who are categorized as passive-politicians.
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Table 5.2.2. Independent sample t-tests to comparing active-politicians’ (AP) and passive-politicians’ (PP)
behavior with regard to years spent in local politics, state politics, vocations, age entered the Bundestag for
the first time, and years spent in the Bundestag.
Sig.
Values
Group
n
Mean
SD
t
(two‐tailed)
Years in Local
Office

AP
PP

158
405

5.89
3.79

6.56
5.79

3.511

.001

Years in State
Office

AP
PP

158
405

1.15
1.56

3.53
3.72

‐1.232

.219

Years in
Profession

AP
PP

158
405

14.08
9.39

8.44
7.83

6.250

.000

Age in
Parliament

AP
PP

158
405

43.51
41.85

8.70
9.44

1.986

.048

Years in
Parliament

AP
PP

158
405

9.59
10.94

6.29
7.26

‐2.184

.030

One of the starkest differences between active-politicians and passive-politicians are the
years they spent in their pre-political career. Those Bundestag members who have a riskacceptant personality spent almost half as much time in their vocations than those who
are risk-averse. Thus active and passive-politicians in the Bundestag act on the basis of
different life-experiences. Max Weber’s division between those living for and those
living by politics is echoed in these findings, too. Passive-politicians, who are
theoretically living by politics, spent significantly more time in high-paying state politics,
and remained shorter times in mostly honorary and unsalaried local office. Activepoliticians, who live for politics, spent much more time in such local offices. While the
average age active-politicians enter national politics and the average age passivepoliticians enter national politics is about the same, the difference is in what these two
groups did until that point, and with what outlook on life they enter the Bundestag.
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In a third and last step, I compare the predictive power of institutional rules to the effects
of ideology in determining politicians’ behavior. Since the German Bundestag is
essentially culturally homogenous, that variable is not applicable. For ideology, I use a
dummy variable, where I subsume the parties of the right under the label “right” (CDU,
CSU, FDP), and the parties of the left (SPD, Greens, Left) under the label “left.” With
regards to institutional rules, I utilize first the dummy variable mandate, whereby I am
able to differentiate between legislators elected in a single member district and legislators
elected through state party lists. I also use the variable “active-politician.” In the
comparative case of the United States vs. Germany, this concept was most useful in
highlighting the effects of institutional rules on elite recruitment. In the case of the
Bundestag, the “natural experiment,” the concept is again useful in evidencing the
indirect effect of institutional rules on elite recruitment through vocational choice. Using
the concept of active-politician as an independent variable now promises to show to what
extent this concept is able to predict a politician’s behavior as compared to the other
predictors.

In tables 5.2.3 and 5.2.4, I present the results from the regression analyses for the German
case. The independent variables at hand were those for ideology, the active-politician
concept, and the institutional difference based on mandate.153 All three variables predict
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differences in social, economic, and political behavior. In the multiple regression
analysis, however, ideology is significant in only one of the tests. Noteworthy is that the
difference between left and right is least significant in these OLS tests, which predict
years spent in a certain function. The ideological distinction between left and right is in
the German case therefore not as pronounced as in the American case.154

Table 5.2.3. Beta Coefficients for legislators’ age when entering the national legislature for the first time,
number of years spent in their respective vocations, years spent in state and local offices and in the national
legislature, and number of children.
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3 Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Age In
Years in
Years in
Years in
Years in
Children
Legislature Profession Local
State
Legislature
Office
Office
Right
‐.11**
‐.05
.04
‐.09
.08
.05
AP
.13**
.27***
.12**
‐.03
‐.13**
.15***
SMD
‐.02
‐.002
.12**
.09*
.11*
.09*
R2
.02
.06
Model Fit
3.52*
13.39***
* ≤ .05 ** ≤ .01 *** ≤ .001

.04
8.42***

.01
2.26

.02
5.63***

.04
8.79***

In the one case, where ideology is significant, in the case of the variable that measures the
age a politician enters into the Bundestag, being right predicts one to be younger than
being left when entering the Bundestag. The actual means are 43.1 years for politicians of
153

To avoid multicolinearity, I measured the Spearman rho rank correlation coefficient for the independent
variables. They are presented in the table below:
Right
AP
SMD

Right

Correlation
Coefficient

1.000

.392**

378**

AP

Correlation
Coefficient

.392**

1.000

.141**

SMD

Correlation
Coefficient

.392**

.141**

1.000

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two‐tailed).
154

The Beta-coefficients for ideology (Right) are, in the same order for models 1 through 6, as follows for
the House of Representatives: -.06, .16**, -.11, .01, -.222***, .16**.

206

the left, and 41.9 years for politicians of the right. Thus the actual difference is not too
great. Yet in this regard, it is interesting to see that the statistical reverse is the case with
the active-politician concept. There, active-politicians enter the Bundestag at a later age
than passive-politicians. Recalling the theory, the idea was, that since passive-politicians
live by politics, they would enter the highly paid offices as early as possible. Thus
economical distinctions, in the form of vocational choice, are more determinative in
pushing entrance into national politics to a later age than ideological distinctions.

Table 5.2.4 Odds ratios for legislators’ likelihood for having served in the military, having been married
(or widowed), having children, having served in executive office, and for having a relative who had been
elected into political office.
Model 7
Model 8 Model 9
Model 10 Model 11
Military
Being
Having
Executive Relative
Service
Married
Children
Right
3.28***
2.10***
1.19
.49**
1.04
AP
1.43
1.25
1.52
1.40
1.99
SMD
1.80**
1.19
1.04
.80
.82
R2
.15
.06
Model Fit
60.27*** 25.28***
* ≤ .05 ** ≤ .01 *** ≤ .001

.02
6.76

.03
11.47**

.01
.77

In the case of the logit models, different results are visible. In the case of the multiple
regressions, the active-politician concept was significant in most models, while the
variable for ideology was significant in only one case. Now, with the logistic regression,
the active-politician variable is not significant in any model, while the variable for
ideology exhibits stronger predictive power. The direction of impact, even though in most
cases not significant, is in all models as expected.
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5.3 Analytical Summary

The statistical tests revealed substantive practical insight into the recruitment processes of
the Bundestag and the House of Representatives. These tests furthermore confirm that the
concept of the active-politician is not only a valid hypothesis, but that utilizing economic
choice has strong explanatory power with regard to explaining elite recruitment. The
hypothesis that the American electoral rules for candidate nominations and campaign
finances are more favorable for active-politicians was confirmed, in that significantly
more active-politician personality types are to be found in the House than in the
Bundestag.

The statistical tests also confirm the hypotheses and theoretical propositions made in the
previous chapters. In conjunction with Sartori (1997: 15), I had stated that my research
offers the opportunity to empirically verify whether different institutional settings for
elite recruitment actually produce empirically verifiable different recruitment patterns.
Indeed, accounting for ideology and culture, it has been shown that candidate nomination
rules and campaign financing rules affect elite recruitment, as is seen in the variation of
active-type politicians in Germany and the United States, and within the Bundestag on
the basis of electoral mandate (SMD vs PR).155

155

Thus the proposition that patterns of legislative recruitment can be measured and observed in an
objective way is confirmed, too.
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I formulated the hypothesis that more active-type politicians would be found in the House
of Representatives than in the Bundestag. I explained this by stating that due to the
existing candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules, self-selection is a
more viable pathway into politics in America than in Germany. I also stated that these
active-politicians would exhibit a sharp difference with regard to their sociological
background in comparison with passive-politicians, these hypotheses were supported by
the data.

In chapter two, I had stated that the combination of increased relevance of national
politics in the United States and the decreased ability of American party-elites to regulate
entrance into politics would lead to the rise of entrepreneurial-type active-politicians. In
comparative perspective, there are indeed more active type politicians in politics in the
United States than in Germany. Yet to thoroughly validate such a hypothesis, I have to
enlarge the data set and include previous congresses to not only test the hypothesis in
comparative perspective but also to assemble data for time series tests.

With regard to the hypothesized prevalence of active-politicians in American politics, my
explanation was that the requirement for a candidate to build his or her own campaign
organization and fund it, is an enterprise that works best for experienced entrepreneurial
types, while other groups would be less likely to have the same type of faculties. Indeed,
in the House of Representatives, which is elected through candidate nomination rules and
campaign financing rules that are favorable for active-politicians, significantly more
active-type politicians are represented than in the Bundestag.
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For practical political purposes, the most important finding of this statistical research is,
however, the immense discrepancy between Germany and the United States when it
comes to the value of local politics and of state politics as pathways into national politics.
While in Germany, local politics is the pivotal point for a political career, in American
politics the pivotal point is in state politics. The candidate nomination rules and campaign
financing rules for the national legislature can be used to explain this interesting and
hitherto unknown phenomenon. I investigate these average trends in more detail in the
following chapter.
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CHAPTER 6 – THE ELITE RECRUITMENT PROCESS FROM THE ELITE’S
PERSPECTIVE

So far in this study, I explored theoretically and analyzed statistically the effects of
institutional rules pertaining to candidate nominations and campaign financing. To
further corroborate both the qualitative and quantitative findings of my research and thus
to increase its explanatory power, I conducted interviews with members of the Bundestag
and the House of Representatives. My epistemological goal was to substantiate my thesis
and verify the statistical findings. The interviews are therefore not only la petite histoire
but they offer systematically gathered data on particular politicians’ career paths. To this
end, I conducted fifteen interviews with members of the Bundestag, covering all political
parties represented in the German national legislature. With regards to the American
House of Representatives, interviews were conducted with five Representatives, four
Democrats and one Republican.

To set up the interviews, I contacted all Bundestag members with an interview request,
and included with the request a list of questions I intended to ask in the personal
interview. Despite the fact that the interview requests were made for the week before
Christmas, i.e. the last week of parliamentary session for the year 2012, I was granted
about 20 interviews. Some of these interviews were however cancelled on short notice, as
roll call votes interfered with the scheduled appointment. A few more interviews were
conducted in the district offices of Bundestagmembers later on. In the case of the House
of Representatives, each representative’s office (specifically the scheduler) was contacted
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again with an interview request. This time, the response rate was significantly lower than
in the case of the Bundestag. Thus I made additional requests, including to the chief of
staffs. In total, each office was contacted four times over the course of the year 2013,
each time contacting the schedulers and chiefs of staff separately for an interview request.

The interviews in Germany and in the United States followed the same schemata.
Questions were asked with regards to campaign financing rules and candidate nomination
rules. This approach allowed the interviewees to talk about the subject matter, revealing
very interesting and informative aspects on elite recruitment. Through follow-up
questions, detailed narratives were given and crucial nuances were disclosed. In all, the
interviewees were asked to consciously differentiate between their particular
circumstances and generally applicable observations.

Most interviews lasted for about three quarters of an hour and where conducted in the
Reichstag and on Capitol Hill (a few were done in legislators’ district offices). In the case
of Representatives, some interviews were conducted by phone and followed otherwise
the same structure as the in-person interviews. All interviewees agreed to the interviews
being recorded. In the following, I will lay particular emphasis on pointing out the
differences and commonalities between elite recruitment in Germany and the United
States as well the theoretical relevance of the statements made by the legislators.

On the basis of the theoretical assumptions made in the previous chapters, I expected
from the interviews with the German legislators an intimate acquaintance with the
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procedural details of the candidate nomination process, while the campaign finance
regulations would be largely extrinsic and rather unfamiliar to them. Thus I predicted that
the nomination process and the financial aspect are separate concerns for the German
politician. Based on the preceding theoretical discussion, the opposite expectation exists
for American politicians, i.e. the nomination process and campaign financing are
conflated into one issue.

The next hypothesis I formulated based on the theory was that the nomination is always
an internal party affair in Germany. While I accepted that there could be variation with
regards to which party circles are involved in the nomination process, they would always
be internal party matters. Thus the politician would be able to anticipate what to expect
and whom to deal with in the nomination process, and thus entrance into politics would
be calculable. The average American political aspirant in the meanwhile is expected to be
more attentive to his rivals and the electorate rather than the party. Consequently, there
would be more unknowns in the U.S. case.
Another expectation based on theory was that the German legislators are intimately aware
of the institutional setting they have to work in. Additionally, both for the nomination and
the campaign process, German politicians would closely work with and within the party.
The expectation for the American politicians was that they are detached from the party
and create and work with their own campaign and political infrastructure. The last
hypothesis derived from theory was that in Germany, campaign funding and fundraising
are a function, fused between the candidate and the party. In the United States, in
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contrast, fundraising is largely done by the candidate, organizationally and logistically
separate from the party.

In the rest of this chapter, I will systematically present the results of the interviews. First,
I discuss the interviews in Germany, and then the ones in America. Note that thereby
information that applies to all parties within a political system, information that applies
only to one party, and information that applies to one particular candidate will be mixed.
However, I will point out to what extent an observation is generalizable and when it is
not. At the end of each country section,156 I will provide a theoretical review and analysis
of the interviews, to underscore the theoretically pertinent aspects of the interviews. In
each party section, the two issues of candidate nomination and campaign financing are
analyzed separately.

6.1 Interviewing German legislators: Nominations as a party affair?

One point that was mentioned by Peter Beyer (Mettmann II),157 and which applies to all
Bundestag members, is the strong legal injunction against announcing incumbency when
it comes to fundraising. Bundestag members may not ask for donations as Bundestag
members. This means that if they contact constituents, it cannot be conveyed that the
156

An extensive analysis of each case from the same party may produce redundant evidence, as information
repeats itself from party to party. Thus in the descriptive party sections, analysis is provided that is
pertinent and case specific. Otherwise, the analysis of the evidence in light of the theory and hypotheses is
done in the specifically designated sections.

157

Elected in a single member district with 39.8 percent of the vote. The interview was conducted on
12/11/2012.
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person asking for money is an incumbent Bundestag member. A letter, flyer, or poster for
the purpose of raising donations cannot indicate that the person asking for funds is
currently in the Bundestag. Thus, it is forbidden to use the abbreviation MDB (Mitglied
des Bundestags), meaning member of the national parliament, using the logo of the
Bundestag, or official letterhead when contacting donors. The candidate is only allowed
to indicate his party affiliation. Even during verbal contact with constituents, when
fundraising, the candidate is not allowed to indicate that he or she is a member of the
Bundestag. Furthermore, the candidate does not know who in his electoral district is a
member of his party. The party is not allowed to provide the candidate with a list of party
members, which would allow him to contact them and raise funds.158 Instead, the
candidate has to be passive and has to be approached by party members, who then will
provide their information to him for future reference.

A third point is that money may not be given to the candidate directly. Instead, supporters
can only make donations to the party. For this, they have the option to give either to the
federal party organization, the state party organization, or one of the several local party
organizations. If giving to the local party (for example the Kreispartei), it can be done
with the annotation that it should be used for the (re-)election campaign of candidate soand-so. Money given to the party for the campaign of a particular candidate, which
remains unused by election day, remains with the party. Furthermore, money donated to
the party does not necessarily have to be used just for the election campaign. It is at the
158

However, it was mentioned off the record that there are ways and means to acquire such lists of party
members.
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discretion of the party leader to use donations at his will, unless they are specifically
designated for a particular candidate. Lastly, only donations to the party are tax
deductible. Donations given to a candidate directly are not tax deductible, besides being
in the gray zone of potential corruption. The German electoral rules simply do not foresee
direct contributions to candidates nor foresee that candidates might actively solicit
donations.

6.1.1 Christian Democrats

CDU legislators, who hold an SMD seat, appeal directly to local businessmen as part of
their fundraising effort. This is essentially the only fundraising done by the candidates
themselves. Otherwise, the local party raises money. For this, the local party uses
member dues as well as donations by party members and sympathizers. A particular
aspect thereby is that there are several local party entities within an electoral district.
Thus there exists the Kreisverband, Stadtverband, Ortsverband, etc., who all contribute
to the campaign fund. They do this so on the basis of a formula, which requires each local
party to provide a certain amount of money on the basis of its membership size. The
amount mentioned by the several CDU interviewees for a campaign for an SMD seat
reached from 30,000 Euros to 100,000 Euros.
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In the case of MDB Willi Zylajew (Erftkreis)159, the expense for an election for a direct
seat was given at 70,000 Euros. Of this, twenty thousand would be provided by the
Kreispartei, the district party. Another twenty thousand would come from the several
Stadtverbände, the parties in the municipalities. The remaining thirty thousand would
have to come from the candidate, either by using his own money or through campaign
donations. About half of such donations are of small amounts. MDB Dieter Stier
(Burgenland-Saalekreis)160 said that in his first unsuccessful run for the Bundestag, in a
single member district in East Germany, he financed it mainly with his own money (with
a total of 35,000 Euros); “money poured down the drain,” as he put it.161

Stier also pointed out that there are people committed to the party, committed to its cause,
who readily donate when approached. One call or a letter is sufficient to receive their
support. Otherwise, a good method for raising donations was said to be through personal
conversations. In the end, financial support would almost completely rest in one’s
district, through either donations or support from the local party, while support from the
state party was insignificant, and from the federal party nonexistent.

In the case of Peter Beyer, where the total campaign expenses were about 50,000 Euros,
ten thousand of this sum was the politician’s own money. The vast majority of the rest,
159

Elected in a single member district with 39.4 percent of the vote. The interview was conducted on
12/20/2012.

160

Elected in a single member district with 33 percent of the vote. The interview was conducted on
12/12/2012.
161

In den Sand gesetzt was the metaphor in German.
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about three quarters, was said to be from donations to the campaign, mainly from local
businesses. Beyer mentioned that Germans do not like to give directly to politicians. He
explained this by stating that asking for donations for political campaigns is culturally
perceived as something “anrüchig,” broadly meaning objectionable, cheeky, and sleazy.
It becomes evident therefore, that besides institutional rules pertaining to campaign
financing, cultural aspects and the people’s mentality with regards to the handling of
money are crucial, too.

All CDU interviewees mentioned that the financial contribution from the federal party
(Bundespartei) was negligible for their campaigns. The national party provided mostly
material support (flyers, pens, balloons, etc.) rather than money. The bulk of expenses
was met by the local party and by the candidates themselves. One peculiarity of German
politics is that Bundestag elections are generally held in late summer/ early fall. Hence
fundraising by the candidates is conducted and completed in the previous year or the
preceding summer at the latest. Thus fundraising and campaigning are clearly separated
in Germany.

Another peculiarity of the German system is that different elections (Bundestagswahl,
Landtagswahl, Kommunalwahl, Europwahl) can be held in the same year, the same
month, or even on the same day. When this happens162, the fundraising opportunities for
candidates are noticeably diminished. Since the circle of donors for each party is limited,

162

Called Superwahljahr in Germany.
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the donors are approached by the different candidates for the different elections in a short
time. Therefore, those candidates whose election is latest in an election “season” have
difficulties in raising funds.

With regard to the candidate nomination process, the interviewees agreed unison that the
national party does not interfere in the nomination process for SMD seats (with rare yet
noteworthy exceptions). Since almost all of the CDU’s legislators gain their Bundestag
seat in single member districts, the nomination process for SMDs is the important
nomination process for the CDU. The list nomination procedures for the Bundestag are
less significant for the CDU. The state party lists are a type of insurance for SMD
candidates who lose in their district. Thus pure state party list legislators are an extreme
rarity in the CDU.

The candidate nomination process in the CDU is generally a local matter.163 The way
candidates are nominated locally can be divided into two processes. A candidate is either
determined through a Delegiertenwahl or through an Uhrwahl. In the Urwahl, all
members of the party are invited to participate in the nomination of the district candidate.
In the Delegiertenwahl, all members of the district party are invited to elect delegates,
who then choose the candidate. Recall that being a party member means that one has to

163

Since no national or state law exists that regulates how parties nominate and finance their candidates, it
is left entirely to the parties to do so. The national parties, in turn, leave it entirely to the discretion of the
state parties on how to determine their state party lists. Furthermore, the way candidates are nominated for
SMD seats is left to the local parties. Thus a wide variety of nomination procedures exist, which differ from
party to party, from state to state, and from district to district within a state.
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apply for membership, which can be denied. One also has to pay membership dues. If
that is not done, participation in the party decision making process is not possible.

One mode for nominating candidates that is becoming more and more popular within the
CDU is the Urwahl. At the Urwahl, all members of the party within the electoral district
are entitled to vote, as mentioned earlier. In the case of the state of Baden-Württemberg,
for example, all nominations are done through Urwahlen.164 Another mode for
nominating candidates is the Delegiertenwahl. In this case, the nominee is chosen by
delegates. A wide variety of procedures exists here as well. This variety is due to the
variation in how electoral districts are organized. An electoral district can be concurrent
with a local party district. Or, what happens more often, an electoral district overlaps with
several local party organizations. In this case, the different local parties have to
coordinate their nomination procedure according to factors such as membership, financial
strength, and/or electoral support for the party.165

In the case of the Urwahl, a Mitgliederparteitag166 is held. All members are invited to
gather (which can be described as a type of caucus) and vote until a candidate is
nominated with a majority vote. In the case of Josef Rief (Bieberach)167, about a thousand

164

In German this is called basisdemokratisch (basis referring to the base of the party, i.e. the membership).

165

It is important to note that nomination procedures can vary from party to party within an electoral
district. To give one example, in the particular electoral district for Beyer (CDU), the nomination occurs by
Urwahl. Yet the SPD nominates in Beyer’s district by delegates.
166

Literally meaning “members’ party day.”
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CDU members out of a party membership body of about 1,700 attended the caucus.
There were five contenders for this particular seat, which was vacated by a retiring
incumbent. One of the candidates had crossed the party lines from the Greens to the
Christian Democrats. Another contender was the mayor of a town in the electoral district.
Rief, who won the nomination, was a member of the Kreistag, which can be described as
a rural county council. Rief was furthermore Kreisvorsitzender, which means the party
chair of one of the local party organization within the electoral district, for a decade. At
the third ballot, Rief eventually gained a majority of the votes and was nominated. While
about two thirds of the party members joined the caucus for the initial nomination for the
vacated seat, only one third showed up for his recent renomination for the elections in fall
2013.

Describing his background, Rief pointed out that he entered the Junge Union, the youth
organization of the CDU, at the age of eighteen. He was an entrepreneur, a small business
owner for thirty years. As an entrepreneur, Rief trained many apprentices (Lehrlinge), a
very respectable function in German society. Rief also said that his party service was
beneficial for the nomination, yet that this long voluntary service was also an enormous
burden as he was simultaneously running a successful small business. This is a good
example for the Ochsentour, where one has to labor for a long time through the party
ranks, until sufficient recognition is achieved, and one is rewarded a higher, elected
position.
167

Elected in a single member district with 42.7 percent of the vote. The interview was conducted on
12/13/2012.
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At least in the case of the CDU, a nomination resulting from loyal party soldiering for
many years (if not decades) should not be seen as a granting of office by party leaders.
Rather, it is the result of years of party-work and the utilitarian name recognition
achieved thereby. By being active in the party apparatus, the members and delegates get
to know a potential candidate, and on this basis a nomination can be won. Thus a
nomination is axiomatically the result of exposure and reputation-building among a
comparatively small circle of local party members.

Rief agreed that influence-taking168 by national or even state party leaders in the
nomination process for single member district candidates is very rare, and if it occurs it is
“extremely” counterproductive. Even attempts to influence the process by local party
leaders are generally not helpful, as the party members value their independence in
choosing a candidate. With the following example, I will highlight this point.

Dieter Stier won the SMD nomination for the 2005 elections. Yet he lost in the general
election to the candidate from the SPD. He did not have a “safe” position on the state
party list either, thus he could not move into the Bundestag. For the 2009 elections, the
local party leadership, the Kreisvorstand, did not want him to be the nominee again.
Therefore, the leadership established a search committee (Findungskommission) to find a
new candidate. The committee picked a female state legislator as the candidate instead of

168

Influence-taking in the sense that senior party officials promote a specific candidate.
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him. At the Urwahl, however, the party members preferred him over her. At the
renomination convention for the 2013 election, Stier was again challenged, yet won with
over 90 percent of the votes.

Peter Beyer stated that the CDU members look for someone they personally know and
someone who has a record of being independent. A candidate has to be known for being
trustworthy and open to criticism. Having idiosyncratic and peculiar character traits is
seen as being advantageous as well. In the particular case of Beyer, he was the underdog
and came from outside the local party hierarchy when he ran for the CDU’s nomination
in his district. The favorite of the local party functionaries for the nomination was the
chairman of the CDU group in the city council of the largest city in the electoral
district.169 Still, due to the support of the party base, Beyer was able to win the
nomination through an Urwahl. At the Urwahl, each candidate introduced himself and
gave a speech. With this, the interviewee convinced the majority of the party members
and was nominated to be the candidate of the CDU in his district.

Zylajew mentioned in the interview sedulity, fidelity, and competence in a given area as
the decisive factors that earned him his first nomination. The party members want to
nominate someone they know and someone who has a reputation. Outsiders to a party
district are thereby confronted with the handicap that the party members do not know
how a politician would react in a crisis situation. This is why it is difficult for them to
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Fraktionsvorsitzender of the Stadtrat.
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gain nominations. It was emphasized that for winning the nomination in the single
member district, it is decisive for a candidate to manage to mobilize those eligible to vote
in the voting-district (Stimmkreis) through trust and reputation.

One rare exception mentioned by several legislators happens when a district is tendered
(andienen) by the party leadership (state and federal) to a prominent outsider or party
member. Zylajew gave the example of Norbert Blüm. Blüm, was a member of the
Bundestag from 1972 to 1981 and then again from 1983 to 1998. As a prominent member
of the CDU leadership, and the party’s Christian Democratic Employees’ Association
(CDA – Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft), Blüm became also minister for
labor and social affairs in the cabinet of Helmut Kohl. Thus Blüm became popular among
the industrial working class.

Yet Blüm, from Ludwigshafen, was a member of the CDU in the state of RhinelandPalatinate. Rhineland-Palatinate is a less urbanized and industrialized state, in
comparison to its neighboring states, especially in comparison to North Rhine-Westphalia
(NRW). Blüm would have been very useful to the CDU in NRW. Blüm could appeal to
the voting-base of the SPD, which consisted mostly of industrial workers. As a prominent
member of the CDU, representing the interest of labor, Blüm decided to transfer from his
constituency in Rhineland-Palatinate to North Rhine-Westphalia. In doing so, a new
parliamentary seat had to be found for him. Even though Blüm was well known nationwide, he was an outsider to the North Rhine-Westphalian CDU.
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Through informal channels, the general secretary of the German CDU reached out to the
chairman of the state party (Landesvorsitzende) to find a place for Blüm in NRW. The
chairman of the state-party, who had good connections to the CDU in Dortmund, was
able to win the party in Dortmund over to the idea of nominating Blüm for their direct
seat. Blüm was also given a top state party list spot, thus guaranteeing his election to the
Bundestag from NRW. After the successful transfer, Blüm became the head of the CDU
in North Rhine-Westphalia.

Another example given by Zylajew for the party leadership promoting a candidate was
the case of Jürgen Rüttgers. Rüttgers had been the state-chairman of the Junge Union, the
youth organization of the CDU. It was seen as necessary to promote him with a seat in
the Bundestag and introduce him to national politics. Yet in the home district of Rüttgers,
an incumbent already held the SMD seat, and had no intentions of relinquishing it to the
leader of the Junge Union. Again, a solution had to be found, and the state party
leadership sprang into action. The state party leadership got in contact with the CDU in
Leverkusen. The CDU in Leverkusen was asked what they thought of the idea of
nominating Rüttgers as their candidate for the direct seat in Leverkusen. In Leverkusen,
being a safe district for the SPD, the local CDU had nothing to lose by nominating
Rüttgers. The CDU in Leverkusen also did not have sufficient leverage in the state
convention to put one of their own onto a safe spot on the state list. Thus, they agreed to
nominating Rüttgers as their candidate to compete in their electoral district, and being
awarded with a safe position on the state list, allowing Rüttgers to enter the Bundestag,
and Leverkusen to have a CDU representative.
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As the examples given by Zylajew show, it is quite possible for the higher echelons of a
party to influence the candidate nomination process. Yet such interference is possible
only in special circumstances. Thus, as a rule, it is still possible to maintain the assertion
that interference by the party leadership is generally counterproductive. The state and the
federal parties’ financial support given directly to the candidates in their districts is
miniscule and negligible. The biggest support available is a personal visit to the district
by a prominent party politician. Thus Angela Merkel or a popular minister like Ursula
von der Leyen campaigning in a candidate’s district, is the most of support one can get
from the federal party.

Another point emphasizing the relevance and independence of the local party are cases
where incumbents were not renominated. In the case of the 16th Bundestag, the cases of
two CDU legislators were given as an example by Zylajew. In one case, Rolf
Koschorrek, a two-term Bundestag member for Steinburg – Dithmarschen South in
Schleswig-Holstein, was not renominated by his district party for the 2013 Bundestag
elections. The reason given was simply that the incumbent neglected his district, was too
aloof, and generally disliked. When on top of that the ancillary incomes from outside
politics170 of Koschorrek were made public, criticism of him grew in his district, and he
was denied renomination.

170

Nebeneinkünfte.
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In another case, Siegfried Kauder, representing the district Schwarzwald-Baar in BadenWürttemberg since 2002, and also the brother of the chairman of the parliamentary
group171 of the CDU in the Bundestag, Volker Kauder, lost his reelection bid in 2013 as
well. Again, a focus on politics in Berlin while neglecting the party at home backfired
and dissatisfaction with the incumbent caused loss of support.

Thus, it becomes evident that the local party structure cannot be seen as a docile and
subservient entity relying on the successful politician, but that indeed the opposite is true.
In German SMDs, at least the CDU politician relies completely on the party for support
and cannot take anything for granted. To this end, SMD legislators emphasize close
connections with the district party.

One way to sustain this close connection to the district is by providing constituents with
assistance and being approachable. Zylajew mentioned that his Berlin office receives
approximately 1,500 visitors every year from his district. He also helps about 400
constituents annually with issues they have in their dealing with the German equivalent
of the Social Security Administration. A practical example for constituency service was
given with the case of a voter whose fence was constantly damaged by passing traffic, so
the constituent wanted to replace the fence with a stonewall. To help him with his petition
to the local township, he appealed to the legislator, who personally showed up to inspect
the situation. This dedication impressed the constituent and the neighbors. Zylajew stated

171

Fraktionsvorsitzende.
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that such personal service is most valuable, as word-of-mouth propaganda of how the
legislator personally showed up and dealt with the situation spreads quickly in the
neighborhood. But he said that this was his personal style, and that different modes of
drawing and maintaining support exist.

One example of a different approach to maintaining constituency support was provided
by the case of Wolfgang Bosbach. Bosbach has strong support among CDU members in
his district in Bergisch-Gladbach. Bosbach, representing the conservative wing of the
party, acts frequently as a maverick, voting against the party line. In recent years he
continuously voted against the measures of the government bailing out other Euro-Zone
members. Bosbach is criticized for this by the party leadership, including Chancellor
Angela Merkel. Yet it was said that the more Bosbach is criticized by the leadership in
Berlin, the more support for him in his constituency grows. (Bosbach won his
renomination with 98 percent.)

Related to these observations, one of the interviewees from the CDU pointed out that
nominations and renominations depend, among other things, on sheer luck, too. If a
candidate simply has a bad day at the renomination convention and gives a bad
performance, he can lose it. Two examples were given for this recently happening for the
2013 election cycle.

Another issue, particularly interesting for observers of American politics, is the issue of
raiding. In the case of the state party lists, raiding is not possible due to the controlling
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power of the party leadership. (See more about this below.) Yet in the case of the district
nominations, raiding is possible. Josef Rief from Baden-Württemberg mentioned that in
his district, 200 people joined the party immediately before the nomination convention.
Considering that out of 1,700 local party members, only about a thousand come to the
nominating convention, just 200 new caucus members who support a particular candidate
can have an effect.

6.1.2 Christian Socials

The CSU, the Christian Social Union (Christlich Soziale Union), is called the “sister”
party of the CDU. Legally, the CSU is an independent party from the CDU. The CSU is
as different an entity from the CDU as it is from the SPD. The connection between the
CDU and CSU is limited to the common caucusing172 in the Bundestag. Only on the basis
of a gentlemen’s agreement does the CDU not “open shop” in Bavaria, while the CSU
limits itself to Bavaria.

The CSU is the only party in the Bundestag whose entire parliamentary group consists
only of representatives from single member districts. Thus, there are no legislators of the
CSU who entered the Bundestag via the Landesliste. Besides this, the CSU (despite
recent setbacks) dominates politics in Bavaria – local, state, and federal. One
characteristic of the CSU is the pronounced independence of both, the local party
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Fraktionsgemeinschaft.
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organizations from the state party, and the independence of the CSU legislators from the
party leadership in Munich, not to mention Berlin. These specifics in the party structure
of the CSU, of having a local party organization that is quite independent of the central
party, is mostly due to the rural-conservative nature of the state of Bavaria.

Ulrich Lange (Donau – Ries)173, ousted an incumbent of almost 20 years in the
renomination process for the 2009 federal election. The incumbent did not merely give up
the fight, but fought hard for his reelection bid. The reason why this upheaval was
possible was that in the 2008 state election, the CSU lost its majority in the state
legislature for the first time in 50 years. The incumbent, being associated by voters with
the electoral failure and the party establishment that was blamed for the loss, lost support,
and was ousted. It was emphasized that the entire nomination process was entirely a local
and regional matter, without any interference from the CSU in Munich.

Lange, having missed the nomination in the first round by just one vote, won in the
second round a majority of the 160 delegates at the nominating party caucus. Lange said
that he used the 2008 state election failure, which caused a general upheaval inside the
party, to seize the strategic opportunity to win a seat in the Bundestag. That winning the
nomination of the CSU equals winning the seat in Bavaria is understandable, when
considering that the interviewee has a forty percent advantage to the first runner up from
the SPD.
173

Elected in a single member district with 52.6 percent of the vote. The interview was conducted on
12/12/2012.
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The nomination caucus in this particular district (called Bundeswahlkreisversammlung) in
Bavaria consisted of 160 delegates, who represent two and a half174 district, regional
party organizations (Kreisverbände), which consist of numerous local, precinct parties
(Ortsverbände). Translating this procedure into the American case would be like this.
There are Republican Party organizations (Kreisverband) for Miami, Fort Lauderdale,
and Palm Beach. Each of these regional parties has its local party organizations
(Ortsverbände, e.g. for Miami, one in Downtown, one for Bay Harbor Islands, one for
North Miami, one for Pinecrest, one for Kendall, etc.). The electoral district (Wahlkreis)
consists of the entirety of Miami and Fort Lauderdale, while only the southern third of
Palm Beach is part of it, while the rest is part of another Wahlkreis to the north. Thus
only the Ortsverbände from the southern third of Palm Beach would send delegates for a
Kreis-convention, where delegates would be picked for the final caucus for the entire
electoral district.

The individual party members, after meeting the candidates, go on to elect a number of
delegates in their respective Kreis. These delegates of the several Kreise come together
and elect from among themselves delegates for the district caucus, where the candidate is
finally chosen. At this district caucus, the voting is done in secret, and delegates can vote
for whomever they want. While the delegates are not bound to any particular candidate,

174

The territory of one local party organization includes two different electoral districts.
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the previous name recognition achieved is crucial in gaining and maintaining their
support.

In the case of Lange, he and the four contenders for the nomination (including the
incumbent) visited the different local parties and introduced themselves. Lange had the
advantage of name recognition. He had been the chairman of the CSU in the Kreistag for
ten years. Lange expanded this name recognition by directly addressing local party
members and by introducing himself to the party base in the district. This was necessary,
as the individual party members are key in the nomination process.

Campaign financing was no significant issue for the CSU candidate. CSU seats are safe
seats. In the case of the Lange, no other party had ever won that seat. Thus the funds used
for the campaign are entirely local. They are provided by the local party organizations
and a significant proportion of the funds come from Lange himself.

6.1.3 Free Democrats

Politicians of the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei) enter the
Bundestag in their entirety through state lists. The FDP has no tradition in electing direct
seat candidates. While the CDU and CSU politicians who were interviewed downplayed,
indeed negated, any influence taking by the higher echelons of the party hierarchy, in the
case of the FDP, the story was different. The federal party was seen as generally having
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very little influence on the candidate selection process, but this was different for regional
and state party office holders (the Bezirksfürsten and the Landesvorstand).

In most German states, state parties have an intermediary organizational structure
between the state party and the regional/local party. This is called the Parteibezirk. These
organizational units represent historical and geographical regions that comprise the state.
In the case of the FDP in North Rhine-Westphalia, as an example, there are nine Bezirke
(and about 60 Kreisverbände, and more than 200 Ortsverbände). The heads of these
Bezirke, the Bezirksvorsitzende (district chairmen)175 come together in conference and
create a list with candidates for the Landesliste. This state list is then passed on to the
state party leadership (Landesvorstand). The leadership can make changes to the list, like
changing the position of a candidate. The board can also add names to the list or remove
them. In the end, the board ratifies the state list. At this stage, about 40 persons are
involved in creating the state party list.

Only at the next stage is a broader group of party members involved. At the state delegate
caucus (Landesdelegiertenkonferenz), delegates, elected in the different Bezirke, ratify
the list, position by position. Candidates who are not on the list can stand to be elected by
the delegates for a position on the list, replacing the originally proposed nominee. Thus,
the delegates can – de jure – reshape the list created by the party leadership, or accept the
proposed list.
175

The interviewee referred to them as Bezirksfürsten as well, which literally means “district-princess.” It
could be translated as district-bosses, due to the latter term being more familiar in the terminology of
American politics.
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In the interview with Otto Fricke (Krefeld I – Neuss II)176, who was the chief whip as
well as the treasurer of the FDP, it was said that until the 1990s, the influence of the party
leadership was much stronger than it is now. Until then, the party leadership, including
the national party leadership, would set up the state lists and the delegates would follow
these proposals. Since then, the leadership has lost power. Especially the federal party
leadership in Berlin has no say whatsoever in nominations anymore. Indeed, it has
become counterproductive if the federal party leadership involves itself in the nomination
process.

One reason given for this change by Fricke was that delegates are now better informed.
They know more about the candidates. Through technological changes, delegates know
more about individual candidates, while previously they would have to rely on “filtered”
information. Filtered information meaning that the delegates would only know what
either the party leadership or the candidates disclosed to them.

With regards to the voting behavior of delegates, i.e. what they are basing their decisions
on, Fricke described it as cue-taking. They look at how other delegates intend to vote. In
this process, a nomination with at least 80 percent of the votes of the delegates at the
nominating caucus of the state party means that the politician is generally accepted
among the party members. If a candidate receives less than 80 percent of the votes, it
176

Elected on the FDP’s state party list for North Rhine-Westphalia. The interview was conducted on
12/27/2012.
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means that the candidate “has done something wrong” and has lost the support of the
party base.

Fricke pointed out another peculiar informal rule in the nomination procedure, namely
the Golden Rule of state caucuses: “What you don’t want to happen to your district, do
not do unto other districts.” Delegates represent one of the several Bezirke (Regionen in
other parties). Thus only the success of the candidate from their respective Bezirk is
relevant to them, and they are theoretically free to vote for anyone else once their
nominee has secured a list position. That such anarchy does not occur after all is due to
the fact that if delegates from one Bezirk do not honor the gentlemen’s agreement with
the delegates from other districts, then the nomination of the candidates from their own
district will be jeopardized.

Another point is that the delegates vote on each position on the state list individually.
Thus delegates can vote someone else in and thereby replace a name on the state list with
the name of someone else. There could be a politician who was not put onto the state list
by the state party leadership. Or there might be an incumbent, whose name was on a low
list position, meaning that he might very well not be reelected. At the state caucus, he
could appeal to the delegates, who could vote him in to a higher list position.

Yet there are several reasons why it is very unlikely that things like this happen at the
state caucuses. For one, the Golden Rule means that if delegates vote for someone other
than the designated person on the state list, the designated person and his supporters will
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have to find a new spot on the state list. This in turn creates conflict with yet another
designated candidate for the list position. Thus even the change of one list position can
easily have a ripple effect on other list positions and bring the entire state list into
disarray. The delegates therefore refrain from behaving in a manner that would
antagonize other delegates.

It is not only the potential disorder and chaos that prevents state lists from being changed
at the state caucuses. Fricke furthermore pointed out that the delegates already have made
up their minds for whom to vote for when arriving at the caucus and that they would
hardly be swayed to switch their support. Thus an eloquent, charismatic speech at the
caucus would not change the voting decision of the delegates.

6.1.4 Social Democrats

The interviews with the SPD legislators were very useful in that the information gained
corresponded with and corroborated the theoretical expectations of the passive-politician
model. In particular their recruitment patterns are illustrative for the theoretical model. In
the case of Christoph Strässer (Münster)177, the incumbent Bundestag member announced
his intention to retire. The SPD party chairman in the district of the retiring legislator
announced his candidacy for the vacated direct seat, and so did Strässer. The ensuing
selection process was an entirely local affair. In this process, the selection criterion for
177

Elected on the SPD’s state party list for North Rhine-Westphalia. The interview was conducted on
12/13/2012.
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the successor was that he was most likely to receive a high position on the state party list,
as the district was not a traditional SPD stronghold and the election in the single member
district race was not likely to be won.

During the nomination procedure the four candidates for the seat of the retiring legislator
introduced themselves to the SPD members in the electoral district. The electoral district
encompassed six urban-local parties (Stadtbezirke). Thus six separate events were held
where the candidates introduced themselves at meetings that were attended by 50 to 100
SPD members. At the final nomination convention, about 400 members out of
approximately 1,800 attended the nomination caucus and voted for Strässer.

In the case of Kirsten Lühmann (Celle – Uelzen)178, a prominent member of the SPD,
Peter Struck (former defense minister) intended to retire and started to look for a suitable
successor for his seat. He approached the local party officials to see if they could
recommend someone. By then Lühmann, who had become one of the first female police
officers in the 1980s, had achieved name recognition with her (unsuccessful) bid to be
elected county commissioner (Landrat). Thus the retiring incumbent was made aware of
her, and chose her as his successor. With this endorsement, she then introduced herself to
the several local party leaders and convinced them to support her candidacy. Only then
did she introduce herself in a last step to the delegates. The entire nomination process was
then a “top down” procedure.

178

Elected on the SPD’s state party list for Lower Saxony. The interview was conducted on 12/13/2012.
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Lühmann pointed out that this procedure, where a candidate is introduced and
promoted179 by a senior party member, is typical for the SPD. A potential candidate has
to impress a senior party official first, prior to launching a candidacy. Being a self-starter
and self-recruiter was described as not being a viable option. Since major elected offices
are very much sought after, it was explained that it is crucial to have the backing of party
seniority, who could tell the party members, “Hey, listen to what she has to say!”

Lühmann furthermore pointed out that in the SPD, in order to be put on the state party
list, one has to first gain the district nomination for an SMD seat. For women, however,
exceptions are made. If a woman cannot gain the nomination in a district, she can still be
a candidate for the state party list. Thus efforts are made by the party to achieve
descriptive representation. If not enough women earn a seat nomination, then women are
added to the state party list. This is done per a “zipper mode” (Reißverschlussprinzip),
where man and woman have to alternate on the state party list.

There are different ways the state party lists are created. The SPD state party list in the
case of North Rhine-Westphalia is a combination of the list proposals of the leadership of
the four regional parties (Regionalverbände).180 The state of North Rhine-Westphalia is a
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Such promoting is, nonetheless, not a peculiarly German thing. As Justice Clarence Thomas says it more
generically, it is important to have someone important, a “pivotal person,” as a mentor in life, that can
“help” someone rise (Viaud 2011).
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large state with more than 17 million inhabitants. The four regional parties all create their
own respective party list proposals, which then are combined with the list proposals of
the remaining regional parties. This process of combining the four lists, which are put
together by the local party elites, involves just the state party elite, the national party has
little or no say in it.

The procedure for creating the four regional candidate lists is that a regional convention
is held, where the local party leadership comes together to create a candidacy list. In the
case of one of the four regions, western Westphalia, the local party leadership from the
respective

Kreis-

and

Ortsverbände

(Siegerland,

Olpe,

Märkischer

Kreis,

Hochsauerlandkreis, Hagen, Ennepe-Ruhr, Bochum, Unna, Hamm, Dortmund, and
Münster) sent, proportionate to their membership, delegates to the regional conference
(Regionalausschuss). The key criterion for being nominated at this stage is having been
loyal to the party, in the way it was described in the theory of rewarding the Ochsentour.

As for the fact that the national party has no say in the matter of nominations, one
interviewee assessed this as a bad thing. “Berlin” (i.e. the national party), should have a
say in the nomination process for promoting “specialists” into national politics. Such
specialists, who might not be able to convince the lower echelons of the party to
nominate them, might still be valuable in national politics. It was also lamented that
legislators who “made a name” with their work in the Bundestag and were important to
180

The four regions in North Rhine-Westphalia are: Western Westphalia, Eastwestphalia-Lippe,
Middlerhine, and Lowerrhine.
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the national party lose renomination battles, since the local and/or state party did not
regard their work as being important to the interest of the state party.

With regard to the state party lists, the consensus among the interviewees was that in the
absence of the federal party influence, the state party influence is very strong when it
comes to the top positions on the list. At this stage, the state party leadership can, as it
occasionally does, promote party outsiders for the sake of having a prominent person
among its ranks. The party leadership also pays attention to having candidates at the top
of the list from the rural areas. The rural areas are more conservative and it is unlikely for
SPD candidates to win in single member plurality elections there. The only way for the
SPD to have representatives from these rural areas is then by placing politicians from
these regions high on the state list. Other than these interventions of the state party
leadership, the delegates at the state party convention are free to vote as they want.

The issue of influence-taking by the national and state party in other cases was described
by Lühmann as being a double-edged sword in that it can backfire on the promoted
candidate. Thus prominent people at the top can say occasionally that they need suchand-such a person in Berlin. Yet in circumstances where the local party members have
their own favorite who was pushed aside, they will abstain from supporting the new
candidate. In such cases, Lühmann stated, it is quite common that local parties may
withhold their support for a candidate (and even an incumbent), if they are not “on fire”
for him or for her. Yet the German candidate is dependent on such support from the local
party members. Unlike the American candidate, the German candidate does not have his
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own campaign staff. Thus the German politician relies on the support of the local party
members for a successful campaign.

Consequently, in the case of the SPD, the role of state party officials and of éminences
grise can be decisive in the nomination process. A call from an influential person to the
party functionary who creates the list can put someone’s name at the top of the list. Yet
this process is secondary to winning the nomination in one’s own district first. Recall that
the SPD has the informal rule that only if a person has won the candidacy in a district will
he181 be also considered for a state party list. On very rare occasions is this rule not
followed.

One prominent example given by Lühmann was that of Gerhard Schröder in 1998.
Schröder had no single member district candidacy.182 After he became the candidate of
the SPD for chancellor, the only path into the Bundestag for him was via the state party
list. Yet due to the success of the SPD in the SMD districts, only one spot on the state-list
was allowed to be “pulled” into the Bundestag, which was Schröder’s spot. If just one
more SPD candidate in Lower Saxony had won his direct seat, Schröder would not have
been elected into the Bundestag in 1998.

181

This requirement does not apply to women.

182

Schröder was the prime minister of Lower Saxony and had not participated in the candidate nomination
process, which occurs generally in the winter before the election.
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With regards to campaign financing, the interviewees pointed out that this matter is partycentric. The SPD has a scheme, in which legislators give from their salary a thousand
Euros a month to the national party. The party invests this money and makes it available
to the local party during elections. This contribution is called “solidarity contribution”
(Solidaritätsabgabe) This contribution is an informal agreement among the SPD
Bundestag members. Legally it is a standing order, albeit not legally enforceable. Similar
contributions are made to the state and local party as well.183 These contributions are
given back to the local parties for Bundestag elections and defray about 80 percent of the
costs that accrue during the Bundestag elections.

The remaining 20 percent of campaign expenses is met by donations from local
businesses and credit unions (Volksbanken) and by the candidate himself. Such
fundraising is not seen as a burden on the legislator, as it is drawn out over the course of
the legislative period. This fundraising was characterized by Strässer as being an
indicator for how well the legislator is connected in his region. If a candidate or
incumbent cannot receive a significant amount of donations, it is regarded that that
person lacks support in his district. This perspective does not apply to all SPD legislators,
as in some districts, the SPD does not accept donations from corporations as a principle.

To give another example, Kirstin Lühmann explained that in her case about 10 percent of
the campaign finances are met by the federal party. Forty percent come from the local
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In the case of Röspel, he was giving 350 EUR per month to the state party.
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party, which are the membership dues. Another 10 percent is her own private money. The
remaining 30 percent are donations, mostly from corporations184 and from unions (if the
politician is either a member of the union or holds a position in Berlin that is important
for a union).185

All interviewees concurred that campaign financing for individual candidates in the SPD
is generally a local matter. Neither the state party nor the national party makes
contributions to local expenses nor do they have the means to limit the availability of
finances. First, most of the expenses are defrayed from local sources. Second, it would
draw negative attention if funds were withheld from a candidate for no other reason than
maverick voting behavior and in an attempt to punish him for that.

There is also little or no money to give away to begin with. The taxpayer money given by
the state to the SPD national party organization for election purposes is used entirely for
the national campaign. The Solidaritätsabgabe, the funds accrued from the legislators’
salary deductions, is distributed on top of that evenly among local parties. The local party
is then the only place where it is decided how much and how to spend money for the
local campaign.

184

Who thereby have a contact person in Berlin.

185

In the context of the unions, it was mentioned that the unions in Germany have no influence whatsoever
on the candidate nomination process in the SPD. The given reason for this was that the German unions are
ideologically very heterogeneous. This statement conflicted with the assessment of both CDU and Linke
politicians.
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Based on these factors, campaign financing is not seen as a critical issue in the electoral
process by individual SPD candidates. The interviewees agreed that when they decided to
enter politics and were nominated for a Bundestag seat, they neither knew how to finance
this endeavor, nor did they mind this. Rene Röspel (Hagen – Ennepe-Ruhr-Kreis I)186 put
it this way. “When I became a candidate, I did not know at all how to finance a
campaign. I didn’t mind the financing at all.”

Another SPD member of the Bundestag, Ingrid Arndt-Brauer (Steinfurt I – Borken I)187
pointed out that without the German candidate nomination and campaign financing rules
being as they are, a person like her could not have successfully entered politics. As a
mother of four, she had no money to spend for campaigning nor was she well connected
either in the local party or in the community after devoting her time to her family. Thus
the only way she was able to prevail against her rivals in the nomination process was that
party seniority provided her with patronage, which elevated her above the much better
connected contenders. Later on in the general election, it was again the party’s support
that helped her win.

186

Elected in a single member district with 43 percent of the vote. The interview was conducted on
13/12/2012.
187

Elected on the SPD’s state party list for North Rhine-Westphalia. The interview was conducted on
12/11/2012.
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6.1.5 Greens

Valerie Wilms (Pinneberg)188 entered politics with the expressed intention to become a
professional politician. She actively sought party work to increase her name recognition.
She did this first by doing party work in the state189 and later by partaking in national
party work. Party work was described as meetings of party members where particular
issues are discussed. Based on this, Wilms acquired name recognition, and was able to
stand for election. The financial aspect during this process was seen as completely
negligible.

The reason given by Wilms, for why statewide name recognition is decisive for a
successful nomination in the case of the Greens was that the candidate has to find support
from delegates who come from throughout the state. Thus a focus on one’s own district is
not enough. The national party’s role in this selection process is generally irrelevant.
Partaking in statewide working groups is a good way to achieve statewide name
recognition and support. Insofar as delegates change frequently, it is not sufficient to gain
name recognition among them. Instead, one has to have name recognition among the
statewide party members from among whom the delegates are recruited.

188

Elected on the Greens’ state party list for Schleswig-Holstein. The interview was conducted on
12/12/2012.
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In so called Landesarbeitsgemeinschaften, which are state-wide working groups.
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In cases where the party leadership tries to influence the delegates to vote for a specific
candidate; these attempts backfire most of the time, since the delegates are keen on
maintaining and asserting their independence from the leadership. This attitude was
characterized as being typical for the Greens. With regards to other parties’ practice,
Wilms stated that their state PR lists are “arranged in backrooms” by the state and local
party leaders and then the delegates vote on such prearranged state list en bloc. Among
German parties, only the Greens were described as being different with regards to the
complete openness of the nomination process at state caucuses.

Wilms described this process as an “open fight” for each position on the state party list,
since the Greens are “basisdemokratisch.” Basisdemokratisch is a popular term in
German politics, denoting that the party is organized from the bottom (“basis” = base) up,
rather than from the top down. It was therefore characterized as being very difficult if not
impossible to circumvent the process of acquainting the party-members with oneself
through party work. A stellar performance at the state party convention would not
substitute for years of party work.

There are a number of elements of the Greens’ candidate nomination procedures, which
have these basisdemokratische features. One is the rule that after two terms in elected
office, an incumbent has to be renominated with at least 75 percent of the votes of the
delegates and not the usual 50 percent. After two or three terms in office, the party base
and thus the delegates become more “unruly” with the incumbent. The party base is seen
as preferring rotation in office rather than political careerism. Another peculiarity of the
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Greens is that uneven numbered positions on the state party list are open only to women,
while for even numbered positions both men and women can compete.

Campaign financing was described as being of no concern at all to Wilms. The campaign
is largely conducted by the party. The candidate may campaign too and can use
predesigned posters of the party on which she can put her photograph. Such posters and
flyers must be paid for by the individual candidate. Only the party-generic “modules” are
paid for by the party. All individual advertisement costs are paid by the candidate herself.
The local party may defray such costs if they want to.

Fundraising for such individual expenses does not exist, since the individual candidate
cannot issue receipts to donors, necessary for tax deduction purposes. Thus while gifts
can be accepted by candidates, these gifts are not tax-deductible. Since only the party,
local, state, or national, can issue tax deductible receipts, donations are purposefully
channeled away from the individual and towards the party. Consequently, the campaign
expense of about ten to fifteen thousand Euros that have to be met for a Bundestag
election is primarily an issue that is dealt with by the local party and not by the candidate.

6.1.6 Die Linke

The interviews with members of the Bundestag from the Linke reveal a divergent
candidate nomination process. While differences from state to state exist among all
German parties, the differences within the Linke are more prominent and noticeable than
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differences within other parties. Differences between the state parties in the West and in
the East are the greatest divide. While in the state parties in the West the influence of the
party leadership is seen as being miniscule to nonexistent in the candidate nomination
process, in the East the party leadership (party heavyweights like Gregor Gysi) have
substantial personal authority.

This situation is typical for leftist parties, and the same praxis applies to the SPD, where
influential party members can promote individual candidates. An exception to this rule
arises if the candidate who is promoted by the leadership challenges a local politician
who has strong support among the local party. Then it is up to the local party leadership
to decide if the nomination is given to the promoted outsider or to the local favorite.

The nominations for state party lists are attended by delegates. In the case of Raju
Sharma (Kiel)190, treasurer of the Linke, there were one hundred delegates representing
one thousand party members at the state caucus. In Sharma’s case, when he ran for the
Bundestag for the first time, he made his candidacy for position number two on the state
party list. He had to compete with twelve other contenders for this list position. In the
ensuing process Sharma and the other contenders went to local party meetings (about 15)
throughout Schleswig-Holstein, where each candidate introduced himself to the party
members for about five minutes. This introductory round was followed by Q&As. (This
praxis exists with the Greens and Pirates as well.) The only cost associated with this
190

Elected on the Linke’s state party list for Schleswig-Holstein. The interview was conducted on
12/12/2012.
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nomination process was payment for transportation. Otherwise no costs accrued by being
a candidate for the Bundestag. Upon his nomination, Sharma had again no concerns with
regards to campaign financing. The party assumed all responsibilities and expenses for
the campaign and defrayed all costs connected with it. Sharma noted thereby that the
party leadership191 determines how the money is spent. It is up to the candidate and the
local party to spend additional money. Yet this is not expected, and if it is done, it is
asked that the additional campaigning be in line with the “corporate design” of the party.
Most of additional money spent is for posters featuring a picture of the candidate. The
national party itself refrains from campaigning with the photographs of individuals. In
their political campaigns, the Linke emphasizes “issues rather than persons.”

When it comes to the nomination of candidates, it was said that the national party has, in
certain circumstances, the ability to promote a candidate. When it comes to the opposite
however, the prevention of a candidacy, it was said that the national party has no ability
to do so, provided that that person has support in his district or within the state party. In
the interviews, several examples were given for this practice of promoting a candidate.
One example was the case of the former judge at the Federal Court of Justice of Germany
(Bundesgerichtshof), Wolfgang Neskovic. One of the most prominent party members,
Gregory Gysi, approached him and offered him a seat in the Bundestag with the Linke.
The aim was to increase the prestige and competence of the Linke in the Bundestag. Once

191

In the American usage of the term, party leadership denotes Congressional leadership. In Germany, the
term denotes the organizational leadership of the party, which is not necessarily connected to the Bundestag
leadership.
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Neskovic accepted the offer, the party leadership sought a district for him to be
nominated in.

Stefan Liebich (Berlin)192 gave the example of Hakki Keskin, a so called “community
leader.” In this case, the chairman of the party, Lothar Bisky, approached Keskin and
asked him if he would be interested in going into the Bundestag for the Linke. As a
Turkish community leader, Keskin was to function as a token Turk in the Bundestag.
After Keskin accepted the offer, Bisky’s next step was to find for him a place to get
elected in. Coincidentally, it was Liebich who was approached by the party chairman and
asked to abstain from a candidacy for the Bundestag and leave his spot on the state party
list to Keskin, so that he could get elected. Liebich did so and let Keskin get into the
Bundestag in 2005. By 2009 however, Keskin had lost the support of the party
leadership. Without their support, Keskin was not renominated on the state party list and
no district accepted him as a candidate.

The entrance of Liebich into professional politics was notable in itself. When East and
West Germany were united, the governing party of the East, the Socialist Unity Party of
Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) changed its name to Party of
Democratic Socialism (Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus, PDS). Many of its old
cadres resigned from politics, which created a unique political opportunity for regular
party members. Rank and file members were actively recruited into high party positions
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Elected on the Linke’s state party list for Berlin. The interview was conducted on 12/12/2012.
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and to elected office. Thus it was easier in the PDS to make a political career in state and
national politics, as the void of the resigned senior party members had to be filled.
Liebich, who was a student in 1995, was approached by the party seniority and directly
asked if he would like to stand for election for the Berlin legislature. Thus Liebich was
actively recruited into politics. Liebich did therefore not undergo the Ochsentour, but
entered the Bundestag relatively quickly. The most relevant factor thereby was that he
had the support of both the state party and his local party organization (Bezirksverband).
When Liebich was nominated for the first time, he had the support of his local party. The
state party, however, supported another candidate for his spot. Yet upon the insistence of
the local party leadership, the state party backed down and accepted him to be the
nominee for the particular spot on a state party list.

The national party leadership has the power to influence the nomination process in order
to promote a specific candidate. This power is, however, limited to the East. In the West
of Germany, it was said that intervention in the nomination process was quite impossible
due to the “chaotic” nature of the nomination process in the West. This is why the
examples of Keskin and Neskovic, as legislators who were “recruited” by the party, had
their seats in the East.

Yet be it East or West, nominations are done by delegates. The interviewees explained
this as a better practice than having candidate nomination caucuses where all party
members are allowed to participate. Such basisdemokratisch nomination procedure was
said to be more democratic, but only upon a cursory view. In reality, such nomination
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caucuses are only attended by a small number of members. Thus the candidate who
makes “the most telephone calls” wins and thereby the apparently more democratic
caucus is seen by Liebich as being less democratic and a less desirable method of
candidate selection than through nomination conventions with delegates in attendance
and participating.

In the case of the Linke, campaign financing was seen as not an issue at all for the
candidates. All campaign expenses are met by the party. Liebich mentioned that in
contrast to his American colleagues, who would tell him that they “spent 75 percent of
their time on the phone begging for money,” he would not solicit a single cent from
anyone. He stated that donations, in particular donations from corporations are “wrong,”
since they would beget control. Donations would come generally from party-members.
Occasionally, party-members who die would bequeath their inheritance to the party.
Otherwise, the Linke was said to receive little support. In particular the unions were
described as being on the side of the SPD, as well as giving smaller support to the CDU
and the Greens. Yet the unions would not financially support the Linke “at all,” and
politically they would give the Linke only marginal support. This, despite the fact that
many unionists get elected to the Bundestag through the Linke.

The way the Linke finances itself was described by Sharma as being one half from state
funding and the other half through member contributions. For the latter, Bundestag
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members were required to give 1,100 Euros of their monthly salary to the party.193 All
other party officeholders, ministers, members of state legislatures, county commissioners,
etc., would also give a certain portion of their salary to the party. All this money is
centrally collected by the national party, who then decides how to allocate and spend it.
While certain strong state parties also have their own funds, local parties were seen as
having little financial resources of their own. The conclusion of the interviewee was that
in Germany “one has not to be rich to go into politics. One only has to be nominated.”

6.1.7 Analysis of the German case

One noticeable feature of the candidate nomination procedure in Germany as evidenced
in the interviews is the small number of persons involved in it. For single member
districts, the number can be as low as a few dozen of people from the local party. Thus
the selectorate has a certain degree of knowledge about the candidate. In the case of the
state party lists, the delegates still have a considerable degree of knowledge about the
candidates. Considering the praxis of the leadership promoting and placing their favorites
on the state party list, familiarity is a key factor in the candidate nomination process.
Such powerful role of the party leadership in the form of metaphorical gate keepers was
evidenced in the interviews. Several of the interviewees had been recruited and promoted
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This voluntary practice exists for all parties represented in Germany. The amount of the contributions
vary however.
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by party elders. These cases are good examples for the theory presented in the first three
chapters. Additional examples for this practice were provided in the interviews as well.194

Another peculiarity of the nomination process in Germany, and an example for an
informal rule, or rather informal practice to be more precise, is the praxis of the
“telephone massage.” Due to the numerically manageable size of the selectorate, and the
relevance of personal relationships in the candidate nomination process, candidates have
the opportunity to contact the selectorate on the advent of a nomination convention, and
reassure themselves of their support.

What has become apparent in the interviews is the ability of the party leadership to
recruit candidates to achieve descriptive representation or to increase the prestige of the
party. Yet the example of Hakki Keskin shows that if such support is withdrawn, the
politician without his own support base in the party will also lose his renomination and
mandate quickly.
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Cemile Giousouf has become the first token Turkic member of the Bundestag for the CDU. The
motivation for her nomination was to “show that the CDU is a political home” for minorities as well. Such
token representation (rather than actual descriptive representation) was possible since the leader of the
CDU in North-Rhine Westphalia, Armin Laschet, promoted her and even found a place for her candidacy
(http://www.cdu-hagen.de/21-aktuelles/archiv/425-nominierung-giousouf). During the state party
convention where Giousouf was to be nominated for a safe state party list position, the party rank and file
opposed the leadership’s decision. Since Giousouf did not undergo the Ochsentour, more senior, more
veteran party members protested openly against the preferential treatment of Giousouf, pointing out that
they had spent many years in party work and thus deserved a nomination more than Giousouf did
(http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article114500565/Migrantin-fuer-Merkel-ueberstehtKampfkandidatur.html).
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With regard to raiding, it has to be said prima facie, that this is in the case of Germany a
real possibility. Keep in mind that renomination conventions are conducted with a low
attendance rate of a few hundred party members in Urwahlen, and therefore raiding is a
possibility. Yet there are noteworthy constraints. To become a party member, one has to
first apply for membership, which can be denied. Then, a party membership means
paying dues. Lastly, one cannot be a member of another party. The interviews
accordingly showed that raiding, in the American sense of the term, does not happen.
(The only example provided in the interviews was that sympathizers of a party member
joined the party to support that member’s candidacy.)

The interviews also displayed the phenomenon of the Ochsentour, where political
careerists purposefully become members in a party and actively engage in party work to
build a resume and to increase name recognition. Thus political capital built up to a
certain level can be used to stand for election. This political careerism is detached from
one’s financial resources and fundraising capabilities. What counts instead is one’s
performance in the specific milieu of the party insiders.

With regard to campaign financing rules, the interviews show that campaign financing is
either literally not an issue at all, or where it is an issue (mostly with single member
district candidates), it is typically resolved in the year prior to the election. Thus the
German political aspirant does not have to worry about finances for the success of his or
her political career.
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6.2 Interviewing American legislators: Nominations as private business?
6.2.1 Republicans

Talking with Representative Tom Petri (Sheboygan – Oshkosh, Wisconsin)195, who has
been serving in Congress since 1979, the first point made was that congressmen are
“politically autonomous.” This autonomy was said to include both activities in the
constituency and work in Congress, since the party leadership “cannot control Congress
at all.” The explanation given was that the Founding Fathers specifically designed a
political system that would reduce the power of parties. Unlike in Germany, Petri said,
American politicians cannot “work their way in” to Congress through party service and
cannot be “awarded” with a seat. Instead, the way into Congress depends exclusively on
the individual’s abilities. The only way congressmen can be influenced in Congress was
said to be by “carrot rather than [by] stick.”

One reason why this autonomous behavior was said to be possible is due to each
congressman having his own “fundraising operation.” Additionally, Congress allocates
resources on the basis of seniority (such as offices) and thereby congressmen were said to
be much more “politically autonomous” than members of the Bundestag. Consequently,
Petri said that American “parties are a coalition, not necessarily an ideological coalition.”
In this coalition, he as the legislator is the one who supports the party financially and not
the other way around.
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The interview was conducted on 4/26/2013.
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Representative Petri said that in over three decades in Congress, he did not receive
funding from the party even once. Instead, it is the party who constantly solicits money
from him. “I thought parties existed to help candidates. It turns out I am always giving
them money. I give money to the state party, I give money to the Republican
Congressional campaign committee.” Going back to the carrot and stick metaphor,
financially the party has neither carrot nor stick.

Effectively, the one carrot the party has, according to Petri, is the committee assignment
procedure. Each party in the House has a committee that determines what the committee
assignment are, and the leadership picks the chairman for the respective committee. Yet
even in this case, the power of the leadership is limited.

Representative Petri gave the example of Speaker of the House Boehner, who removed in
December 2012 a number of conservative representatives from their committee
assignments. Boehner intended to punish them for their voting record going against the
leadership’s interests. Yet this punishment had little to no deterrent effect on these
legislators. “It didn’t seem to bother them and it made them more popular in their
districts.”

When then these legislators complained at the Republican House Conference, Boehner
said to them: “I hope you work your way back into our good graces.” The legislators’
response to this remark was indicative of the power relations in Congress. The ousted
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legislators responded: “Well, we hope that you work your way back into our good graces,
since we think you work for us.” Thus there is no clear top-down power structure within
the parliamentary group.

The independence of the American legislator derives from how the candidate nomination
rules and campaign financing rules allow him to act (i.e. vote), independently from the
wishes of the leadership. “The leadership can bring issues up, we can vote it down,” Petri
said. That is why the leadership counts the votes before they bring up a bill, and pull the
bill back if there is not enough support. The whips who inquire about a legislator’s vote
are, however, generally not told how the legislator will vote but rather in what direction
he leans.

Representative Petri mentioned that in one instance, he indicated that he would vote “no”
on a bill that the leadership supported. The whip organization then “called up people”
(head of a company and others) in his district and told them: “Tell your representative to
change his mind.” Thus the leadership “tried to brow-beat” him. Yet even this rare
occurrence of the congressional party-leadership trying to assert authority backfired.
Confronted with this fait accompli of the leadership, the legislator informed them that if
they ever did something like this again, he would never again tell them what his voting
intentions were and that he would “go maverick.” This was enough to intimidate the
leadership. “Please, please, we won’t do it again,” is how the representative characterized
the leadership’s reaction.
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Legislators are therefore quite independent of party pressures. Instead, and here a partisan
difference exists, extra-party political groups, self-funded and self-organized, are more of
a concern to politicians. In particular on the Democratic side, it was said, that such groups
have more of a say in the primaries than “Nancy Pelosi.” With regards to the Democratic
“average member,” industrial unions and public employee unions have more a say than
the party when it comes to a politician’s renomination, campaign financing, and
congressional behavior. Succinctly put, “If the unions support someone else, you’re
done.”

Thus asked what the function, the raison d’être of the party is, Representative Petri said
the party is there to “help organize politics at the national level somewhat, it helps to
provide a storyline so people can follow it like comics.” The way the party was described
was that of a service organization, “a defensive crouch,” which “holds the illusion that
they are in charge than really being in charge.”

In his district, Representative Petri faces, in relative terms, a weak party as well. Political
rivals, including some from the same party, arise as independent and autonomous
competitors. In the end, the legislator is less accountable to the party than to outside
groups (especially ideological groups in the case of the Republicans), as these groups are
the ones that “go after the candidates.”

This weakness of the party enables uniquely American political careers. Rather than
earning an elected political position based on party favor, people can enter (if they have
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the resources) electoral politics whenever they want to and on their own conditions and
not those of the party. One example that was given by Representative Petri was that of an
accomplished businessman from his district. His “kids were grown and he thought it
would be fun and interesting to run” for Congress and ran in the “next district over” and
got elected. Another businessman, Ron Johnson, from Petri’s district was “frustrated”
with the state of politics. He decided to run for the Senate and beat the incumbent Senator
Russ Feingold and won the seat. This independence of the candidates and of the
selectorate makes it difficult (if not impossible in most districts) for an incumbent officeholder to pick his successor. In neither case of the given examples, did the political
entrepreneur have to earn his spoils from the party.

6.2.2 Democrats

“You gotta run twice” is how the path into Congress was characterized by Danny Davis
(Chicago, Illinois)196. Referring to the primary and the general election, Davis described
the primary as being more important than the general election for a politician running in a
so-called safe seat (which most congressional seats are). The “primary is more important
for American politicians. For all practical purposes you are elected, except in a
competitive district,…a swing district.”

196

The interview was conducted on 4/25/2013.
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With regards to the local party, the congressional office-holder was seen as the “most
dominant person in the party.” The party is, however, not a “particular group of people. It
is the organized party apparatus…and registered Democrats.” This diversified status quo
is contrasted with the previous state of party power. “Chicago used to be totally
controlled by the party. When I broke into politics, if the party was not with you, you had
virtually no chance at all,” said Davis. The party was then synonymous with the
leadership. Yet “I beat the party when I ran, I consistently beat the party. I am not a party
guy, although I am a member of the central committee, which is the party apparatus.”

This apparatus is constituted of two persons (one man and one woman) for each district,
which on the aggregate makes up the state party. The committee members elect a stateparty chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary. These become the state-party apparatus
and these are the state-party offices. This apparatus used to have controlling influence on
nominations. Yet this is not the case anymore. Now, only the decision of registered
primary voters counts. Davis said that the party could support someone other than him,
but it could move the final decision on the nomination anymore.

There was a time, Davis said, when “you could not get elected if the party did not support
you.” In the present, however, there are on occasion “people who can break through the
party and get elected.” This is because the party does not have the power it once had on
the nomination and election process. Davis’ conclusion was: “It ain’t all about money,
but it’s a great deal about money.” Without money, someone who is a good speaker, is
charismatic, erudite, etc., can “rise to a certain level, but cannot win a major election” if
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he does not have money. If someone is already well known in the district, then money is
less of a concern than if a political aspirant is unknown and has to achieve name
recognition. Then, an incumbent can figuratively suffocate a rival (primary and election)
just with money. If someone has not enough money, then the “press would say he is not a
viable candidate.”

This is why fundraising is so important to American politicians. “Most of the time you
have to raise funds.” You have to have “fund raisers, cocktail parties, chicken dinners,”
Davis said.197 A candidate has to raise whatever funds he needs by himself. No one aids
him therein. Even in the case “where the party is sponsoring you, you still have to raise
funds.” The reasoning behind that is that “he who pays the piper, calls the tune.” If a
politician would accept money from the party, he would rely on the party and he would
be indebted to it. The constituency would not want that. If, however, someone from a
politician’s district gives him “a big, fat campaign-check,” then that is OK.

The constituency wants to think that their representative acts independently of the party.
On an individual basis, party leaders like Obama and Pelosi give money to people they
support. Yet there is no across-the-board financial support. Davis put it like this: “Money
begets control. People don’t want to be controlled – that much, that way. I don’t want
people to tell me how to vote.” The voters would not accept that Davis receives money
from Obama. They would ask what Obama is trying to do, “buying all the politicians.”
197

Representative Pastor similarly said that “fundraising is part of campaigning.” He conducts receptions,
breakfasts, and concerts for that purpose. Direct soliciting, from businessmen, associations, and nationwide
active PACs are part of this fundraising-campaigning effort as well.
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The electorate likes “the idea that you are making up your own mind, not that someone
else is taking care of you.”

Davis explained that campaign donations derive mainly from “self-interest” groups, and
in his case from lobbyists. These are lobbyists representing local, state, and national
groups. Since each person and interest group is limited to giving “little bits and pieces”
(USD $2,600 for the primary and general election each198), Davis says that he is not
dependent on any particular person or group. Since there are too many ways to get
caught, Davis stated that it does not happen too often that the legal contribution limits are
evaded. He also stated that often candidates finance their campaigns in such a way that
“many candidates do not use their own money” for elections. With such electoral and
financial autonomy, Representative Davis said that the reason why legislators still
cooperate in Congress within the party is that “out by yourself, you couldn’t get anything
passed.” Thus legislative achievement is the reason given for why congressmen cooperate
in a parliamentary group.

Representative Timothy Bishop (Long Island, New York)199, gave a twofold definition of
the American party and its functions. First, it is a “set of principles and of guiding
values.” Then, there is also the national party with his colleagues and the leadership, as
well as the local party. The local party is where he turned to first, when he intended to run
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The interview was conducted on 11/14/2013.
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for Congress. In a “pretty traditional” way, Bishop announced his intentions to the county
leader. He emphasized that he did not need his “blessings” for his candidacy. Next,
Bishop “touched base” with the party leadership in each of the seven townships in his
district on Long Island. In a third step, Bishop got in contact with the DCCC (Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee) to get their support as well.200

The support he received, Bishop described as get-out-the-votes campaigns, walking the
neighborhood, and running phone banks. Thus valuable, yet non-financial support was
given to him. As a candidate for federal office, the local party is precluded from
financially supporting his campaigning efforts. This federal law was said to “diminish the
impact of parties” on politics. The financial support for campaigning, the candidate gets
from individuals. In the two year period between elections, Bishop receives about 3,000
individual contributions, reaching from ten dollars to five thousand dollars.

Besides this group of financial supporters, Bishop also acknowledged the group of people
who support him electorally with their work. This group, encompassing “thousands,” is
much bigger than the financial supporters, and “move[s] from campaign to campaign”
with him. Some of these supporters “have a particular loyalty” to Representative Bishop,
some are partisans who support him as the Democratic Party candidate. Collating the
different sources of support, Bishop stated that having “grass roots support is vastly more
important” than the party structure. In three out of six congressional elections Bishop was
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The support received from the DCCC in the eventual general election was described as “considerable.”
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outspent by his Republican opponents. Still, he won the races, sometimes very narrowly,
thanks to strong grass-roots support. Illustrating for the mode of party-candidate
relationship existing in the United States, was the fact that Bishop had prior to his
announcement of candidacy for Congress no formal involvement with the party structure
in his district.

Regarding campaign finances, Bishop furthermore said that over the two year
congressional cycle, he spends about ten hours a week just for fundraising. Closer to the
election, this effort “goes up.” A last point made by Representative Bishop, which is
worth mentioning for the purpose of comparison, was his assessment that in the United
States, the “Democrats run with organized labor, Republicans run against organized
labor.” From this source, support in the form of votes, volunteers, and money is derived.

Another aspect of fundraising was emphasized by Representative Ed Pastor (Phoenix,
Arizona)201. Pastor pointed out the importance of establishing “relationships” with
donors. While anyone can run, not anyone can establish these relationships, which are
based on personality. Family connections were described as being of particular help in
attracting support. Representative Pastor pointed out that for a successful candidacy for
elected office, one does not have to have his own money necessarily, but at least “a
relationship with people who have money,” who are outside the party. While in the
primary process, the people with whom relationships have to be established for
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The interview was conducted on 12/3/2013.
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fundraising are characterized as partisans, in the general election money is solicited from
“everyone.” Accordingly, Representative Pastor stated that a prospective candidate has to
know people who have money before becoming a candidate for elected office. In this
context, the utility of the party is that it “introduces you to people who can help.”
Alternatively, being a member of a union or an association is helpful in fulfilling the
same fundraising function. Examples given were Emily’s List, which solicits money for
the candidate and can refer the candidate to potential donors. Another example given was
the National Firefighters Association.

Representative Pastor also pointed out the possibility that the party can recruit someone if
an incumbent has a “problem.” In this case, the party can support the recruited person by
helping him with managing the campaign and connecting him with donors. Yet as a
general rule, it was stated that the party does not want to get involved in the primary stage
by taking sides with one of the contenders.202 At this stage, the candidate has to have his
own money and his own people for campaigning.

Another peculiarity of the American nomination system mentioned by Representative
Pastor is the easiness for an outsider to use only the party label to run for office, without
being “part of a particular party and not getting support from the party.” The possibility
for every political entrepreneur to gain the “party banner” in the candidate nomination
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process, was described in the following manner by Pastor: “There,203 the candidate has to
be part of the party. Here they don’t” (sic.).

From a comparative perspective, it was interesting that Representative Pastor said that
“party soldiering can be rewarded, too” in America. “Persons can be supported with
manpower and financial resources. But that does not mean that they can keep anyone
out.” This liberality of American candidate nomination and campaign financing rules was
said to have a functional effect on Congress, too. “If you have the means, then you can
act independently from congressional leadership.” The “only saber” in the hands of the
leadership of the parliamentary group was, again, described as the committee assignment
process. Due to these discussed reasons, Representative Pastor described the American
national legislators as “independent contractors” – “You can run as a Democrat and not
be supportive of Obama.”

Representative David Price’s (Durham – Chapel Hill, North Carolina)204 assessment of
American party power was that while the “party machinery” is quite decentralized in the
United States, the party in Congress has “a more important and dominant role than” it had
“in a long time.” The Congressman equated the increase in party power with an increase
in the power of the parliamentary group leadership. As for the “party in the electorate,”
“party activists and issue activists” were seen to be the groups dominating the party. The
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The interview was conducted on 5/17/2013.
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“party establishment” was seen as having little or no control over these groups. Indeed,
Representative Price said that many of his colleagues would “run against the party” and
“deny their party,” paralleling a previous argument made by Representative Pastor. These
colleagues would call the party “almost an annoyance.” An example for such behavior
was said to be found in the “Blue Dog Democrats.”

Campaign financing was described as an individual, almost personal matter for a
Congressman. The rank and file Congressmen from “reasonably safe districts,” those
who are not on “target lists,” are expected to fund their campaigns entirely on their own.
Thus no party funds are expected or received. Those politicians in endangered districts,
however, would receive outside party support. Yet not only would this give the
leadership more sway with such candidates, but on the contrary these candidates are the
ones least in agreement with the party line.205 Thus there is “no correlation between party
loyalty and how much money they get.”

Representative Pastor commented in this context that the rank and file party members
(the registered Democrats who are most partisan and active in the primaries and
caucuses), tend to be those who donate very little to the campaign. The big campaign
donors are a different circle of people. As pointed out in the previous interviews too, a
dissonance is evident in American politics between those people who are responsible for
the candidate nomination stage and the campaign financing stage.
205

Since these candidates are in swing districts, meaning potentially Republican districts, this independence
is by default.
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The difficulty differentiating between the nomination stage and the financing stage (and
thereby the general election stage), mentioned by the previous interviewees, was evident
in Price’s statement that “fundraising is campaigning,” too. This process was described as
being done through “small-dollar fundraisers in peoples’ homes.” These events are
perceived as means for “reaching out to the community” and the place where “people are
activated” in the process.

The candidate nomination process was characterized as almost always being a local
matter. Two relevant factors for achieving success in this process were named. One point
for a successful nomination is achieving name recognition. A second point is getting the
support of activists groups, inside and outside of the party. The role of the party (i.e. the
“parliamentary group” leadership), becomes relevant and active only in those cases where
a viable candidate206 runs in a marginal district. Only then does the national campaign
committee come to the support of a candidate.

6.2.3 Analysis of the American Case

In the case of the congressmen, it was revealing that their understanding and/or usage of
the term “party” referred primarily to the leadership of the parliamentary group in
Congress. Only in this context does it become understandable why some legislators run
206

The definition of a viable candidate was said to be someone who had already raised significant amount
of money on his own, and who has good poll numbers.
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against the “party.” They do not run against the party in its generic, Weberian form. They
do not run against the brand identity of Republican or Democratic. When legislators run
against the party, they run against the legislative leadership. Thus the popular semantic
understanding of the “party” must equally be narrowly defined as the legislative
leadership instead of an external partisan structure.

The peculiarity of the American candidate nomination and campaign financing rules
become evident in the noted dissonance between the political participants who are active
in the candidate nomination stage and the political participants who are active in the
campaign financing stage. The ostensible different composition of these two groups
highlights that the American legislator has, paraphrasing Fenno (1978),207 two different
“circles” of supporters. Thus the American legislator has a divided loyalty and divided
accountability towards two distinct bodies of supporters.

The interviews also made clear that in the American case, the candidate nomination
process (and subsequent campaign process) and the campaign financing process are
conflated into one undertaking. To succeed in both the nomination and election, the
American politician has to constantly raise funds to meet the campaign expenses. Thus
the a priori menial task of fundraising becomes synonymous and indistinguishable with
the political campaign itself.

207

Yet the difference is based on function, and not the degree of support as in Fenno’s argument.
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Lastly, the interviews provided excellent examples for the active-politician model. In
particular the interview with Congressman Petri, and the examples he provided. In the
case of Ron Johnson, a citizen was “frustrated” with how politics was conducted and
wanted to change this. Thus, a politician who had a calling for office. He decided to run
for the Senate and beat the incumbent Senator Russ Feingold. A perfect example for
someone who wanted and could live for politics. Similarly, another accomplished
businessman from Petri’s constituency, who out of curiosity and interest ran for office,
was able to live for politics. His “kids were grown and he thought it would be fun and
interesting to run” for Congress and ran in the “next district over” and got elected. These
cases match perfectly the theoretical propositions of the active-politician.

6.3 Analytical Comparison of the American and German Cases

The interviews with the American congressmen and German members of the Bundestag
provide significant insight into the effects of candidate nomination rules and campaign
financing rules on the elite recruitment process. From a comparative perspective, the first
point to be made is that the cause for party cohesiveness in the legislature is different
between Germany and the United States. In Germany, the reason the legislative caucus
cooperates is to keep their reelection chances high. The legislators depend on the party
and the party brand.

In contrast, the primary reason why legislators cooperate in Congress is that they depend
on each other to get anything done legislatively. Thus the necessity to cooperate in the
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legislative process is the key incentive in the American case. While the party label is
significant too, American legislators are shielded from the party208 leadership by the
candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules. The party label has a different
functions; most legislators run in safe districts where a damage to the party label is less
likely to be advantageous to the political opposition. The party label or party banner helps
to identify a congressional candidate with an ideological camp rather than with a specific
group of politicians.

In the previous chapters, I hypothesized that while German legislators resemble a
followership in the sense of Max Weber’s theory, American congressmen are more like a
guild. The interviews validate this hypothesis, as the American representatives pointed
out that the party leadership cannot count automatically on the support of the party
caucus. Even in cases where the leadership wanted to assert its authority, it backfired and
was counterproductive. Thus the comparison with a guild is quite apposite.

This finding also confirms the hypothesis that a political system with many active-type
politicians would be marked by having weak political parties. As the previous statistical
chapter demonstrated, the United States has many active-type politicians. The interviews
showed, the American political party, either inside or outside of Congress, is weak in
historical and comparative perspective.

208

Being synonymous with the parliamentary group leadership.
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The interviews show that in Germany, the candidate selection process is a defining,
intrinsic function of the party. In contrast, the candidate selection process is entirely
removed from and thus extrinsic to the party in the United States. The only connection
the candidate nomination process has with the party is that the identifying label of the
party is used. Yet it cannot be said that the party in America has the same function as the
German party, which I demonstrated theoretically in Chapter 2. In this context, the role of
personality is different between Germany and the States. In Germany, the selectorate has
a comparatively close relationship with the candidate over a long time. This allows for a
certain degree of acquaintanceship. In contrast, the selectorate in the American case is
confronted with a marketed image and is more removed from the candidate.

Another theoretical expectation received evidence in these interviews, as well. It was
argued that until the Progressive Era, political offices were quite literally handed over,
but that this practice ceased since. In contrast, it was expected that this is still practicable
in Germany. In the German interviews, several examples were given where legislators
where directly picked by party superiors, and where party elites picked their successors.
In contrast, in the American case the interviewees regarded this practice as quite rare and
generally not practicable. (The one example given in the interviews was that of Daniel
Lipinski of Illinois.) In this context, informal rules (such as in promoting a candidate or
successor) are important in the German nomination process in influencing the selectorate.

The next critical distinction between the United States and Germany is that the decision
to run for office is made in the United States by so-called quality candidates on the basis
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of electoral opportunities that arise among the electorate (viz. electoral district), and
notably not within the party. In contrast, the political aspirant in Germany has to closely
observe what is going on within the party to find an opportunity to stand for election.
This is why there are uniquely American careers, as I said above when discussing
Representative Petri. The two examples given by Petri account for the fact that if
someone wants to enter politics, is an active-politician, and the conditions are right, he
can do it. In contrast, someone “bursting” into politics in the German case, would be
confronted with the obstacle of an established pecking order within parties, where other
people have “seniority” over him in getting a candidacy, irrespective of the qualities and
capacities of the political novice.

As mentioned above, the candidate nomination process and campaign financing process
are conflated into one process, one activity in the United States. These two activities are
functionally one and the same for the American politician. In comparison, the German
politicians emphatically distinguish between the two. Politicians of the left in fact define
the activity of fundraising as something “dirty” and as something that should not be part
of politics. The differences between German and American politicians are most
pronounced when it comes to campaign financing. While in the United States fund
raising is synonymous with political activity, in Germany it is seen by at least half of the
political spectrum as something apolitical and malign to the political process.

Based on the interviews, the following general observation can be made. The process of
fundraising is a permanent endeavor for American legislators. The metaphorical constant
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campaign is also a constant fundraising. In Germany, the process of fundraising is largely
contained to the year before the election. When the election season arrives, fundraising is
already done. Thus fundraising and campaigning are separate and subsequent processes.
In the United States, the two steps are conflated into one effort.

This difference is evidenced by another finding in the interviews, which is a powerful
example for the different political culture, if not worldview, when it comes to campaign
finances. In Germany, the opposition to fundraising was expressed in that by accepting
donations the politicians would be susceptible to extra political influence. Bringing in
money is something negative. In the American case, the opposite argument is made. By
accepting donations the politicians gain independence from the party. If the politicians
would get their funds only from the party, or indeed merely accept funds from the party,
this is seen as something negative. Bringing in money is something positive therefore. It
provides the politicians with freedom from their party. Thus a different perspective and
outlook on the task of representation becomes clear. In Germany, the legislator is the
representative of the party and thus should shun the influence of extra-party influence. In
the United States, the legislator is the representative of the constituency and thus should
shun the influence of the party as an entity outside the constituency. This is a very good
and clear example for how different political culture can be on a specific issue.
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Comparing the American and the German cases, a conclusion can be made that in the
United States a politician has two different circles of supporters209 to win over. First,
there are those people who will vote for him (nomination and election). Second, there are
those people who will financially support his campaign (nomination and election). These
two groups are separate in quality and quantity. In contrast, there is no such difference in
Germany. The politician does not have to cater to two different groups and thus two
different interests. If the politician gains the support of those who nominate him, no
separate and significant effort for fundraising has to be made. Thus fundraising is
campaigning in the United States and these two are completely separate in Germany.

Another notable difference between the two political systems is the role of unions. In the
United States the unions were described to be entirely on the side of the Democrat Party,
as there is no viable political alternative for them. In Germany, however, the influence of
the unions on the SPD was pointed out by politicians of all couleur. Yet the CDU has a
strong union arm, too. The Linke as well, has close ties to the unions. Thus the dominant
and decisive influence alluded to unions in certain Democratic constituencies is lacking
in Germany where the relationship between the unions and political parties is much more
polycentric than in the United States.

To sum up the differences between Germany and the United States with regards to
candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules, a dichotomous terminological
209

The role of outside groups in the nomination (and campaign) process in America, such as the ones’
mentioned by the interviewees (Firefighters, Emily’s List) has no equivalent in Germany.
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juxtaposition would be familiarity versus image. In Germany it is decisive that a
candidate has familiarity, and thus support of the small selectorate or even just one
influential person within the party. Such familiarity then assures the nomination of the
politician, and the finances are a mere formality. In the United States, it is image that is
decisive. The selectorate is not familiar with the candidate and thus he or she has to have
a certain image (be it true or not), and this image relies heavily on marketing and thereby
on the availability of funds. Consequently, the nomination process and campaign
financing are intertwined and mutually enforcing.

277

CHAPTER 7 – THE EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL RULES ANALYZED

Overview
I began this research by asking two fundamentally political questions. Do the institutional
rules for candidate nomination and campaign finance have an effect on elite recruitment,
i.e. on what type of people get elected? And, does it matter whether one or the other type
of people are in politics? On the basis of the empirical evidence given in chapters five
and six, the answer to both of these questions is, yes. Both the statistical analysis and the
interviews support the claim that the type of candidate nomination rules and campaign
financing rules in effect pose different incentives and have different demands on the
politician. These institutions can therefore be regarded as gatekeepers into politics. This
matters, since a different type of people with different backgrounds and life-experiences
will be in positions of political power. The following elaboration on this finding allows to
offer lessons and insights to practitioners of politics, who are interested in the
consequences of the institutional rules under which they act or which they design. I also
outline some limitations of the present study and point out where future political science
research can build upon this dissertation.

The key research problem of this dissertation was whether institutional rules pertaining to
how candidates for national legislatures are nominated, and how the consequent election
campaigns are financed, have an effect on elite recruitment. I wanted to know if different
rules would mean that different political personality types would end up in the national
legislature. The reasoning behind this argument was that certain political personalities
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will be more likely to prevail under a specific institutional setting than in another. With
this approach, I purposefully chose an institutionalist explanation to the political
recruitment process rather than a structuralist explanation.

I was able to answer this question by creating the necessary research design for this
problem. I selected the cases of the United States House of Representatives and the
German Bundestag to research the effects of candidate nomination rules and campaign
financing rules on elite recruitment in comparative perspective. I argued that these
institutional rules affect what type of political representation, what type of elite
recruitment is accomplished. I brought this hypothesis into operation by creating the
conceptual distinction of active-politician and passive-politician. Thereby, I distinguished
between political personalities living for politics and those living by politics. While this
notion roots in numerous previous theories, I operationalized this conceptualization for
the first time in a comparative way and conducted statistical measurements.

The argument I developed went beyond culture and ideology as explanations for elite
recruitment. It added a psychological dimension with the concept of the active and
passive-politicians to the cultural and ideological predisposition of a politician. This is
why I argued that variation in political personality types is a decisive factor in
understanding why someone enters and prevails in politics under particular electoral
rules.
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My argument did not, however, include a normative reasoning if it is better to have one
or the other type preferably in politics. Nor did I argue what the effects of one or the
other political personality type would be on the quality of democracy. Instead, I provided
a thorough explanation on what the difference in personality types is and how these types
manifest themselves. Based on previous literature, especially Max Weber’s work, I
argued that there are differences and that such differences matter. The scientific
assessment of the effects of active and passive-politicians on the quality of democracy
remains a phenomenon to be studied in further research. Yet the explanation provided in
this study can already anecdotally inform the reader.

To test the theory I used multiple approaches. First, I created an original large-N data set.
I used the cases of the United States House of Representatives and the German Bundestag
to observe the differences in elite recruitment at the individual level. To ensure that the
data set, and therefore this study, is expandable and replicable, I used the same
operational definitions for the variables used in the two data sets. Thereby I was able to
observe the political elite and statistically ascertain the different outcomes. The statistical
analysis was complemented by case studies of legislators from both countries that
analyze in depth their personal experience with the elite recruitment process.

Theoretical Findings
On a meta-level, my research was a test for the theory of institutionalism itself. The
dissertation showed that the basic argument of institutionalism, that institutions affect the
behavior of those who are subject to its constraints, is a correct assessment (Sartori 1997).
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More specifically, this study proved that variation in recruitment opportunities will favor
one type of political personality over another type (Loewenberg 1985: 35). Thus
institutions are important as explanatory variables, corroborating Zaller’s (1998) and
Rahat and Hazan’s (2001) hypotheses, stated in Chapter 1.

The statistical analysis in Chapter 5 showed that there are significantly more activepoliticians in the United States House of Representatives than in the German Bundestag.
In the sole case of the German Bundestag, the statistical analysis showed that active type
politicians are, as expected, more prevalent in the single member districts than on the
state party lists. In both cases, the statistical tests confirmed the theoretical predictions.

I also predicted that the conceptual definition of the active/passive legislator would have
strong explanatory power with regard to showing the effects of differing institutional
rules, i.e. that it matters to distinguish between active-politicians and passive-politicians.
Bringing this concept into operation, I was able to test my prediction against evidence
presented by data on the House and the Bundestag. I found that the active/passivepolitician distinction to be a powerful predictor for behavior and different life-experience.
The concept proved thereby to be helpful in identifying patterns within the elite
recruitment process.

The findings on the active/passive-politician concept have implications for the literature
on democratic quality, too. Having established that institutions can act as gatekeepers into
politics, the question from the democratic quality perspective is how this function of
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institutional rules as gate keepers is to be evaluated. The two possible options are that 1)
institutional rules were intentionally designed by their framers in such a way to weed out
certain types of people and advance another type of people. Or, 2) institutional rules were
designed without having in mind any gate-keeping function, which instead developed
over time, and people just live with it. In either case, both for theoretical and practical
purposes, a discussion of the effects of institutional rules on elite recruitment is
necessary.

Another finding pertains to the proposition that candidate selection is “one of the central
defining functions of a political party in a democracy” (Katz 2001: 278). Based on the
definition of “party” by Max Weber, this assessment can unreservedly be given only to
the German case, where a core partisan group selects the candidate. In the American case
the candidate selection process involves many participants, the party being just one of
them.

Based on the statistical analysis, the research question – whether institutional rules have a
demonstrable effect on elite recruitment – can be answered in the affirmative. In the
comparative case of the Bundestag and the House of Representatives, significantly more
active-politicians are found in the American system than in the German system.
Additionally, I reveal that state politics is a key prerequisite for a successful political
career in national politics in the United States, while in Germany local politics is the
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functional equivalent to this prerequisite.210 This last point constitutes a genuine
discovery of a hitherto unknown political phenomenon.

Political science theory is mute on this phenomenon of systemic differences between
state and local politics as prerequisites for national politics. While I discovered this
phenomenon through exploratory research, the explanation for this phenomenon of
diametrically opposed recruitment patterns between Germany and the United States can
be found in the theory I advance in this study. The candidate nomination and campaign
financing rules in the United States “force” or “guide” politicians to move into state
politics for having sufficient “clout” to launch a successful bid for national office. The
candidate nomination and campaign financing rules in Germany, in the meanwhile, allow
politicians to launch a successful bid for national politics on the basis of local office
service.

In the “natural experiment” of the Bundestag, evidence was given again that institutional
rules have the ability to “design” national politics. Thus, institutional rules, irrespective
of a normative evaluation for the purpose of the theory of democratic quality, can be
characterized as de facto “gate-keepers” into politics, even if they are de jure not
assigned such function.

210

The statistical evidence in Chapter 5 showed that even though Germany and the United States are both
federal systems, local and state politics have diametrically opposed functions for national politics in these
two cases. It is therefore most apposite to look for these patterns in other, comparable cases, which are
federally organized, such as Canada and Austria.
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Practical Implications
This study has important real world implications, too. The most consequential finding is
that even if a political entrepreneur has the same strategic goal of going into national
politics in Germany and the United States, he has to use different tactics to achieve that
goal. In Germany, the politician has to earn the favor of a specific group of people.211
These people, small in number,212 have to know you. For the politician, this institutional
setting is calculable. One can purposefully get to know party members and realize who is
active in the party. In the United States, the process is more ambiguous. A politician
needs money and advertising to be known by a wider group of persons. Very early on in
the nomination process, the American politician relies on public campaigning, while in
the German case a more private conversation suffices. Thus while in the United States it
is more about perception and image,213 in Germany the key element is convincing.
Additionally, the circle and the role of enablers, i.e. the people who enable someone to
become a professional politician, are different in the United States and Germany.

The circumstance that in the case of the United States the selectorate equals the electorate
makes the nomination process only apparently more democratic. As the interviews show,
in Germany everyone can literally afford to go into national politics. Someone “poor” in
Germany, can by dedicating time to the affairs of the party, become prominent and in that

211

Or even just with one person, as the interviews show, if that person has the ability to promote the
candidate with his or her influence.
212

A few dozen to a few hundred.

213

The term “marketing” comes to mind in this context.
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way earn his or her way into national politics. In the United States, this option is not
there, and thus, entrance into politics is more costly.214 Consequently, the German case
constitutes the case of “peer-review,” where fellow party members are “eyeballing” a
potential candidate. A narrow, clearly defined and known group of party-peers exists.
This group observes over a long time a person’s abilities, attachment to the party’s
ideology, and party loyalty and service. Consequently, the institutional rules provide for a
personal selection process, whereby the candidates are well known to the selectorate.

In the American case, such personal peer review is institutionally of much less
consequence. Instead, early on a politician has to advertise himself to a larger population,
where no familiarity exists. Through the presence of money, partisan peer review can be
bypassed. This makes the selection process more impersonal. Even though the personal
image of the candidate is highly relevant both in the primary and in the general election,
this personal image is a marketed and advertised image. It is thus of a different quality
than the case of Germany, where one has to set an example over time.215 The American
selection process is therefore much more impersonal.216

214

Following the aphorism, “Time is money,” cost is not only about financial means but also the ability to
afford spending time for political activity.

215

Through the Ochsentour, for example.
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The personal-impersonal differentiation in recruitment/ promotion processes between Germany and the
United States is noted in other areas, too. Van Creveld, for example, observes the same division in case of
military promotions (van Creveld 1982: 137). Culture, and political culture for that matter, have a strong
influence on selection processes.
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These practical differences, in who has to be won over for a successful candidacy, and
what type of resources have to be “invested” over what period of time, determine the
success of active and passive political entrepreneurs. The differences in the institutional
rules between Germany and the United States also point toward the differentiation of
people made by Weber, in that there are more people in American politics who can live
for politics. Practically, paraphrasing MacKenzie, American candidates assume more
“personal responsibility for securing the nomination” (MacKenzie 2011). Professional
personal marketing is of higher importance.217

For the practitioner of politics these findings might lead to a reevaluation of the candidate
nomination rules and campaign financing rules. Knowing that a specific type of people
end up ruling, the political elite could look for alternative institutional rules that would
favor different recruitment paths and patterns to bring different types of people into
politics. Venturing into this aspect of my finding which pertains to democratic quality,
would be a topic for future research.

Outlook
Besides the accomplishment discussed above, the results of this study lead to further
research questions. A key component thereby is to further investigate the comparative
effects of culture, ideology, and institutional rules on elite recruitment. Since my focus in
this study was on the effects of institutional rules, the effects of culture and ideology
217

Due to the significantly larger constituency sizes, this professional marketing is not only more relevant
in the selection process but in the election process as well.
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remained under-evaluated. In particular the results of the regression analyses in Chapter 5
show however, that in particular the predictive power of culture rivals that of institutional
rules. Methodologically novel approaches are needed to comparatively evaluate these
rival explanations. One way to improve such analyses would be to gather good quality
data on cultural characteristics at the micro-level.

Another topic for future research is to what extent the institutional rules I analyzed not
only shape elite recruitment, but to what extent they facilitate or prevent elite
replacement. What is meant thereby is to see – through a time-series analysis – if a
specific strata or type of people are recruited constantly into politics, or not. Thus when
politicians are replaced by other politicians, it is important to know if the politicians are
replaced by the same type of people. If the same segment of political personalities is
replacing the outgoing politicians, then only the “faces” change, while over time the same
political personality types prevail.

Yet another important task for future research is to extend the present methodological
approach to the analyzed phenomena with cross-sectional studies. In this first step, I
researched the cases of Germany and the United States. Other, similar cases218, can easily

218

Such as Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Austria, to name some. Thus new
discoveries on elite recruitment could be added to the knowledge in political science, and the gaps would
be filled.
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be added to the methodological “blue-print” I put forward here. By combining qualitative
and quantitative methodologies, as I did in this dissertation, the effects of institutional
rules on elite recruitment can be studied further to better understand the rules under
which we live. The replication of this study on the political class promises thereby to be
an interesting, useful, and productive field of comparative political science research.

State
52.3%
??
16.4%
Office
(Country codes are according to ISO 3166-1.)
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Appendix A: Vocational choice of German and American legislators.
GER

USA

Total

Judicial, Lawyer,
Judge

Count
% within
Country

65
10.1%

83
18.9%

148
13.6%

Administrative,
Bureaucrat

Count
% within
Country

59
9.1%

24
5.5%

83
7.6%

Parliamentary
work

Count
% within
Country

28
4.3%

27
6.1%

55
5.1%

Party work,
Union Work

Count
% within
Country

40
6.2%

4
0.9%

44
4.1%

Entrepreneur

Count
% within
Country

41
6.3%

69
15.7%

110
10.1%

Academic,
Science

Count
% within
Country

26
4.0%

7
1.6%

33
3.0%

Teacher

Count
% within
Country

64
9.9%

13
3.0%

77
7.1%

Medical

Count
% within
Country

11
1.7%

24
5.5%

35
3.2%

Worker

Count
% within
Country

34
5.3%

8
1.8%

42
3.9%

Politics, Activist,
Social Worker

Count
% within
Country

118
18.3%

101
23.0%

219
20.2%

Media, Journalist

Count
% within
Country

9
1.4%

2
0.5%

11
1.0%

Military

Count
% within
Country

4
0.6%

17
3.9%

21
1.9%
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Skilled Labor,
Engineer

Count
% within
Country

29
4.5%

4
0.9%

33
3.0%

White Collar,
Manager

Count
% within
Country

60
9.3%

32
7.3%

92
8.5%

Assistant,
Secretarial, Sales

Count
% within
Country

25
3.9%

2
0.5%

27
2.5%

Police, Law
Enforcement

Count
% within
Country

8
1.2%

7
1.6%

15
1.4%

Agriculture

Count
% within
Country

13
2.0%

9
2.0%

22
2.0%

Student

Count
% within
Country

2
0.3%

0
0.0%

2
0.2%

Houseman, ‐
wife,
Unemployed

Count
% within
Country

4
0.6%

3
0.7%

7
0.6%

Priest, Pastor,
Religious
Vocation

Count
% within
Country

4
0.6%

2
0.5%

6
0.6%

Artist, Sports

Count
% within
Country

2
0.3%

2
0.5%

4
0.4%

Total

Count

646

440

1086
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Appendix B: Educational background of German and American legislators

no High School

Higher Education
without graduation

FH, BA or Less

JD, LLM, Law

VWL, BWL, MBA,
Business Degree

MA, Diplom

PhD, Dr., Habilis

MD

Total

Count
% within
Country
Count
% within
Country
Count
% within
Country
Count
% within
Country
Count
% within
Country
Count
% within
Country
Count
% within
Country
Count
% within
Country
Count
% within
Country

GER

USA

Total

0

1

1

0.0%

0.2%

0.1%

26

15

41

4.0%

3.4%

3.8%

16

142

158

2.5%

32.3%

14.5%

108

160
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16.7%

36.4%

24.7%

49

19

68

7.6%

4.3%

6.3%

221

61
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34.2%

13.9%

26.0%

114

15

129

17.6%

3.4%

11.9%

8

20

28

1.2%

4.5%

2.6%

646

440

1086

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%
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Appendix C: Active/ passive politician distribution by party in Germany.

Active
Politician
Passive
Politician
Total

CDU

CSU

FDP

SPD

Grüne

Linke

Total

74

17

40

13

7

7

158

42.3%

44.7%

51.9%

9.5%

10.6%

10.0%

28.1%

101

21

37

124

59

63

405

57.7%

55.3%

48.1%

90.5%

89.4%

90.0%

71.9&

175

38

77

137

66

70

563

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100%
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